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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation addresses three important price judgments: price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation. Developed over three chapters, the main objective of this 
research is to determine underlying differences in these three price judgments. These differences 
are based on conceptualizing price fairness as a combination of affective and cognitive 
components, whereas price magnitude and price expectation reflect different cognitive aspects of 
price judgment. Chapter 1 provides a literature review and identifies several research questions 
related to these three price judgments; Chapters 2 and 3 provide testable hypotheses and conduct 
three pretests and two experiments to test the hypotheses. Using structural equation modeling 
and repeated measures ANOVA, the interrelationships, the antecedents, and the consequences of 
these price judgments are described and analyzed. Chapter 2 examines the effects of focal price, 
locus of control, judgment environment, and judgment/intent order on price fairness, price 
magnitude, price expectation, and purchase intent. Chapter 3 examines the effects of focal price, 
judgment environment, mood, and processing fluency on the three price judgments and their 
subsequent effects on purchase intent and anger.  
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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS AMONG PRICE FAIRNESS, PRICE 
MAGNITUDE, AND PRICE EXPECTATION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Marketing theories have expanded from axiomatic-choice theory and rational utility 
theory to behavioral pricing theory (Estelami and Maxwell 2004), which explains psychological 
implications of pricing by analyzing how price information affects consumer judgment and 
decisions. Exploring behavioral pricing, researchers attempt to understand how contextual and 
cognitive factors influence consumer price judgments, preferences, and choices. Contextual 
factors such as available information, market conditions, price distributions, price frames, price 
semantics and images, and cognitive factors such as information processing, memory, 
involvement, and motivations, are considered important in behavioral research (Liu and Soman 
2008)  
Price judgment research owes much of its basis to judgment and decision making 
theories. Hastie (2001, pp.655-656) summarizes judgment and decision making research:  
“The focus of (this) research is on how people (and other organisms and machines) 
combine desires (utilities, personal values, goals, ends, etc) and beliefs (expectations, 
knowledge, means, etc) to choose a course of action. The conceptual (perhaps defining) 
template for a decision includes three components: (a) courses of action (choice options 
and alternatives); (b) beliefs about objective states, processes, and events in the world 
(including outcome states and means to achieve them); and (c) desires, values, or utilities 
that describe the consequences associated with the outcomes of each” 
 
Judgment and decision making research has expanded to three broad theoretical domains 
(Hastie 2001): a) utility theory; b) cognitive algebraic theory; and c) cognitive computational 
theory. Utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947), based on axioms of consistency, 
linearity, and convexity of preferences, suggests that choices are outcomes of weighted 
probabilities assigned to alternatives, in which an alternative that has the maximum utility is 
always chosen (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981).  The related premise of prospect theory (Kahneman 
2 
 
and Tversky 1979) finds that, in reality, several axioms of utility theory are violated. Prospect 
theory proposes that decision makers simplify their cognitive choices by adopting a two-stage 
decision process where framing in the first stage allows consumers to attach and edit 
probabilistic values to alternatives that in the second stage are evaluated and chosen (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Cognitive algebraic theories propose that choice, an outcome of human 
judgment and decision making, can be represented through simple algebraic models (i.e., 
cognitive algebra; Petty and Cacioppo 1996). Cognitive computational theories study perceptual, 
inferential, and mnemonic functions involved in price judgment (Hastie 2001).  
Research in price judgment explains how price plays an important role in determining 
consumers’ judgments, choices, and purchase intent (Monroe 1973). Price provides both 
quantitative and qualitative components of judgment and decision making (Monroe 1973). Out 
of a myriad of external and internal stimuli confronting a buyer, such as price, brand attributes, 
product design, purchase environment, and psychological inputs, organization of information 
becomes crucial, and price plays an important role in integrating and evaluating an offer (Grewal 
et al. 1998; Monroe 1973). The role price plays in this combinatorial process is far from being 
simple. The focus of this research is to decipher how an external price cue affects price 
judgments and purchase intent. Specifically, understanding differences in price judgments is of 
prime importance in this research. This chapter defines and categorizes judgments, reviews price 
judgments in the context of judgment and decision making research, and explains three important 
price judgments. Subsequent discussions propose pertinent research questions and motivations to 
study these questions, followed by a literature review of each research question.  
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1.2 PRICE JUDGMENTS 
1.2.1 Definitions and Types of Judgments 
According to German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1781), judgment (Urteil) is a type of 
cognition (Erkenntnis), and a basic human faculty (Hanna 2009). He defined judgment as “an 
objective, conscious, mental representation, and an output of cognitive capacity” (Hanna 2009). 
American philosopher and psychologist John Dewey (1910) considers judgment a mental 
process that represents inferences. According to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 
judgment is “the process of forming an opinion, or evaluation by discerning and comparing an 
opinion or estimate so formed.” Webster’s definition characterizes judgment as the process of 
comparison and evaluation, rather than the outcome. In other words, judgment could be 
understood as a process through which a person forms, evaluates, and compares opinions. 
In the consumer behavior literature, judgments refer to consumer evaluations or estimates 
of product attributes (Johnson and Puto 1987). Judgment guides our decision making, leading to 
a choice and producing an outcome (Rachlin 1989). Hence, a judgment can be considered as a 
process of evaluation and its outcome. In marketing, judgments are considered as assessment, 
estimation, and inferences about events, outcomes, and processes (Hastie 2001). Preferences, as 
outcomes of judgments, are considered expressed behaviors of choosing a course of action over 
others (Hastie 2001).  
 Information processing theory explains two fundamental mechanisms that underlie 
human judgments (Liu and Soman 2008): a) a systematic, effortful examination of the context, 
which generates interpretations and evaluations and is called central or systematic processing 
(Eagley and Chaiken 1993); and b) a quick, less effortful use of already existing concepts, ideas, 
or expectations, known as peripheral or heuristic processing (Chaiken et al. 1989). 
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Janiszweski et al. (2008, p.152) provide an extensive list of judgment categories: 
"A base judgment can be a belief (e.g. “there is a God.”), an attitude (e.g., “I like 
chocolate.”), a decision (e.g., “I’ll bet on team X.”), an estimate(e.g., “It’s worth about 
$40.”), a prediction (e.g., “I’ll get an “A” on the exam.”), an assessment (e.g., “I am in 
good shape.”), a plan (e.g., “I’ll start my diet tomorrow.”), and so forth. The judgment 
can concern accuracy (e.g., “How much do I know?”), confidence (e.g., “How certain am 
I?”), intent (e.g., “How likely am I to act?”), or insight (e.g., “I did this because...”)."  
 
Judgment categorization varies widely across disciplines. For example, in mathematics 
and logic, two types of judgments, inductive and deductive, are considered important (Katz 
1998). In behavioral sciences, judgments are classified as: a) non-evaluative, such as belief 
(Hamilton 1971); b) evaluative, such as attitude (Olson and Zanna 1993; Schwarz 2007); c) 
preference (Johnson and Puto 1987); d) inference, as reflected in heuristics (McGuire 1997); e) 
prediction, as represented in expectation (Hoch 1985); and f) assessment and comparative, as 
found in computation, parity determination, and numerical cognition (Leffkof-Hagius and Mason 
1993). 
Non-evaluative or belief-based judgments are mental representations of existing 
knowledge, structured as propositions or premises (Schwitzgebel 2006). Marks (1982) finds no 
difference between belief and non-evaluative judgment, and hence described this judgment as 
non-evaluative belief. Non-evaluative judgments reflect impressions (Hamilton 1971). They 
generate likes and dislikes, positive or negative valences toward judged objects (Winkielman et 
al. 1990). Non-evaluative judgments can be expressed in two dimensions: potency and activation 
(Hamilton 1971).  
Evaluative judgment is an assessment of value, quality, or importance (Winkielman et al. 
1990). Evaluative judgment is a psychological tendency that expresses a degree of favor and 
disfavor (Schwarz 2007). An example of an evaluative judgment is attitude. Schwarz (2007) 
argues that there is no difference between attitude and evaluative judgments. In an extensive 
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review of evaluative judgment and attitude, Schwarz (2007) suggests that evaluative judgment is 
adaptive and context sensitive, formed instantaneously, and can be classified in terms of 
intensity, stability, personal involvement, and behavioral relevance (Schwarz 2007). Wittenbrink 
(2007), using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), suggests that context dependency is a primary 
characteristic of evaluative judgment. Researchers found no evidence of context independence, 
despite situations when evaluative judgments could be derived from automatic processes 
(Ferguson and Bergh 2007). In contrast to a mere statement of facts, or lexical ordering of 
information, evaluative judgment is often found to describe phenomena such as stereotyping and 
prejudice (Wittenbrink et al. 2001). Outcomes of evaluative judgments are explained through 
attitude-behavior consistency theory, which suggests that behaviors are found to be consistent 
with the evaluations made (Schwarz 2007). Haminlton and Huffman (1971) argue that both non-
evaluative and evaluative judgments can be expressed either through summated models 
(Fishbein and Hunter 1964), or averaging models (Anderson 1971). 
An important component of behavioral decision theory is preference judgment 
(Novemsky et al. 2007). Preference judgment is a process of selecting one specific response from 
many alternatives (Paulus and Frank 2003). Preference determines which object is favored over 
another (Olson and Zanna 1993). Using one or more comparative dimensions, this judgment 
produces an inclination or liking for a particular product, brand, or service. Preference judgment 
can emerge from valenced evaluation (attitude) or from prior satisfaction, affect, behavioral 
tendency, or choice (Holbrook 2006). Preference judgment is considered to be an important 
determinant of choice (Novemsky et al. 2007). As opposed to a more automatic, rule-based 
choice, preference-based choice is constructed, and it explains a variety of choice situations, 
including deferred and compromised choices (Mellers et al. 1998; Novemsky et al. 2007). 
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Inferential judgment draws a conclusion, based on interpretations of a context, existing 
knowledge, or heuristics (Loftus and Beach 1982). In decision making research, choices have 
been found to be contingent on inferential judgment (Dick et al. 1990). Consumers often make 
decisions based on limited or uncertain information. What makes inferential judgment interesting 
is its capacity to draw causal arguments based on information beyond what is immediately 
available (Kardes et al. 2004). By answering if-then questions, inference judgment creates 
linkages between information available as cues, heuristics, arguments, knowledge, or beliefs. 
Inferential judgment rests on two important premises (Kardes et al. 2004): a) inductive, which 
explains the process of generalizing a conclusion from specific information; and b) deductive, or 
constructing specific conclusions from a general assumption or understanding. Information used 
for inferential judgment could be externally available, as found in stimulus-based or data-driven 
processing, or could be retrieved from memory as found in memory or theory-based processing 
(Lynch and Srull 1982). For memory-based processing, previously formed attitudes, beliefs, and 
categories may serve as important memory cues (Lynch and Srull 1982). The major distinction 
between inductive and deductive inferences lies in the type of outputs that these judgments 
generate. Inductive inferences lead to generalization, learning, and predictions, but deductive 
inferences yield hypothesis evaluation, logical reasoning, and evaluative conclusions (Kardes et 
al. 2004). Recent research also shows that inductive inference is forward-looking  and tries to 
predict an expectation for the future, while deductive reasoning, operates as a backward looking 
diagnostic measure and tries to determine the accuracy of a judgment (Mass et al. 2001).  
Predictive judgments can be expressed as outcomes of inferences, and imply what people 
anticipate will happen (Hogarth 1987). Studied under covariation judgment, a predictive 
judgment generates an evaluation based on a single cue or multiple cues of covariations of 
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attributes (Sawyer 1993). Constructed as expectation, predictive judgment generates mental 
assessment of a probabilistic outcome (Hoch 1985). In behavioral research, two phenomena, 
forecasting and backcasting, are found to characterize predictive judgments (Ebbert et al. 2009). 
These two processes explain how a hedonic expectation of a future outcome guides consumer 
decision making (Ebbert et al. 2009). Anticipated feelings of pleasure, guilt, anger, and regret 
have been found to influence a broad range of consumption decisions (Gilbert et al. 1998). 
Predictive judgments consist of three stages (Hoch 1985): a) accumulation of evidence; b) 
evaluation of evidence; c) assigning a numerical value to represent subjective perception of 
future probability. Research on calibration and overconfidence shows confidence is a primary 
determinant of predictive judgments (Hoch 1985). It is interesting to note that for a wide variety 
of tasks, people have been found to be overconfident in their predictions (Hoch 1985).   
A similarity or comparative judgment compares a pair of entities in terms of magnitudes 
of an attribute, trait, attitude, etc. (Thurstone 1929). Comparative judgment is applied in 
comparing intensities of stimulus values (Thustone 1994). Examples of this judgment are 
abundant in daily experiences. For example, when comparing light, sound, prices, satisfaction, 
and value, we engage in comparative judgment. Two important laws proposed in the literature, 
Weber’s law and Fechner’s law have been used in predicting comparative judgments from 
quantitative and qualitative attributes (Thurstone 1994). Personal bias, motivation (Moore and 
Small 2007), speed of processing, and cognitive styles (Blais et al. 2005) have been found to 
influence comparative judgments.  
In general, judgments have been found to influence a wide array of outcomes. Outcomes 
relevant for behavioral research include satisfaction and regret (Gilovich and Medvec 1995), 
confidence (Alba and Hutchinson 2000), learning (Dunlosky and Nelson 1994), belief and 
8 
 
attitude (Schwarz 2007), anchoring and adjustment based estimation (Einhorn and Hogarth 
1981), cause and effect inference (Koriat et al. 2006), and memory and choice (Schooler and 
Schooler 1990). Based on the above discussion of judgment categorizations and outcomes, it is 
relevant to determine characteristics and categorization of price judgments. 
1.2.2 Price Judgments 
A price judgment is defined as the process by which consumers translate prices into 
meaningful cognitions (Lichtenstein et al. 1988). Consumers store price information in memory 
as subjective interpretations (Oh and Jeong 2004). Instead of using nominal values, consumers 
often evaluate prices by using words such as “too high,” “fair,”  “acceptable,” “very reasonable,” 
or “expected” (Monroe and Lee 1999; Zeithaml 1988). Consumer dependence on these 
subjective interpretations has prompted researchers to understand price judgments as a process of 
“knowing” prices rather than “remembering” prices (Monroe and Lee 1999). Subjective price 
knowledge, rather than recollecting actual price, reflects price judgment (Lichtenstein et al. 
1993; Monroe 1973).  
Price judgment is essentially a comparative process (Lichtenstein et al. 1988; Monroe 
1990). Researchers accept that consumers judge focal prices in relation to reference prices 
(Monroe 1990). Hence, differences in construction and interpretation of reference prices generate 
differences in price judgments. Because this comparative process is context-, person-, and 
situation-specific, the same focal price may be interpreted differently by different consumers or 
in different contexts (Lichtenstein et al. 1988).  For example, a consumer with a wide reference 
price range may find a particular price as more acceptable than someone whose reference range 
is narrower (Lichtenstein et al. 1988).  
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1.2.3 Price Judgment Literature Review 
Figure 1.1 illustrates two analytical frameworks— stimulus-organism-response model 
(SOR model; Jacoby and Olson 1977) and information integration model (Anderson 1971)—that 
explain cognitive processes by which consumers evaluate focal prices. 
 
Figure 1.1 Comparing cognitive process models of price judgment  
 
Jacoby and Olson (1977) propose a stimulus-organism-response (SOR) model that 
explains how human judgments and responses are developed from environmental stimuli. Their 
organism component elaborates on descriptions of mental processes that influence perception 
and judgment (Jacoby 2002). In this model, observed prices provide the environmental inputs 
(stimuli), perceptual changes of inputs develop price judgments in consumers’ minds (organism), 
and the organism is expressed as responses to the prices (Jacoby 2002).  
Lichtenstein et al. (1988) use the SOR model to explain how price acceptability, a price 
judgment, is generated. After observing a price cue (environmental stimulus), consumers 
compare the price to a range of acceptable prices retrieved from memory (organism component), 
which are influenced by their price-quality inferences, price consciousness, and product 
involvement (Lichtenstein et al. 1988), and finally are expressed as price judgment (response 
Information integration model:    
  Valuation  Integration Response  
  function function function 
Actual (focal) 
price 
Internal representation 
of prices 
Price 
judgment 
Actual (overt) 
response 
Stimulus 
(focal price) 
Organism 
(price judgment) 
Response  
(overt) 
SOR model:    
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component). Similarly, Maxwell (2002) applies the SOR model to determine how focal prices 
affect consumers’ willingness to purchase. 
Anderson (1971) proposed an alternative model that helps overcome the SOR model’s 
inability to predict precise price judgments.  Anderson’s information integration model suggests 
that price judgments could be represented through precise mathematical relationships (Anderson 
1971; Huber and McCann 1982). Using the information integration model, Niedrich et al. (2001) 
summarize the processes by which consumers generate price judgments. First, physical stimuli of 
observed prices generate internal representations, which can be measured using valuation 
functions. Next, the internal representations are converted to subjective price judgments (covert 
responses), represented through integration functions, and finally, consumers generate overt 
responses, reflecting their covert price judgments, which can be represented using response 
functions.    
Valuation functions, represented as logarithmic or power functions, specify relationships 
between physical stimuli and their representations as subjective values (Niedrich et al. 2001). 
Integration functions generate price judgments using internal representation of actual prices. 
Three functional forms of integration functions exist and are based on: a) adaptation level theory 
(Helson 1964), which proposes that price judgment is proportional to the difference between 
subjective value of focal stimulus and the mean value (the adaptation level) of contextual prices; 
b) range theory (Volkman 1951), which suggests that  price judgment is proportional to a ratio of 
the difference between focal price and the minimum subjective value of the reference range, to 
the difference between reference range’s highest and the lowest values; and c) range-frequency 
theory (Parducci 1965), which suggests price judgments are a weighted linear function of range 
and frequency of the reference prices, where weights are assigned to proportionate range values  
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and ranking values of the contextual prices. Response function denotes the retrieval of subjective 
judgments into an overt rating using a linear function. Niedrich et al. (2001) predict price 
judgments using an integration function under different sets of contextual conditions. Their 
findings show that frequency effects surpass range effects in a stimulus-based context, but range 
effects dominate frequency effects in a memory-based context.  
Cognitive basis of contextual effects on price judgments can be explained using 
processing level theories (Hristova et al. 2005). Low-level processing theories propose that 
external stimuli change perceptions early in processing stages, whereas high-level processing 
theories suggest stimuli are processed in parallel to judgment processes (Hristova et al. 2005). A 
general cognitive architecture, known as judgment mapping or JUDGMAP models, proposes two 
fundamental processes that underlie low-level or high-level processing  (Hristova et al. 2005): a) 
analogy-making, through which consumers map a target stimulus to an exemplar, and apply 
cognitive phenomena such as reasoning, inference, perception, and comparison, to develop an 
overt response that reflects price judgment; and b) a spreading activation mechanism, through 
which associative and constructive mechanisms of human memory perform connectionist and 
symbolic cognitive roles. Relative activation strength and diffusion speed have been found to 
influence human judgment (Hristova et al. 2005). Applied to price judgments, these two broad 
physical cognitive mechanisms help researchers explore how price information is encoded, 
retained, and retrieved, and to explain how price information connects to other cognitive areas. 
Interestingly, using a spreading activation mechanism, effects of unrelated or irrelevant 
stimuli on price judgments could be explained. Irrelevant stimuli, such as loudness of sounds 
(Marks 1988), taste (Rankin and Marks 1991, 1992), touch (Marks and Armstrong 1996), smell 
(Rankin and Marks 2000), visuals in the form of length of vertical and horizontal lines (Arieh 
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and Marks 2002; Potts 1991), colors of geometric shapes and sizes (Goldstone 1995), and line 
length (Kokinov et al. 2004), have been found to influence various aspects of judgment, 
including price judgments. Understanding how irrelevant information affects human judgments 
opens up interesting perspectives on price judgment.   
Price judgments play an important role in consumers’ buying decisions (Grewal et al. 
1998). Consumers use price information for two main purposes: a) to infer non price attributes 
such as product quality; and b) to calculate monetary sacrifice of a purchase (Suri and Monroe 
2003). With limited non-price information, consumers use price judgments to infer product 
quality, but when non-price information is available, consumers contemplate mainly on the cost 
component of the offer (Suri and Monroe 2003). Price judgments that affect this tradeoff 
relationship of price-quality and price-sacrifice are found to influence consumers’ purchase 
decisions (Suri et al. 2007).  
Price judgment depends on context (Nowlis and Simnonson 1997). Contexts affect price 
judgments in four ways (Liu and Soman 2008): a) modifying the number of alternatives or 
attributes in a choice task; b) affecting construction and retrieval of reference prices; c) 
impacting wording and framing of prices; and d) affecting consumers’ individual abilities to 
process available price information.  
Simonson and Taversky (1992) address choice alternatives in their dominated alternative 
theory, which explores how tradeoff contrast and extremity aversion lead to a choice. This theory 
explains that contextual effects on choice follow two hypotheses: a) tradeoff contrast states that 
preference of an alternative is influenced by a tradeoff calculation between a focal alternative 
and all other alternatives in the choice context; and b) extremeness aversion states that 
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attractiveness of an alternative is greatly increased if it is in an intermediate range of options 
rather than in the extremes. 
Reference price context (i.e., how reference prices are constructed and retrieved) has 
been found to affect price judgments (Niedrich et al. 2001). Adaptation level theory (Helson 
1964), range theory (Volkmann 1951), and range frequency theory (Parducci 1965) explain how 
reference prices affect price judgments. Whether reference prices are retrieved from memory or 
from provided stimulus have been found to affect price judgments (Niedrich et al. 2001). 
Alternative prices (of related products or from other markets), depth and frequency of discounts 
(Alba et al. 1999; Lalwani and Monroe 2005), plausible and exaggerated referred prices (Biswas 
and Blair 1991; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; Urbany et al. 1988), and anchoring and 
adjustment to a relevant or irrelevant (incidental) starting price (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1971) 
have also been found to affect price judgments. 
Low price guarantees (Arbatskya et al. 2004; Biswas et al. 2002), price framing (i.e., how 
prices are presented), and temporal reframing (Gourville 1998) have been found to influence 
price judgments. Under different cognitive constraints and processing fluencies, how people 
perceive, encode, process, and evaluate price stimuli are influenced by price formats (Liu and 
Soman 2008). Examples of price formats affecting price judgments are found through tensile 
claims (Dhar et al. 1999; Mobley et al. 1988), right digit ending (Schindler and Kirby 1997), and 
perceptual fluency (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Particularly, perceptual fluency is found to affect 
comparative price judgments, through price information processing, beyond a conscious, 
deliberate level (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Interesting findings by Coulter and Coulter (2005) 
further emphasize the role of unconscious price assessment, through processes tapping into 
perceptual fluency. Ease of information retrieval and information processing, influenced by 
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distinctive color (Coulter 2002), size, position, isolation, or contrast of price information (Pieters 
et al. 1996), or diagnosticity and accessibility (Menon et al. 1997) of price information from 
memory may affect conscious or unconscious evaluation of price. 
The next section identifies and distinguishes three price judgments: price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation. Theoretical explanations as well as empirical evidence are 
provided to help readers understand the characteristics of these three price judgments, their 
differences, and their influences on consumers’ buying decisions.      
1.2.4 Three Main Price Judgments 
A dearth of literature exists to address differences between various price judgments. Past 
price studies explained either isolated, individual price judgments, or various combined price 
judgments. Research on expertise and knowledge categorization suggests that in situations where 
buyers have low product knowledge, buyers benefit from using multiple processing modes 
(Massaro and Friedman 1990). Lacking any other information, where prices are predominant 
cues, multiple price judgments may be the most effective consumer strategy. Human behavior is 
strongly influenced by multiple modes of information processing (Massaro and Friedman 1990). 
From a practical standpoint, conceptualization of multidimensional price judgments provides the 
most accurate understanding of real-world price judgments.   
This research empirically tests a multidimensional model of price judgments. This 
inquiry helps us understand if all the price judgments are of equal importance, whether price 
expectation precedes any other price judgments, and whether price fairness is more important 
than other price judgments. Analyzing price judgments of various types has not been addressed 
in existing pricing research.  
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Liu and Soman (2008) argue that price expectations influence price fairness. Consumers 
compare actual prices to their expected prices. If the actual price exceeds their expectations, 
consumers are likely to perceive the price as unfair (Heath et al. 1999). In repeat purchases, 
consumers judge price fairness by comparing new prices to past or other prices (Bolton et al. 
2003). Do consumers consider various types of price judgments while making purchases? Do 
different price judgments influence consumers’ purchase decisions differently in different 
situations? Are price judgments consciously constructed before making purchase decisions? 
Answers to these questions are addressed by multidimensional-conceptualization of price 
judgment.  
Price judgments such as price fairness have been studied by several researchers (Bolton 
et al. 2003; Campbell 1999; Haws and Bearden 2006; Maxwell 2002; Vaidyanathan and 
Aggarwal 2003; Xia et al. 2004; Xia and Monroe 2005). Similarly, price magnitude (Adaval and 
Monroe 2002; Coulter and Coulter 2005; Dehaene 1992; Thomas et al. 2007; Thomas and 
Morwitz 2009) and price expectation (Delvecchio et al. 2007; Kalyani and Yim 2004; Kopalle 
and Mullikin 2003; Lichtenstein et al. 1991; Menon et al. 1997; Turnovsky 1970) have also been 
given due importance. Careful assessment of existing pricing studies indicates the clear 
possibility of classifying price judgments in terms of price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation. This research, therefore, is designed to investigate three primary price judgments, 
price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, in the same model. Table 1.1 summarizes 
basic definitions, properties, affective or cognitive characteristics, and influencing factors for 
each price judgment. Each price judgment is explored in depth in the following section. 
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Table 1.1 Characterization of three price judgments 
Price 
Judgment 
Definition Judgment 
properties 
Affective  
or cognitive 
Influencing factors 
Price 
fairness 
 
How reasonable, 
acceptable, just, 
satisfactory a price is 
Evaluative and 
comparative 
Combination 
of affective 
and  cognitive 
component  
past prices, competitor prices, prices 
paid by other consumers, product 
costs, store reputation, mood, 
attribution (internal or external) 
Price 
magnitude 
 
How big, large, high, 
huge a price is 
Comparative Cognitive  Mean, range, and  frequency of 
reference price, discount depth and 
discount frequency, framing of 
discounts, processing fluency 
Price 
expectation 
 
How predictable, 
common, ordinary a 
price is 
Predictive and 
comparative 
Cognitive  
 
Judgment environment (memory or 
stimulus-based context)  
 
1.2.4.1 Price Fairness  
 
In an exchange, judged fairness may reflect consumers’ perceptions of sacrifice and 
benefits accrued to each party involved (Bolton et al. 2003). Price fairness is defined as a price 
judgment that determines how just, reasonable, acceptable or satisfactory a price is (Xia and 
Monroe 2005). Price fairness has been conceptualized as a comparative or evaluative judgment 
(Wirtz and Kimes 2007; Xia et al. 2004), affected by consumers’ derived reasons behind a 
retailer’s offer prices (Vaidyanthan and Aggarwal 2003).  Perceived reasons for a retailer’s 
pricing policy, the retailer’s reputation, or the retailer’s motives have been found to be important 
drivers of price fairness (Campbell 1999). Factors such as degree of price control by retailers, 
frequency and depth of price changes offered by retailers, production cost, technology, and other 
external marketplace factors also have significant influence on price fairness (Kalapurakal et al. 
1991; Maxwell 2002; Xia et al. 2004).   
Price fairness has cognitive and affective dimensions (Xia and Monroe 2005). Its 
cognitive aspect involves comparative judgment of an offer price to a reference standard; the 
affective component includes evaluations based on feelings of unease, guilt, inequality, rejection, 
anger, or even outrage (Xia et al. 2004).  Defined from an affective perspective, price fairness 
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has been described as associated emotions that determine how reasonable, acceptable, and 
justifiable the difference is between competing sellers’ offer prices (Xia et al. 2004).      
Real-world examples often reveal interesting facets of consumer beliefs about price 
fairness. Concerns around prescription drug prices, gasoline prices, hidden fees charged by 
service providers, or resentment toward Amazon’s dynamic pricing (charging different prices for 
same product across different purchase situations) reflect consumers’ feelings that they are being 
treated unfairly. On the contrary, when consumers buy flight tickets close to the day of departure, 
paying much more than they would have paid earlier for the same ticket, they rarely feel a sense 
of unfairness. Similarly, consumers care much less about fairness while paying much higher 
prices for desirable seats at theaters or football stadiums, but often do find higher prices charged 
for better airplane seats to be unfair. Given these examples of consumers’ differential judgments, 
a further exploration of causes and consequences of price fairness is highly appropriate.  
Contrary to common economic theories that justify price increases during times of 
scarcity, or to mitigate excess demand in the market, empirical evidence suggests that sellers do 
not necessarily increase prices even in such situations (Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). This 
implies that sellers do consider the repercussions of price fairness. Because consumers often 
resist buying at prices they consider unfair (Campbell 1999), reactions emerging from an unfair 
price judgment can lead to reduced profits (Kachelmeier et al. 1991), consumer reprisals (Okun 
1981), consumer boycotts (Goldman 1994), civil actions (Kaufmann et al. 1991), reduced sales 
(Grover 1994), or reduced market shares due to damaged consumer trust and goodwill (Arrow 
1973) .  
Existing research provides three major conceptualizations to explain price fairness: dual 
entitlement theory (Kahneman et al. 1986), distributive justice theory (Homans 1961; Rawls 
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1971), and equity theory (Adams 1965). Dual entitlement theory suggests that market agents 
acknowledge each other’s entitlement.  Firms are entitled to an acceptable profit, and consumers 
are entitled to an acceptable value. This entitlement is computed based on a reference price to the 
buyer and a reference profit to the seller (Novoseltsev and Warlop 2002). Price changes that 
affect any of these referred entitlements, either a decrease in consumers’ entitled value or an 
increase in sellers’ entitled profit reduce price fairness (Kachelmeier et al. 1991; Kalapurakal et 
al. 1991). Distributive justice theory highlights that parties involved in an exchange expect 
proportionate reward from their investment in the exchange (Homans 1961). This theory predicts 
that consumers would perceive a price as unfair if a seller uses it to leverage higher profit by 
distorting the sense of proportional parity. Equity theory extends this idea to entail that any sense 
of fairness arises from a comparison process to another standard which could be another person, 
a class of people, an organization, another market, or the individual at a different point in time 
(Jacoby 1976). Deliberating on this theory, Xia and Monroe (2005) show that of all the reference 
standards used for comparisons (prices charged over time, or other retailers’ prices), prices paid 
by other consumers have the largest effect on price fairness.  
While Xia and Monroe (2005) did not specifically consider attribution theory, this 
research addresses price fairness using arguments based on attribution theory. Attribution 
thoughts direct consumers to infer sellers’ motives behind offered prices (Campbell 1999). 
Consumers infer about a firm’s profit by evaluating a seller’s degree of control in the market. 
Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003) use attribution theory to verify that stability of prices, degree 
of control, and locus of causation affect price fairness. They argue that price changes due to 
external or non-firm controlled factors generate greater price fairness (Vaidyanathan and 
Aggarwal 2003).     
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In summary, according to existing research, price fairness can be comparative, based on 
references drawn from past prices, same or similar product prices, and transaction costs (Xia et 
al. 2004). It is also evaluative and tends to be biased towards consumers’ self interests, which 
attributes causes of unfairness more toward the seller (Kalapurakal et al. 1991). Price fairness 
entails affective components in addition to cognitive evaluations (Bougie et al. 2003; Xia and 
Monroe 2005). Cost justified price increases are perceived to be fair if the increase seems beyond 
the control of the seller (Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003).  
1.2.4.2  Price Magnitude  
 
 Price magnitude is a size estimation of the focal price (Thomas and Morwitz 2007). It is 
a cognitive judgment that determines numerical interpretation of a focal price (Menon et al. 
1997); i.e., how large a price is. Lynch et al. (1991) show that numerical judgments on a 
response scale result from how the scale numbers are interpreted in the context of the price 
stimuli. Such quantitative interpretations, referred to as price magnitude in this research, are an 
outcome of conscious or automatic translation of an objective stimulus value into a subjective 
size estimation (Adaval and Monroe 2002).  
Price magnitude is a comparative judgment, where a focal price is compared to a 
reference standard (Thomas et al. 2007). This reference standard could be constructed from 
memory, which is known as an internal reference price, or it could be available externally during 
price comparisons, which is known as an external or stimulus-based reference price (Mayhew 
and Winer 1992, Niedrich et al. 2001). Price magnitude is found to be affected by internal and 
external reference prices (Greenleaf 1995).  
Cognitive processes that help decipher numbers, known as numerical cognition, explain 
how people encode, interpret, and apply numbers while making judgments (Dehaene 1992). 
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Research on numerical cognition has highlighted four important aspects of price magnitude 
(Adaval and Monroe 2002; Coulter and Coulter 2005; Thomas and Morwitz 2009). First, 
encoding and processing of price magnitudes can be conscious or automatic. A deliberate and 
rational consideration of prices, as with conscious processing, or an automatic or non-conscious 
processing of prices using peripheral cues such as color, sound, spokesperson, or layout, are 
found to affect price magnitude (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Second, numerical stimuli are 
generally encoded and stored in memory as magnitude representations, which are judgments of 
size, arranged in analog format along a left to right number line, and may reproduce an exact 
numerical value (e.g. 7) or an approximation of exact value (e.g., “large” or “big”) (Dehaene 
1992). Third, to compare prices as quantitative numbers requires retrieval of referent standards 
(Coulter and Coulter 2005; Greenleaf 1995; Xia et al. 2004). Fourth, comparative distances 
between two prices are affected by factors such as computational difficulties (Thomas and 
Morwitz 2009).   
1.2.4.3  Price Expectation  
 
 Behavioral literature commonly defines expectations as judgments of the future, or 
outcome assessments based on present or past information (Menon et al. 1997). Thus, price 
expectations are predictions of future price. Price expectation is different than factual reports of 
past or present prices (Menon et al. 1997). In customer satisfaction research, expectation is 
defined as a possibility standard (Teas 1993). Price expectation is defined as judgment of a focal 
price based on a comparison of the focal price with an internally generated expected price 
(Kalyani and Yim 1992).  
This research defines price expectation as a comparative judgment that determines 
whether a focal price is less or more than an expected price. Though price expectation and price 
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magnitude are both comparative judgments, price magnitude compares focal price to 
contextually retrieved reference standards, whereas reference standards are constructed for price 
expectation based on an anticipated price. A reference standard based on anticipation is not just a 
summarization of contextual prices, but also involves assigning a probabilistic belief about how a 
price is expected to occur in the future.  
Availability-diagnosticity theory is used to explain price expectation (Menon et al. 1997). 
Research shows that prior elicitation, availability of price information, repeated use of memory 
retrieved prices, and habitual access of similar information influence price expectation (Menon et 
al. 1997). In other words, greater availability of price information affects price expectation 
positively. Diagnosticity implies that the more relevant and reliable a price is, the more expected 
it becomes (Menon et al. 1997). Turnovsky (1970) uses an empirical model to explain the 
formation of price expectation. He explains how extrapolative and adaptive mechanisms generate 
price expectation as a weighted average of past price knowledge.  
Delvecchio et al. (2007) show that promotion framing affects price expectation. 
Promotion discounts framed as percentage-off or cents-off, generating varying degrees of 
processing difficulty, affect price expectation (Delvecchio et al. 2007). Depth and frequency of 
promotion are also found to influence price judgments (Kalyani and Yim 1992). Using heuristic 
principles (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) and adaptation theory (Helson 1964), Kalyani and Yim 
(1992) explain that frequently discounted prices lower the reference range, which gets adapted to 
generate a new heuristic that lowers price expectations. Deeply discounted prices help consumers 
transcend a zone of price insensitivity (Raman and Bass 1988), and generate a strong positive 
transaction utility (Thaler 1985), which gets assimilated as low price expectation.  
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Using assimilation and contrast theory (Sherif and Hovland 1961), Lichtenstein et al. 
(1991) explain the U-shaped price expectation curve. This curve also explains how price 
expectation gets updated.  Lichtenstein et al. (1991) show that a price inconsistent with 
consumers’ reference frames is adapted completely, partially, or not at all. It is argued that 
consumers’ expected price estimates rise when retailers’ reference prices are higher than 
consumers’ initial expectations. When the reference prices seem implausible, price expectations 
either stop rising or decline (Lichtenstein et al. 1991; Kopalle and Mullikin 2003).  
In summary, price expectation is considered a comparative judgment, contingent on 
factors such as reference prices (Lichtenstein et al. 1991), predicted prices (Menon et al. 1997), 
price discounts (Kalyani and Yim 1992), and accessible prices (Menon et al. 1997). However, it 
is important to note that although price expectation and price magnitude are comparative 
judgments, they employ different reference standards. To judge price magnitude, the focal price 
is compared to a reference standard either available in the context or retrieved from memory, but 
price expectation is based on a reference standard constructed as an anticipated price. A 
reference standard based on anticipation involves a probabilistic belief in further occurrence of 
the reference price, which differs from simple integration of the contextual prices.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS  
Opportunities to raise new questions in price judgment research are far from exhausted. 
Experimental results and empirical models suggest that price judgments depend on external cues 
such as price discounts (Kalyani and Yim 1992), branding, price framings (Delvecchio et al. 
2007), and reference prices (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Niedrich et al. 200; Rajendran 
and Tellis 1994), but debate still exists on representations and the nature of price judgments 
(Danziger and Segev 2006). A careful examination of existing price judgment research generates 
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many interesting and unanswered questions. A few of those are proposed below, and will be 
studied at depth in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
1.3.1 Research Question 1 
 Are price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation different constructs?  
1.3.1.1  Motivations and Literature Review  
During a broadcast (March 17, 2009), CNN highlighted a story about Java Street Café in 
Dayton, Ohio, where the store owner implemented a pricing policy, somewhat common in many 
European and Asian countries, that has the customer suggest a fair price. If the customer’s offer 
is acceptable to the seller, the transaction is completed. This pricing practice places greater 
emphasis than usual on customers’ judgments of fair price. This is one obvious example of 
consumers using price fairness.  Do they usually use it more than other judgments? This example 
encourages further investigation of how consumers reach decisions about price fairness. In 
particular buying contexts, do consumers use a specific price judgment or a combination of price 
judgments? Do consumers seek more market-based information or use self-generated thoughts to 
construct price judgments? If a pricing practice such as the one used at Java Street Café becomes 
common enough that consumers start expecting more power in determining prices, would that 
create a stronger role for price expectation  than price fairness? 
New technology such as search engines, shop bots, GPS-based market scanners, and 
other mobile devices instantly informs consumers about prices available at nearby stores. In 
these shopping environments, prices are the primary and salient buying cues (Grewal et al. 
1998). When only price information is available, are consumers primed to use price magnitude 
more than other price judgments? Knowing the degree to which consumers adopt or resist a 
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specific price judgment would provide valuable information about consumers’ shopping 
behaviors. These examples demonstrate the need to address research question 1. 
Finding differences between price judgments can help researchers understand 
characteristics of price judgments, reasons why consumers utilize specific price judgments, and 
major implications of these price judgments. Awareness about how choice tasks are performed 
has answered questions such as preference reversals, choice under risk and uncertainty, causal 
schemas in probability judgment, and context effects (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981), but trying to 
understand why some choice tasks are performed in different ways has rarely been answered. 
Though cognitive research has focused on understanding, developing, and predicting descriptive 
and normative models of consumers’ decision making processes, inadequate focus has been 
given to distinguish cognitive processes involved in various judgments (Einhorn and Hogarth 
1981). This inadequacy is also prominent in price judgment research.  
This research proposes that price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are 
different constructs. Price fairness manifests affective and cognitive characteristics, price 
magnitude reflects cognitive characteristics of price comparisons, and price expectation 
highlights a predictive judgment. Extant research shows that consumers’ price judgments are 
outcomes of distinct cognitive systems (Kamins et al. 2009). Numerical or non-numerical price 
judgments, quantitative or qualitative price judgments, and cognitive or affective price 
judgments signify tasks that reflect fundamentally different cognitive systems (Kamins et al. 
2009). Medical research shows that human cognitions, formed from different mental systems, 
generate variations in judgments (Kinzler and Spelke 2007). An application of these ideas in 
pricing research leads to the following proposition. 
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1.3.1.2 Proposition 1 
 While correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are different 
constructs. 
1.3.2 Research Question 2 
What are the antecedents of price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation?  
1.3.2.1 Motivations and Literature Review 
Causal analysis emphasizes the need to determine a cause preceding a presumed effect 
(Cook and Campbell 1979). For generating nomologicals (laws), Cronbach and Meehl (1955) 
emphasize validating and predicting relationships between constructs. Studying relationships 
between price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, determining factors that affect 
these price judgments and understanding consequences of these price judgments can establish a 
causal network among price judgments. Finding moderators helps establish a nomological net 
(Baron and Kenny 1986). Moderators affect direction and strength of relationships between 
independent (predictor) and dependent variables (Baron and Kenny 1986). Finding moderators 
that affect price judgments differently supports the main objective of this research by 
establishing conceptual distinctions of three price judgments. 
A number of antecedents of price fairness are found in the pricing literature: a) reference 
price (Bolton et al. 2003; Monroe et al. 1991; Winer 1986), which suggests the comparative 
aspect of price fairness is primarily driven by a referred price; b) locus of control (Vaidyanathan 
and Aggarwal 2003), which suggests that prices determined by factors outside the seller’s control 
are perceived to be fairer than prices controlled by the seller;  c) consumers’ estimates of past 
prices, competitors’ prices, producers’ costs, and associated profits (Bolton et al. 2003); d) self-
interest bias (Dickson and Kalapurakal 1994; Maxwell 2002; Xia et al. 2004), which means that 
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the disadvantaged party in a transaction receives more price unfairness; e) perceived motive of 
the seller (Campbell 1999), which indicates that cost- justified pricing, social-goal-oriented 
pricing, and prices exploiting market conditions affect price fairness;  and f) size, scale, and 
mode of sellers’ operations (Gielissen et al. 2008), which find that target market size, wealth, and  
perceived size of sellers  may influence price fairness.  
Campbell (1999) found that a firm’s reputation moderates the impact of inferred motive 
on price fairness. Reputable sellers are given the benefit of the doubt when they change prices, 
but skepticism looms large for price changes made by less reputable sellers. Extant research has 
also identified other factors that moderate price fairness (Xia et al. 2004):  a) transaction 
situations; b) types of market agents involved; c) trust and strength of relationships between 
buyers and sellers; d) consumers’ existing knowledge and beliefs about offered prices; and e) 
customer satisfaction. Consumers’ perceptions of who and what controls prices have consistently 
been found to influence price fairness (Campbell 1999; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). This 
research tries to understand the effect of locus of control on price fairness. 
Major antecedents of price magnitude are contextual factors (Adaval and Monroe 2002). 
Contextual antecedents applicable to price magnitude include range of values (Ostrom and 
Upshaw 1968), internal standards (Briesch et al. 1997; Kardes 1986; Lynch et al. 1991), 
cognitive effort (Wathieu and Bertini 2007), and levels of consciousness and automaticity 
(Adaval and Monroe 2002; Coulter and Coulter 2005). In particular, cognitive effort (Shugan 
1980), ambiguous or emotionally charged choice contexts (Johnson and Puto 1987; Luce et al. 
1997), involvement, motivation, arousal, elaboration, and attention have been found to influence 
price magnitude (Wathieu and Bertini 2007). Memory plays a significant role in retrieving and 
constructing contextual prices (Dehane 1992). In general, price information in memory is 
27 
 
represented as a magnitude in high-low terms, rather than the actual numerical digits, which 
explains why consumers have poor recollection of actual prices (Dehane 1992). In addition, 
diagnosticity of available information (Herr et al. 1991) and capacity of memory are also found 
to influence processing speed which determines the numerical differences between prices 
(Thomas and Moritz 2009).  
Expectation formation and its use are important issues in consumer research (Oliver and 
Winer 1987). How information is used, from memory or from the external environment, 
influences price expectation (Menon et al. 1997). Using an accessibility-diagnosticity framework 
representing available mental resources, existing research finds that regularity (Menon 1993), 
frequency of retrieved information (Burton and Blair 1991), estimation strategy employed (Blair 
and Burton 1987), rate of occurrence (Burton and Blair 1991), alternative information sources 
considered (Menon et al. 1995; Scwarz et al. 1985), relative importance of attributes (price) in 
the judgment task, and levels of effort involved (Sujan 1985) influence price expectation.  
Judgment environment, defined in this research as a memory- or stimulus-based context, 
is assumed to moderate effects of focal prices on price judgments. Whether contextual prices are 
retrieved from memory, as in memory-based contexts, or externally provided to the consumers, 
as in stimulus-based contexts, are found to affect price judgments (Biswas and Blair 1991; 
Niedrich et al. 2001). Extreme prices are more salient (Fiske and Taylor 1991) and, thus, are 
more easily retrieved than intermediate values (Tversky and Kahnemann 1973); less-salient 
intermediate values would be easily retrieved only in a stimulus-based (externally provided) 
context. Because information use, whether memory-or stimulus-based, influences price 
expectation (Menon et al. 1995), judgment environment is likely to affect price expectation.  
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Mood affects human judgments, including price judgments (Hsu and Liu 1998; Martin 
and Tesser 1992). Mood can bias evaluations and judgments (Hsu and Liu 1998) in such a way 
that transaction value, discount value, and judgment of an offer price are influenced in a mood 
congruent direction (Clark and Isen 1982; Gardner 1985; Johnson and Tversky 1983). Mood 
enhances accessibility and retrieval of mood congruent thoughts that serves as a retrieval cue for 
judgment objects (Clark and Isen 1982; Isen et al. 1978). Positive mood extracts consistent, 
positive-valenced material from memory, while negative mood blocks memory retrieval, or 
enhances negative-valenced material (Hsu and Liu 1998). This provides an interesting 
proposition for pricing research; specifically, that mood may moderate the effect of focal price 
on price judgments. 
Given the intricacies of price judgments, it is unsurprising that a person’s evaluative tool-
box includes several mechanisms. Drawing on these different mechanisms, a person may depend 
on the fluency or the speed with which information about a target is processed (Winkielman et 
al. 2002). High fluency is associated with positive affect, resulting in a favorable or positive 
evaluation as reflected in judgments and other psychological processes (Winkielman et al. 2002). 
A fluently processed price may result in favorable price judgments, thereby highlighting the 
moderation role of processing fluency on price judgments.  
1.3.2.2 Proposition 2 
Locus of control is an antecedent of price fairness. Judgment environment, mood, and 
processing fluency moderate effects of antecedents on price judgments. 
1.3.3 Research Question 3 
How do price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations affect purchase intent?  
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1.3.3.1 Motivations and Literature Review 
Research on how price fairness affects behavioral intentions has produced contradictory 
findings. While Urbany et al. (1989) find no impact of price fairness on purchase decisions (due 
to high switching cost) in the banking industry, Campbell (1999) finds that consumers draw 
inferences about sellers’ motives for price changes, and shows a positive relationship between 
price fairness and likelihood of buying. Price fairness affects consumer preference for firms 
(Feinberg et al. 2003), customer satisfaction (Martins 1995), purchase intentions, and complaints 
(Campbell 1999; Huppertz et al. 1978). Xia et al. (2004) found that price fairness influences 
purchase intentions, complaints, and negative word of mouth through the mediating factors of 
product value and intensity of negative emotions.   
In consumer research, price expectation has been found to influence effectiveness of 
promotions (Anderson and Salisbury 2003; Winer 1986), purchase quantity (Neslin et al. 1985), 
product and service quality (Meyer 1981), and brand switching (Hardie et al. 1993). Pricing 
research finds that price expectation influences market-size, brand-shares, and segment sizes 
(Menon et al. 1997). Research on consumer search and brand choice shows that price 
expectations influence consumer choice and search behavior (Swan 1972). 
1.3.3.2 Proposition 3 
Price fairness and price expectation have positive effects on purchase intent. Price 
magnitude has a negative effect on purchase intent.  
1.4 EXPECTED RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS  
Marr (1982) conceptualized three levels for understanding cognitive theories: a) at the 
highest level, theories are intended to find relationships with other theories; b) at an intermediate 
level, theories try to explain cognitive and perceptual processes; and c) at the lowest level, 
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theories describe neurobiological operations to better understand the second level perceptual 
systems. Judgment and decision making research focuses on intermediate and highest level 
goals. This research contributes to intermediate and highest level goals of exploring cognitive 
process in price judgments. It also intends to understand how price judgments differ from each 
other, and how they individually affect purchase intent.  
Understanding differences among three important price judgments will allow researchers 
a more realistic and integrative framework for studying price judgments. From a practical 
standpoint we find that consumers employ all or at least some combination of these price 
judgments that influence their purchase intent. Therefore an integrated approach towards 
examining these price judgments in the same context would add realism and provide better 
explanations for price judgments. Price judgments studied in segregation are subjected to 
different interpretations as they may ascribe to different areas in conceptual domains. For 
example, a commonly cited judgment variable, price attractiveness, has often been interpreted 
from a price fairness perspective, a price magnitude perspective, or even from a price expectation 
perspective. This would generate very different interpretations based on the type of price 
judgment considered in the study. However if price attractiveness is considered to be a 
multidimensional judgment, with components from price fairness as well as price magnitude 
influencing this judgment, it could provide better conceptual clarity. Hence, knowing how these 
price judgments differ, interact, and impact downstream choice processes could provide 
important managerial information. 
1.5 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation contains three chapters. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on a common 
theme of price judgments, but explore one or more different research questions pertaining to the 
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proposed price judgments. Employing methodologies appropriate for each research question, 
these two chapters provide theoretical and empirical support for proposed hypotheses. The 
following section provides brief summaries of the main ideas in each chapter.  
1.5.1 Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 introduces the dissertation topic, classifies and defines price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation as three important price judgments, proposes three possible 
research questions, articulates rationale for studying those research questions, provides 
background literature for each, and provides a framework for this dissertation.  
1.5.2 Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 proposes specific hypotheses to answer each research question, and provides 
empirical support for the hypotheses. This chapter tests the hypothesis that price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectations are unique judgments. It also explores the effects of focal 
price, locus of control, judgment environment, and judgment/intent order on three price 
judgments and purchase intent. Using data from two pretests, this chapter generates and validates 
necessary scales for measuring price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation. Next, 
using the validated scales, an experiment is undertaken and a structural equation model and 
repeated measures ANOVA are employed to test the hypotheses.  
1.5.3 Chapter 3 
 Chapter 3 continues with the main objective of testing whether price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation are distinct constructs; however Chapter 3 extends Chapter 2 
by considering the effects of focal price, judgment environment, mood, and processing fluency 
on price judgments, purchase intent, and anger. A pretest reports the findings for a new price 
expectation measures and an experiment is conducted to test the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 2: TOWARD EMPIRICALLY DIFFERENTIATING AMONG PRICE 
FAIRNESS, PRICE MAGNITUDE, AND PRICE EXPECTATION 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this chapter is to distinguish price fairness, price magnitude, and 
price expectation as distinct price judgments. Understanding differences between the three price 
judgments would help researchers explore different relationships among the price judgments and 
understand how each price judgment influences consumers’ purchase intent differently. This 
chapter explains the effects of focal price, locus of control, judgment environment, and 
judgment/intent order on the three price judgments and on purchase intent.     
This chapter contains: a) relevant construct definitions; b) hypotheses and related 
literature to address research questions discussed in Chapter 1; c) two pretests to develop and 
validate price judgment scales; d) analysis of the data using structural equation modeling and 
repeated measures ANOVA; and e) discussions of the main findings and their implications and 
limitations.    
2.2 DEFINITIONS OF CONSTRUCTS 
2.2.1 Focal Price 
Focal price is a target price on which consumer judgments of price fairness, price 
magnitude, price expectation, purchase intent, and anger are based.   
2.2.2 Price Fairness 
Price fairness is a consumer judgment of how just, reasonable, acceptable, or satisfactory 
the focal price is (Xia and Monroe 2005).  
2.2.3 Price Magnitude 
Price magnitude is a consumer judgment of the numerical size of a focal price (Thomas 
and Morwitz 2007). Consumers judge how large, big or huge a focal price is.  
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2.2.4 Price Expectation 
Price expectation is a consumer judgment of how expected the focal price is.  
2.2.5 Locus of Control 
Weiner’s (1974) attribution theory identifies locus of control as a cause of action or 
outcome. Locus of control determines whether the location of a cause (control) is ascribed as 
internal or external to an actor (Rotter 1954). In this study, internal control implies a situation 
when prices are controlled by the retailers, and external control implies a condition when market 
factors, external to the retailers, determine prices.  
Rotter’s social learning theory describes locus of control as an individual belief that 
locates causes of events (Rotter 1954). Some people, driven by internal locus of control, believe 
that they have substantial influence on their lives, actions, and outcomes, whereas some, 
influenced by external locus of control, believe that they are relatively powerless and have little 
control over outcomes (McCarty and Shrum 2001).  
To explain the reasons behind peoples’ actions, Heider (1944) and Weiner (1974) 
introduced attribution theory, which adds dimensions such as stability and controllability to 
Rotter’s theory. In psychology, locus of control is applied widely in areas such as obesity 
(Saltzer 1982), mental health (Wood and Letak 1982), gender differences (Schultz and Schultz 
2005), and cross-cultural differences (Shiraev and Levy 2004). In managerial decision making, 
locus of control explains how managers attribute reasons for organizational success (Chebat et al. 
1992). In marketing, Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2003) use attribution theory to highlight the 
roles of causality, controllability, and stability in explaining price fairness. Maxwell (2002) uses 
locus of control to explain how consumers attribute reasons for determining their rule-based 
price fairness.  
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2.2.6 Judgment /Intent Order  
Judgment/intent order denotes the order in which consumers use judgment tasks or 
purchase intent tasks to evaluate a focal price. Behavioral decision theory shows that consumers’ 
constructed preferences depend on levels of elicitation (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). Studies 
demonstrating preference reversals show systematic differences between choice and preference 
despite identical elicitation (Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). González-Vallejo et al. (1994) find 
that choice order is important for judgment tasks that consist of numeric and non numeric 
probabilities. Van De Kaa (2004) demonstrates how preference is contingent on choice context 
and on the order in which choice options are presented.  
2.2.7 Judgment Environment 
Price judgments are context dependant (Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989). The context in 
which consumers make judgments is known as the judgment environment. Consumers evaluate a 
focal price against a reference standard (Biswas and Blair 1991; Niedrich et al. 2001). How the 
reference prices are retrieved in a judgment environment influences price judgment (Lichtenstein 
and Bearden 1989; Niedrich et al.2001). Judgment environment describes the source of reference 
price information and is conceptualized in two ways: a) memory-based context; and b) stimulus-
based context (Biswas and Blair 1991).  
In memory-based contexts, consumers retrieve reference prices from memory. Memory-
based contexts generate internal reference price as a single price, multiple prices, or as a range of 
values (Monroe 1984). Researchers have conceptualized internal reference prices in many ways, 
such as fair price, lowest or highest price, normal market price (Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989), 
or average or expected market price (Emory 1970),  but they hardly agree on the type that is 
most important or prevalent (Jacobson and Obermiller 1990). Two important cognitive 
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mechanisms, the numerosity heuristic and the availability heuristic explain how consumers 
retrieve reference price information from memory (Ofir et al. 2008). Numerosity heuristic refers 
to the number of sample prices that consumers are able to retrieve (Pelham et al. 1994), while 
availability heuristic refers to the ease at which consumers can recall price information (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973).   
In stimulus-based contexts, consumers rely on externally provided reference prices to 
judge a focal price (Biswas and Blair 1991; Grewal et al. 1998; Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989; 
Lichtenstein et al. 1991). External reference prices vary in how they are framed (e.g., “Was $x, 
Now $y,” “List price/current price,” “Their price/our price,”). Stimulus-based context can be 
provided through multiple ways including retail channels, advertising, catalogs, search engines, 
and price lists. In stimulus-based contexts, retailers use comparative pricing strategies to create a 
perception of higher savings or higher values (Biswas and Blair 1991).  
The effect of judgment environment on price judgments are explained using three main 
theories: a) adaptation-level theory (Helson 1964); b) assimilation-contrast theory (Sherif and 
Hovland 1964); and c) transaction-utility theory (Thaler 1985). Adaptation-level theory assumes 
that contextual prices are integrated into a single reference price, as reference standard against 
which a focal price is judged high, fair, or acceptable (Biswas and Blair 1991). Assimilation-
contrast theory suggests that focal price is assimilated and accepted when it is within an 
individual’s latitude of acceptable prices, and contrasted when it falls outside that range of 
acceptable prices (Monroe and Petroshius 1981). Transaction-utility theory predicts that the 
difference between a focal price and the internal reference price, known as transaction utility of 
an offer, affects price judgment. External reference price is intended to increase consumers’ 
internal reference prices, so that transaction utility increases (Biswas and Blair 1991).       
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2.2.8 Purchase Intent 
Purchase intent is defined as the degree to which a consumer is willing to buy a product 
(Dodds et al. 1991). It represents consumer intent or beliefs, rather than actual choice.  
2.3 HYPOTHESES 
2.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
Price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, as defined in Chapter 1, are 
distinct price judgments because of differences in underlying cognitive and affective processes. 
Price fairness is a combination of affective and cognitive processes (Xia et al. 2004), but price 
magnitude and price expectation reflect only cognitive processes. Dual-entitlement theory 
(Kahneman et al. 1986), equity theory (Adams 1965), and distributive-justice theory (Homans 
1961) suggest that consumers do not rely only on the magnitude aspect of prices. In addition to 
magnitude comparisons, consumers activate ethics, norms, or beliefs while judging fairness of 
focal prices, leading to evaluative price judgments that reflect affective dimensions (Xia et al. 
2004). Also, when cognitive evaluations of focal prices are difficult, consumers rely on feelings 
to judge focal prices (Liu and Soman 2008). Therefore, it can be argued that price fairness is an 
evaluative judgment constructed using both cognition and affect (Xia and Monroe 2005).  
However, consumers’ affective thoughts are unlikely to dominate their numerical 
cognition, a cognitive process applied to compare numbers. Size estimation, reflected in price 
magnitude, is dependent on cognitive elaboration (Coulter and Coulter 2005). Literature on 
numerical cognition suggests that price magnitude involves cognitive comparison of a focal price 
to a referred anchor (Coulter and Coulter 2005; Lynch et al. 1991; Thomas and Morwitz 2009). 
This implies that consumers locate a focal price within a set of ordered, contextual prices to 
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determine price magnitude. Hence, price magnitude is considered a cognitive, comparative 
judgment.  
Price expectation, as defined in Chapter 1, is a similarity judgment which combines two 
judgment stages: prediction and comparison. At the first stage, consumers use predictive 
judgment to construct an expected price, which they use to judge the proximity of a focal price.  
Price magnitude and price expectation are both comparative judgments, but they differ in 
how they generate the reference standards. Price expectation depends on belief about future 
prices. Price magnitude creates its reference anchor by integrating available, contextual prices. 
The cognitive process of integration is different from prediction (Neimeyer et al. 1983). 
Therefore price expectation differs from price magnitude.  
Since it incorporates prediction, price expectation is an inductive inference, but price 
magnitude depends on a standard available at the moment, rather than on a possible or predicted 
anchor. Hence price magnitude is a deductive inference, different than the inductive process 
found in price expectation.  
Price expectation and price magnitude, which are cognitive in nature, differ from price 
fairness, which is a combination of cognitive and affective processes. Hence:   
H1: While correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are different 
constructs.   
2.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
Price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation depend on comparisons to 
reference standards. Consumers perceive any focal price lower than the reference standard as fair 
and low in magnitude, and any price higher than the reference standard to be unfair and high in 
magnitude (Bechwati et al. 2005;  Xia and Monroe 2005). As focal price increases, price fairness 
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declines and price magnitude increases. So price fairness represents a negatively sloped curve, 
and price magnitude represents a positively sloped curve. Price expectation compares focal price 
to an anticipated price. Because consumers believe extreme prices are less frequent, price 
expectations are low at two extreme (high and low) focal prices, and higher at the mean focal 
price, generating an inverted U-shaped curve. The predicted patterns of the three price judgments 
are hypothesized below and represented in Figure 2.1. 
H2: (a) Price fairness is a negatively sloped function of focal price; (b) price magnitude is 
a positively sloped function of focal price; and (c) price expectation displays an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with focal price. 
 
Figure 2.1 Hypothesized relationships of price judgments to focal price 
 
2.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
Anderson's (1981) information integration theory illustrates that overt responses to focal 
stimuli are outcomes of intermediate judgment stages (Niedrich et al. 2001). Research in 
psychology concurs that judgment is strongly related to choice (Petty et al. 1994), and that the 
effect of stimuli on behavioral intentions in mediated by judgments (Siu 2007). Pricing research 
has established that price judgments affect willingness to purchase, a type of behavioral intention 
(Jacoby and Olson 1977; Kahneman et al.1986; Kalapurakal et al.1991) and choice (Winer 
1988). Maxwell (2002) suggests that price fairness mediates the effect of focal price on 
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willingness to purchase. Focal prices also influence purchase intent through price magnitude 
(Coulter and Coulter 2005).  
However, price expectation is less diagnostic (Helgeson and Beatty 1985). Analyzing 
diagnosticity of price judgments based on levels of attention, meaning orientation, and 
processing orientation, Helgeson and Beaty (1985) posit that price expectation operates on the 
lower end of the processing continuum, signifying non-evaluative, low-attention, and low-
resource based price judgment. Because expectation-based judgments are less diagnostic, 
possessing lower activation strength (Helgeson and Beatty 1985), price expectation would have 
no mediating impact on subsequent purchase decisions. This leads to the following hypothesis:          
H3: (a) Price fairness and (b) price magnitude mediate the effect of focal price on 
purchase intent; (c) price expectation does not mediate the effect of focal price on 
purchase intent. 
2.3.4 Hypothesis 4 
Consumers’ feelings affect their evaluations (Schwarz 1997). Affect, as an information 
processing source, plays a vital role in evaluative judgments (Schwarz and Clore 1996; Wyer and 
Carlstone 1979). Positive feelings lead to favorable evaluative judgments, whereas negative 
feelings lead to unfavorable evaluations (Pham 1998; Schwarz 1997; Winkielman et al. 2003). 
Studies also show that affective judgments are perceptually stronger than cognitive evaluations 
(Edwards 1990). Attitude research also finds that impact of affective attitude on judgment is 
stronger than cognitive attitude (Fazio et al. 1982). 
 Accessibility of affective and cognitive components, the speed with which an evaluative 
component is accessed from memory, influences subsequent behavior and decision making in an 
affect consistent manner; that is, quickly accessed components affect behavioral intentions most 
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strongly (Fazio et al. 1982). Extant research also supports affect primacy, which shows that in a 
similar context, affect components are more readily available than cognitive components 
(Verplanken et al. 1998), because a) cognition follows affect (Isen 1984); that is, affective 
thoughts are more fundamental, basic, and more likely than is cognition (Bargh et al. 1989; 
Zajonc 1980); b) cognition depends on comparison to referent conditions, making it resource-
dependant, and slower than affect (Verplanken et al. 1998);  c) affect is not verified for truth or 
accuracy, but cognition relies on comparative assessment, which can be judged for accuracy 
(Verplanken et al. 1998); and d) affective judgments are often irrevocable, because people tend 
not to question their own feelings (Zajonc 1980). Research shows that consumers place more 
confidence in affect-based evaluations than in cognitive judgments (Edwards 1990). But 
Edwards (1990) also shows that cognition and affect may jointly influence consumer decisions 
(Edwards 1990). It is reasonable to argue that compared to cognitive price judgments, affect-
based price judgments will have a larger impact on purchase intent. Because price fairness is an 
affective judgment, its effect on purchase intent will be stronger than price magnitude. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Price fairness has a stronger effect on purchase intent than does price magnitude.  
2.3.5 Hypothesis 5 
 Affect primacy theory suggests that affective reactions may involve minimal stimulus 
contribution and have limited or no cognitive processing, and shows that response time for 
affective judgment is significantly less than cognitive judgments (Zajonc 1980). Emotion rich 
judgments, outside of cognitive awareness, cloud impressions and generate judgments which are 
prompt and quick (Murphy and Zajonc 1993).  
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Of the three price judgments considered here, price fairness is the only price judgment 
with affective characteristics. Price fairness is expected to be quicker than price magnitude and 
price expectation, which require cognition. This leads to the following hypothesis. 
H5: Response times are faster for price fairness than for (a) price magnitude and (b) price 
expectation. 
2.3.6 Hypothesis 6 
It has been argued that individual price judgments are different from each other. Thus, 
judgment environment (i.e., memory-based or stimulus-based context) is expected to influence 
price judgments differently. In particular, price expectation, which involves a predicted 
(expected) price, would differ if the predicted value differs under memory-based and stimulus-
based contexts.  
As defined, price expectation is determined by comparing a focal price to an expected 
price. Price expectation entails two judgment processes: a prediction and a comparison. Although 
the comparison process should not change between the two conditions, the process of prediction 
would differ between memory- and stimulus-based contexts primarily because a) the task for 
generating a predicted price is easier under stimulus-based than under memory-based context 
(Helgeson and Beatty 1987); b) with an easier task for predicting a price, consumers show 
greater confidence and accuracy under stimulus-based than under memory-based context 
(Delvecchio et al. 2007); and c) in a memory-based context, with lower confidence in the 
accuracy of the predicted price, consumers will place lower weights on the contextually retrieved 
price (Delvecchio et al. 2007).  
Therefore, in a memory-based context, a systematic bias towards the focal price shifts the 
expected price (referred anchor) closer to the focal price, and thereby results in weaker contrasts 
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(Delvecchio et al. 2007), as compared to a stimulus-based context, when all the contextual prices 
are available, and consumers are able to eliminate any systematic biases. We expect larger 
contrasts from the focal price under stimulus-based contexts.  
Other price judgments would be less vulnerable to systematic biases due to retrieval 
errors. For example, price fairness is mainly influenced by affect, thus the judgment environment 
should not influence price fairness.  Price magnitude is a comparative judgment, and does not 
involve a predictive process. Therefore, it should not be different across memory- and stimulus-
based contexts. This leads to the following hypothesis, which is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
H6: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by an interaction 
between focal price and judgment environment; (b) price expectation is lower in a 
stimulus-based context than in a memory-based context at low and high focal prices, 
but does not differ across contexts at the mid focal price.   
 
Figure 2.2 Hypothesized effects of judgment environment on price expectation  
 
2.3.7 Hypothesis 7 
Locus of control ascribes cause to an action or an outcome (Rotter 1954). Using 
attribution-affect-action theory, Schmidt and Weiner (1988) find that reasons attributed to 
controllable causes produce anger, and uncontrollable causes generate pity. Their findings also 
highlight that while attributing causes, locus of control generates affect, which influences 
judgment. Weiner et al. (1974) also find consistent results that locus of control affects feelings 
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and affective states.  Green et al. (1994) use ego-serving bias theory, which highlights that 
internal locus of control generates affect to satisfy ego-serving responses.  
Consumers’ derived reasons for a retailer’s offer price affect price fairness, because it is 
an affective judgment (Campbell 2002). In addition to monetary sacrifice (economic rule) of 
price fairness, Campbell (2002) finds that social acceptability (social rule) of price fairness is 
also an important determinant of willingness to purchase. Similar views resonate in Xia and 
Monroe (2005) who find price fairness to be driven by a combination of affective and cognitive 
calculations. 
Consumers consider focal prices fair when sellers are perceived to have little or no 
control over prices (Campbell 1999; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 2003). High prices may not 
necessarily result in lower price fairness, because consumers’ inferred reasons of locus of control 
may provide support to the retailer. The same price could create low price fairness if consumers 
suspect that the seller is exerting control. Because locus of control affects affective judgment, it 
is expected to influence price fairness, and not price magnitude or price expectation, in an affect-
consistent manner. This leads to the following hypothesis, illustrated in Figure 2.3.  
H7: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by locus of control; 
(b) price fairness is higher under external control than under internal control.   
 
Figure 2.3 Hypothesized effects of locus of control on price judgments  
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2.3.8 Hypothesis 8 
Determining practical relevance of price judgments requires discerning whether price 
fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are outcomes of directed elicitations, or are 
naturally undertaken in actual decision-making contexts. One way to address this question would 
be to compare responses between instances when price judgment precedes or follows a purchase 
intent task, henceforth referred to as judgment/intent order. In other words, changing 
judgment/intent order could suggest which price judgments occur naturally. Before consumers 
commit to a purchase intent task, they would undertake a price judgment if it is naturally 
occurring. Identical price judgment responses, irrespective of judgment/intent order, are 
indicative of judgments that take place without conscious priming. If price judgments depend on 
experimenter induced elicitation process, mean price judgments are expected to differ when 
judgment/intent order changes.  
Price expectation may be affected by judgment/intent order. Cognitive phenomenology 
theory suggests that cognitive and affective components are the two most natural outcomes while 
judging a focal object. But constructing a prediction and using it as a judgment standard of 
comparison requires effort and deliberation (Clore 1992).Such construction is plausible only 
when consumers are primed for it. Lacking confidence in knowledge about actual market-prices, 
consumers are unlikely to adopt price expectation naturally.  Hence this leads to the following 
hypothesis illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
H8: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by 
judgment/intent order; (b) price expectation is lower under judgment first than under 
intent first condition. 
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Figure 2.4 Hypothesized effects of judgment/intent order on price judgments  
 
2.4 METHODOLOGY  
 Structural equation modeling and repeated measures ANOVA have been used in this 
research to test the proposed hypotheses. Structural equation model (SEM) determines viability 
of the measurement model, and predicts path coefficients between latent constructs. SEM finds 
correlations between latent constructs, and determines measurement errors and residual errors 
(Kline 1998). Even in the presence of collinearity, SEM estimates regression coefficients with 
multiple dependent and independent variables. SEM uses confirmatory factor analysis to 
diagnose unidimensionality of constructs. In addition to computing measurement errors, SEM 
allows multiple model comparisons, or suggests alternative models by assessing relative model 
fits (Kline 1998).   
A structural model proposed in this chapter predicts the effects of three focal prices (low, 
medium, and high) on purchase intent, mediated by price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation. In this model, locus of control is assumed to influence price fairness, and 
judgment/intent order is expected to influence price expectation. Additionally, judgment 
environment is conceptualized to moderate the effect of focal prices on price expectation. To test 
for moderation, a multi-group approach is employed. Changes in path coefficients (of the same 
path) across groups suggest a moderating effect of the grouping factor (Barron and Kenney 
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1986). In addition, analysis based on repeated measures ANOVA is also performed to determine 
empirical support for the proposed hypotheses.   
2.4.1 Pretests  
2.4.1.1 Pretest 1 
2.4.1.1.1 Purpose 
Price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, and purchase intent have been 
measured in this study using multi-item scales. Researchers have used open-ended questions or 
consumers’ self-reported estimates as measures of price judgments (Grewal et al 1998; 
Lichtenstein and Bearden 1989). Measures generated from statements such as “Give us an 
estimate of a price you consider to be high, low, fair, expected etc.” have been used in past 
studies to assess various price judgments (Biswas and Blair 1991). These measures at best 
capture price predictions. These measures neither represent a specific price judgment nor do they 
distinguish between various price judgments. 
 Research shows that price judgments are encoded and retained in memory as non- 
numeric evaluations (Dehane 1995). Questions asking precise numerical estimates to represent 
various price judgments are expected to be flawed. Unavailability of non-numerical scales to 
uniquely measure price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation required developing 
new, reliable and valid scales. The new scales should allow researchers to measure price 
judgments rather than their reported predictions. A major challenge in developing an accurate 
price judgment scale is finding words that would elicit accurate price judgments.  
Purchase intent is also studied in this research as an outcome of price judgments. This 
scale is adopted from an existing willingness to buy scale (Grewal etal. 1998) and adjusted for 
present context. The purchase intent measure used in this research consists of three items with 
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nine scale points. Between two end points of very low to very high, the scale items were: “The 
likelihood that I would purchase the car polish at the given price is….,” “The probability that I 
would consider buying the car polish at the given price is….,” and “My willingness to buy the car 
polish at the given price is….” 
Surprisingly, no research has developed multi-items measures for the three price 
judgments. Therefore, two pretests were conducted to develop scales for price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation. Standard scale development procedures were employed to test 
the psychometric properties of the multi-item measures.  
2.4.1.1.2 Sample  
 
In pretest 1, participants were undergraduate business students at Louisiana State 
University who were awarded with participatory credit for taking part in this study. Pretest 1 was 
conducted over two weeks, and generated a sample of 48 students. After adjusting for 
respondents who used the scales incorrectly or provided incomplete answers, the final sample 
consisted of 43 respondents.   
2.4.1.1.3 Design and Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a behavioral computer lab, under controlled settings. 
Each study session was one hour in duration, and was conducted at approximately the same time 
of the day. Respondents were instructed to carefully follow the instructions on a computer screen 
and respond to questions on the screen by using an attached keyboard. E-prime was used to 
develop and execute this pretest, which allowed response time for each question to be recorded 
unobtrusively. To control for possible external distractions such as noise or environmental 
interference, each respondent was placed in a small, individual cubicle in the lab.  
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Pretest 1 used nine-point, semantic differential scales with ten items for price fairness, 
nine items for price magnitude, and nine items for price expectations. Each price judgment item 
was chosen based on existing literature review and a list of synonyms generated that resembled 
the underlying price judgment construct. Bipolar antonyms, chosen to represent a price judgment 
construct, served as anchors on respective scales. The price magnitude scale was reverse ordered, 
while the price fairness and price expectation scales were positively directed, to give the scales 
consistent meaning. This was considered necessary to reduce subjects’ interpretational difficulty 
(i.e., a higher value on price magnitude scale suggests a lower price fairness or price 
expectation). To further reduce incorrect use of scale items, reversed scales were intentionally 
avoided. The judgment-priming word was underlined in bold font once in the question and again 
as end-point anchors on each scale. Each scale displayed nine scale points below each sentence. 
The only word that differed on each item was the thought-priming word in each sentence and the 
two bipolar anchors. A typical question is shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 An example of a price judgment scale item (price fairness) 
    Price Fairness -1 
How fair [thought priming word] is the price of this card reader? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
very              very 
 fair        unfair 
 
An image of a fictitious car polish was displayed on the initial screen, to provide realism 
to the context. Product choice was based on results from an earlier pretest where car polish, 
among other products, generated the least product knowledge and least price confidence among 
subjects. Product knowledge and price confidence has been found to influence price judgments 
(Rao and Sieben 1992; Thomas and Menon  2007). To minimize potential confounds, car polish 
was chosen for this pretest.   
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Participants were provided nine contextual prices (i.e., reference prices that are not 
judged) and three focal prices (i.e., prices that are judged). The nine contextual prices were: 
$15.00, $16.25, $18.00, $19.50, $21.00, $22.50, $24.00, $25.50, and $27.00. The three focal 
prices were $8.99, $20.99, and $32.99. Focal prices and the contextual prices followed a uniform 
distribution and were held constant for all participants. Throughout the experiment, the range, 
mean, and distributions of the contextual prices were kept constant. The three focal prices were 
chosen so that the low focal price was lower than all contextual prices, the mid focal price was at 
the mean of the contextual prices, and the high focal price was higher than all the contextual 
prices. The three focal prices (high, medium and low) were equidistant from each other and from 
the contextual prices. 
To create the memory-based context, the nine prices were randomly chosen and 
individually presented on nine screens. In the stimulus-based context, all nine prices were 
simultaneously displayed on the screen. After all contextual prices were displayed on screen, 
subjects were shown a single (focal) price and asked to provide their price judgments (i.e., 28 
measurement items) and purchase intent responses (i.e., three measurement items). Once a focal 
price was evaluated, and responses were collected, the same process was repeated for the two 
other focal prices.  
2.4.1.1.4 Results 
 In order to allow for standard reliability tests with a minimum number of items, the goal 
of the pretests was to identify four items each for price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation. The initial items along with the final items retained are provided in appendix (Table 
A.2.1 - A.2.3). 
Each scale was subjected to several iterations of scale reliability tests. In each iteration 
the least effective item of each scale was identified and eliminated from subsequent iterations. 
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Various diagnostic criteria for testing scale reliability were considered. Items resulting in largest 
gain in alpha (if item deleted), along with other criteria, such as corrected item-total correlation 
(at least 0.7), squared multiple correlations (0.5 or more), and inter-item correlations (at least 
0.5) were given due considerations. The same approach was adopted for price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation. Appendix Table A.2.4 shows items dropped for price fairness, 
price magnitude, and price expectations at each iteration. The final scale reliability and scale 
items retained are also shown in Table A.2.4. 
The twelve selected items (four for each of the three price judgments), were subjected to 
factor analysis; the rotated component matrix and number of eigenvalues greater than one 
produce two orthogonal factors (Table 2.2) instead of the expected three factor solution.  
 
Table 2.2 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix, pretest 1) 
Items Factor1 Factor2 
Fair 0.797 0.408 
Reasonable 0.812 0.418 
Satisfactory 0.829 0.269 
Acceptable 0.819 0.318 
Attractive 0.927 -0.089 
Desirable 0.890 -0.075 
Appealing 0.900 -0.042 
Good 0.751 0.206 
Expected 0.207 0.830 
Predictable 0.103 0.829 
Common 0.050 0.833 
Ordinary 0.103 0.845 
 
 
Although the four items of the price expectation load on a single factor, the rotated factor 
loadings suggest weak separation of price magnitude and price fairness items. Unexpectedly, the 
price magnitude and price fairness items loaded on the same factor. The two factors shown in 
Table 2.2 indicate the need for further scale refinement which is conducted in the second pretest. 
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2.4.1.2   Pretest 2 
2.4.1.2.1 Purpose 
 The purpose of this pretest was to refine the price magnitude measure.  
2.4.1.2.2 Sample  
For pretest 2, undergraduate business students at Louisiana State University were used as 
study participants. These students were awarded participatory credits for taking part in this study. 
This student group is familiar with the facility and with computer-run studies. Pretest 2 generated 
a sample of 111 students. After adjusting for incomplete or incorrect responses, 102 respondents 
could be used for this pretest analysis. 
2.4.1.2.3 Design and Procedure 
 
 This pretest followed identical procedures as pretest 1. This pretest used nine-point, 
semantic differential scales with four items for price fairness, four items for price expectation, 
and three items for purchase intent; all these items were retained from pretest 1. As in pretest 1, 
ten items were chosen for price magnitude out of a 15-word synonyms list that were deemed to 
be close in meaning to price magnitude. Bipolar antonyms served as scale anchors. The price 
magnitude scale was reverse-ordered, while price fairness and price expectation scales were 
positively directed to give the scales consistent meaning, and to reduce subjects’ interpretational 
errors. As in pretest 1, the judgment-priming word, underlined and in bold font, was displayed 
once in the question, and was an end-point anchor on each scale.  
 An image of the same car polish from pretest 1 was displayed on the initial screen, to 
provide realism to the context. The same nine contextual prices and three focal prices were 
retained from pretest 1. After all the contextual prices were displayed, subjects were shown a 
single focal price and asked to provide price judgments (i.e., 18 items provided in Table A.2.2) 
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and purchase intent responses (i.e., three items). Once the focal price was evaluated, and the 
responses were collected, the same process was repeated for two other focal prices, keeping the 
range, mean, and distributions of the contextual prices the same for each type of price judgment.  
Data for this pretest were collected online using Qualtrics. Each condition was generated as a 
separate link to be randomly distributed to survey participants.     
2.4.1.2.4 Results 
 
The new price magnitude items were first tested for reliability. Appendix Table A.2.5 
summarizes price magnitude items dropped in each iteration of pretest 2, the criteria used to 
eliminate items at each stage, and the final best items retained for price magnitude scale. The 
final four-item price magnitude scale confirmed high scale reliability (alpha = 0.980).  
Factor analysis results show a clear three-factor solution to support unidmensionality of 
the three price judgment constructs (Table 2.3). The rotated solutions show the largest item 
loadings only on factors to which they are conceptually related. Table A.2.5 displays the factor 
analysis results of this pretest. 
Table 2.3 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix, pretest 2) 
Price judgment  
scale items 
Factors 
1              2          3 
(at low focal price) 
Factors 
1              2          3 
(at mid focal price) 
Factors 
1              2          3 
(at high focal price) 
Fair 0.124 0.113 0.755 0.837 0.358 0.269 0.837 0.358 0.269 
Reasonable 0.219 0.000 0.802 0.859 0.325 0.300 0.859 0.325 0.300 
Satisfactory 0.002 -0.044 0.829 0.874 0.330 0.218 0.874 0.330 0.218 
Acceptable 0.177 -0.033 0.789 0.876 0.314 0.237 0.876 0.314 0.237 
Low 0.802 -0.103 0.144 0.359 0.207 0.745 0.359 0.207 0.745 
Small 0.939 -0.168 0.104 0.228 0.120 0.879 0.228 0.120 0.879 
Little 0.927 -0.077 0.197 0.199 -0.004 0.885 0.199 -0.004 0.885 
Tiny 0.827 -0.143 0.129 0.098 0.085 0.874 0.098 0.085 0.874 
Expected -0.015 0.908 -0.011 0.301 0.816 0.092 0.301 0.816 0.092 
Predictable -0.041 0.909 -0.022 0.296 0.865 0.152 0.296 0.865 0.152 
Common -0.177 0.863 0.015 0.228 0.874 0.070 0.228 0.874 0.070 
Ordinary -0.298 0.833 0.067 0.280 0.869 0.076 0.280 0.869 0.076 
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 Table 2.3 shows clear segregation of three price judgments at each price level. The scale 
reliability and factor analysis results suggest that the final price judgment scales display 
acceptable reliability and unidimensionality.      
2.4.2 Main Study 
2.4.2.1 Purpose 
 This study collected data to test the proposed hypotheses.  The main objective of this 
study was to determine the effects of focal price and three proposed factors–locus of control, 
judgment environment, and judgment/intent order–on three price judgments, and purchase intent.  
2.4.2.2 Sample  
Four hundred undergraduate business students at Louisiana State University participated 
in this study in exchange for extra credit. The experiment took approximately 30 minutes to 
complete and was conducted in groups of approximately 25 students in a computerized 
behavioral laboratory.  
2.4.2.3 Design and Procedure 
Subjects were asked to pay close attention to the information presented to them on the 
computer screen. E-prime was used to develop and execute the experiment, which allowed 
response times for each question to be recorded unobtrusively. To control possible external 
distractions such as noise or other environmental interference, each respondent was provided a 
small individual cubicle in the lab.  
The experimental design consisted of three between-subjects factors: locus of control 
(external vs. internal); judgment environment (memory- vs. stimulus-based context); and 
judgment/intent order (judgment first vs. intent first). One within-subjects factor was also 
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employed: focal price ($8.99, $20.99, and $32.99, representing low, mid, and high focal price 
respectively). This created a 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 mixed design. 
Locus of control was manipulated by describing a reason for the seller charging each 
particular focal price. In the external locus of control condition, subjects were told that there was 
a change in the cost of raw materials.  In the internal locus of control condition, subjects were 
told that there was a change in the retailer’s business objectives and pricing policies. 
To manipulate judgment environment, contextual prices were either individually 
presented on nine subsequent screens (memory-based context), or simultaneously displayed on 
the screen (stimulus-based context). In the memory-based context, subjects were instructed to 
remember the prices, because contextual prices would not be available during their judgment and 
purchase intent tasks. In the stimulus-based context, subjects could see all the contextual prices 
on each screen while they answered judgment and purchase intent questions.  
To manipulate judgment/intent order, price judgment questions were administered prior 
to the purchase intent items in the judgment first condition. In the intent first condition, the 
purchase intent questions were administered prior to the price judgment items.  
Once all the contextual prices had been displayed, the focal prices were presented. The 
three focal prices were chosen so the low focal price was lower than all contextual prices, the 
mid focal price was at the mean of the contextual prices, and the high focal price was higher than 
all contextual prices. To maintain a uniform price distribution, a consistent $12.00 difference was 
kept between focal prices: $8.99 (low), $20.99 (mid), and $32.99 (high). Also, the low and high 
focal prices were located at the same distance (with a difference of $6.00) from the minimum 
and maximum of the contextual prices. 
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After price context was established, one randomly chosen price from the three focal 
prices was displayed at the center of the screen, highlighted boldly with black borders. As the 
location of the focal price stayed fixed, price judgment, purchase intent, and anger questions 
were asked sequentially. Once a focal price was evaluated for price fairness, price magnitude, 
price expectation, and purchase intent, the same process was repeated for the two other focal 
prices. The display order of every focal price and the contextual prices was kept constant for 
individual subjects, but randomized across subjects.   
2.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The main study was conducted to test hypotheses proposed in this chapter. In this section, 
scale reliability and validity for the three price judgments are evaluated, then results related to 
the structural model are shown with a focus on relevant hypotheses, and analyses based on 
repeated measures ANOVA are discussed.  
2.5.1 Scale Reliability and Validity Assessment 
Measurement theory suggests that summated scales comprising interrelated items should 
satisfy reliability and validity tests for drawing accurate, reliable, and valid conclusions 
(Cronbach 1951). Reliability measures the degree to which a scale is consistent whenever used, 
and validity measures the degree to which interrelated items truly capture the underlying 
construct. Since replication and precision are major concerns for any scientific inquiry, focus on 
reliability and validity has always been of prime importance in marketing (Hair et al 1998). 
Given the subjectivity involved in marketing scales, scale reliability and validity are particularly 
necessary.  
 Cronbach alpha tests internal consistency of scale reliability. It ranges from 0 to 1 with 
higher scores signifying greater reliability (Hair et al 1998).  Nunnaly (1978) suggests 0.7 as a 
minimum acceptable limit for alpha values.  As alpha is considered a less restrictive estimate of 
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reliability, a more stringent, two-stage alternative test uses composite reliability and average 
variance extracted (AVE) for confirming reliability (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Composite 
reliability measures the proportion of true variance each indicator reflects across all other 
indicators of a latent construct. AVE measures the common variance shared among indicators of 
a latent construct (Hair et al. 1998). 
 Convergent and discriminant validity are frequently referred to as the most important 
aspects of construct validity (Trochim 2000). AVE (Fornell and Larcker 1991) and Cronbach 
alpha have been proposed in the literature as measures to verify convergent validity. Dillon and 
Goldstein (1991) and Bagozzi (1991) suggest an alpha greater than 0.7 and AVE greater than 0.5 
as adequate support for convergent validity. Confirmatory factor analysis, AVE method (Fornell 
and Larcker 1991), and structural equation methods are accepted as tests to confirm discriminant 
validity of underlying latent constructs.  
 Data analysis, provided in Table 2.4, shows that each price judgment scale conforms to 
the reliability tests discussed above. 
Table 2.4 Reliability of price judgment scales 
  Scale 
Alpha 
Composite 
reliability  
AVE 
Price fairness scale 0.958 0.958 0.853 
Price magnitude scale 0.980 0.980 0.926 
Price expectation scale 0.935 0.935 0.783 
   
 Each Cronbach alpha is greater than 0.7, and item-to-total correlations and squared 
multiple correlations for all scale items are satisfactory. Composite scale reliabilities for the price 
judgments are more than 0.7, and AVEs for the price judgments are more than 0.5. Composite-
reliability and the Cronbach alphas turned out to be identical, suggesting tau-equivalence of the 
scale items. Taken together, these results show that price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation satisfy scale reliability.   
57 
 
 To verify whether price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations are different 
judgments, each price judgment scale is tested for discriminant validity. Table 2.5 illustrates 
results from the confirmatory factor analysis (using a CFA analysis in AMOS). In addition, 
Table 2.6 shows results from the (rotated) component matrix of factor analysis, suggesting the 
unidimensionality and distinctness of the constructs.  
Table 2.5 Confirmatory factor analysis results for price judgment scales 
Price judgment Squared standardized 
loadings 
AVE of 
summated 
scale 
correlations 
φ
2
<  AVE 
Price fairness (PF)  1            2          3          4 
0.915  0.929  0.931  0.920 
0.853 YES 
Price magnitude (PM)  
 
1           2           3          4 
0.965  0.969  0.965  0.952 
0.926 YES 
Price expectation (PE)  
 
1             2          3         4 
0.902  0.877  0.885  0.877  
0.783 YES 
   
 
Table 2.6 Factor loadings (component matrix, main study) 
Scale scale items Factors 
1            2         3 
(at low focal price) 
Factors 
1        2         3 
(at mid focal price) 
Factors 
1         2        3 
(at high focal price) 
Price fairness fair 0.024 0.038 0.697  0.867   0.154 0.163 0.277 0.766 0.275 
 reasonable 0.035 0.080 0.759  0.834   0.216 0.160 0.251 0.830 0.236 
 satisfactory 0.232 -0.039  0.741 0.810 0.248 0.135 0.215 0.793 0.146 
 acceptable 0.160 0.049  0.721 0.883 0.167 0.070 0.262 0.722 0.281 
Price 
magnitude 
low 0.804 -0.083 0.103 0.190 0.815 0.045 0.831 0.278 0.149 
 small 0.833 -0.102 0.197 0.216 0.840 0.105 0.845 0.220 0.157 
 little 0.868 -0.082 0.108 0.176 0.865 0.089 0.819 0.236 0.181 
 tiny 0.745 -0.137  0.067 0.167 0.851   0.128 0.868 0.228  0.158 
Price 
expectation 
expected -0.043 0.840 0.006 0.073   0.023   0.835   0.213 0.168 0.825 
 predictable -0.076 0.810 0.041 0.172   0.096   0.799  0.206 0.173 0.799 
 common -0.100 0.810 0.079 0.090   0.102   0.819   0.145 0.307 0.734 
 ordinary -0.178 0.794 0.022 0.136   0.120   0.809  0.055 0.188 0.775 
 
  
 Table 2.5 shows that squared standardized loading for each item is high, AVEs are more 
than 0.7, and square roots of AVEs are more than correlations among the judgments scales (φ2). 
The factor analysis results from Table 2.6 show each item loading highly on appropriate 
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underlying constructs. These findings provide evidence for the discriminant validity of price 
fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation.   
2.5.2 Structural Model Assessment and Hypothesis Testing 
2.5.2.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 A confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the four endogenous constructs (see 
Figure A.2.1), with 15 items to assess reliability, dimensionality, and discriminant validity of the 
scales used in this model (Netemeyer, et al. 2003). Results from the confirmatory factor analysis 
are summarized in Table 2.7. Model fit statistics show adequate model fit. The overall minimum 
chi-square statistic (CMIN) is 294.021. CMIN, a discrepancy function measuring the difference 
between model-predicted and actual covariance matrix (input matrix), is found to be an 
acceptable 3.500 (with degrees of freedom=84). The normed fit index (NFI), the goodness of fit 
(GFI) and adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) are within suggested ranges, at 0.988, 0.960, and 
0.949.  The comparative fit index (CFI), robust to sampling characteristics, is 0.991, and the 
root-mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), supportive of a more complex model, is 
0.048. Other indices, such as Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Brown-Cudeck Criterion 
(BCC), which penalize for greater model complexity or over-parameterization, are 366.021 and 
367.089. Each of these statistics support adequate overall model fit for the measurement model 
(Kline 2005; Netemeyer et al. 2003). In addition, results from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 demonstrate 
that all the scale reliability values are more than the accepted minimum (0.7), and none of the 
AVEs are found to be less than 0.50 (minimum limit for unidimensionality). The range for 
standardized factor loadings is 0.91 to 0.93 for price fairness, 0.95 to 0.97 for price magnitude, 
and 0.87 to 0.90 for price expectation. Each item-to-factor loading is significant (p<0.01). Taken 
together, the composite reliability, factor loadings, AVE, and factor correlations provide strong 
support for reliability, discriminant validity, and unidimensionality of the price judgment scales.  
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Table 2.7 Confirmatory factor analysis results 
Model: Chi-
square 
df CMIN/
df 
NFI CFI AGFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
4-factor model: 294.021 84 3.500 0.988 0.991 0.949 0.048 366.021 367.089 
Correlations between factors          
 Price 
fairness  
Price 
magnitude 
Price 
expectation 
Purchase 
intent 
Price fairness  
Price magnitude  
Price expectation 
 
 
-0.884 0.163 
0.049 
 0.805 
-0.780 
 0.073 
   
 Test of Hypothesis 1 
 
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that while correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation are different constructs.   
 Results (Table 2.6) from the factor analysis show clear segregation of three factors. 
Relevant items have the highest loadings on the factors they represent (with low cross loadings). 
Confirmatory analysis (Table 2.5) shows high squared standardized loadings for each item, the 
unstandardized loadings are all significant (AMOS output in appendix table), AVE for each price 
judgment is greater than 0.7, and square root of AVEs are greater than correlations between each 
price judgments. These results suggest price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are 
distinct. The correlations (Table 2.7) are high between price fairness and price magnitude             
(-0.884), between price fairness and purchase intent (0.805), and between price magnitude and 
purchase intent (0.805). Of the three price judgments, price expectation is found to be least 
correlated with price magnitude (0.049) and price fairness (0.163). The (linear) correlation 
coefficients for price expectation may demonstrate lower values due to inherent non-linearity of 
the price expectation scale. Based on these findings hypothesis 1 is supported. 
2.5.2.2. Model Selection 
 In an exploratory process of model building, SEM allows researchers to compare 
alternative model specifications. Evaluating comparative fit statistics across different models can 
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identify a model that best fits sample observations. Model specification can take two approaches: 
a) start with a simple model and gradually add paths; b) start with a saturated model, where all 
possible paths between constructs are specified, then free each path in subsequent iterations 
depending on the changes in fit statistics. For this data analysis, the first approach was adopted.  
To choose an alternative model, researchers favor a model specification that results in an 
incremental change in chi square value of four or more for changes in each degree of freedom. 
This technique in SEM allows an iterative model selection process, helping researchers explore 
relationships between constructs when theoretical explanations are nonexistent or inadequate.   
 First, the model consisting of price fairness, price magnitude and price expectations 
mediating the effect of focal prices on purchase intent is considered the base model.  To address 
non-linearity in price expectation (which violates the necessary linearity assumption in SEM), 
the entire sample is divided in two groups, with one group consisting of price expectations from 
low to mid focal price, and the other group comprising price expectations from mid to high focal 
price. These groups are hereafter described as less-than-expected and more-than-expected 
groups.  Splitting the sample into two groups requires testing for group invariance, i.e., to test if 
the same conceptual model is relevant for both groups. Before testing for group invariance, 
Kenney (2009) suggests testing for configural model fits, which assumes that an appropriate 
measurement model is diagnosed and holds for both groups. Once a model is found to be better 
fitting, group invariance is tested to find changes in structural path coefficients.   
 Based on theories of price judgment (Thaler 1985), price fairness, price magnitude, and 
price expectation are expected to be correlated, requiring the SEM model to be specified with 
correlated errors of endogenous constructs (i.e., the disturbance terms). Exogenous variables in 
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this model consist only of manipulated factors. Hence, to compute covariance (input) matrix, 
price judgments or their structural errors need to be correlated in this model (Kline 1998).  
 The initial structural model (shown in appendix Figure A.2.1) specifies that the effect of 
focal price on purchase intent is mediated by price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation. Next, all possible alternative specifications of paths originating from focal price 
through the price judgments affecting purchase intent are tested. Based on this analysis the best 
model is the initial model, with an added direct path from focal price to purchase intent (Table 
2.8). 
 
Table 2.8 Fit statistics of the initial and final model 
 Chi-
square 
df CMIN
/df 
NFI CFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
Model1: Initial 524.77 197 2.66 0.98 0.99 0.03 738.77 743.88 
Model 2: Final 528.17 258 2.05 0.98 0.99 0.03 768.17 774.59 
 
 
2.5.2.3 Structural Model Results 
 After several rounds of iterations, exploring all possible paths and comparing changes in 
fit statistics, a best fitting model is selected (shown in appendix Figure A.2.1). Fit statistics 
relevant for this model, and standardized path coefficients (and t and p values) for each group, 
are summarized in Table 2.9(a and b).  
 
Table 2.9(a) Structural equation model results-fit statistics 
Fit statistics for structural model (paths unconstrained between groups) 
 Chi-square df CMIN/df NFI CFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
 946.872 252 1.804 0.967 0.985 0.024 1408.872 1434.327 
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Table 2.9(b) Structural equation model results with  standardized path coefficients 
Less than expected –memory 
                   (group 1) 
Coefficients  t-value    p-value 
Less than expected –Stimulus 
                   (group 2) 
Coefficients  t-value    p-value 
Focal price Price fairness  -0.651 -13.901 (0.001) -0.562 -9.454 (0.001) 
Focal price Price magnitude 0.831 23.894 (0.001) 0.867 25.946 (0.001) 
Focal price Price expectation 0.822 20.545 (0.001) 0.848 26.036 (0.001) 
Locus of controlPrice fairness 0.047 2.46 (0.014) 0.061 2.46 (0.014) 
Judgment/intent orderPrice expectation -0.078 -4.769 (0.001) -0.066 -4.769 (0.001) 
Price fairness  Purchase intent 0.370 4.79 (0.001) 0.418 5.384 (0.001) 
Price magnitude  Purchase intent -0.086 -0.881 (0.378) -0.069 -0.596 (0.551) 
Price expectation  Purchase intent -0.109 -1.284 (0.199) -0.077 -0.767 (0.443) 
Focal price  Purchase intent -0.176 -1.638 (0.101) 0.017 0.131 (0.896) 
 
More than expected –memory 
                   (group 3) 
More than expected –stimulus 
                   (group 4) 
Focal price Price fairness  -0.728 -17.891 (0.001) -0.834 -25.109 (0.001) 
Focal price Price magnitude 0.753 19.444 (0.001) 0.822 22.951 (0.001) 
Focal price Price expectation -0.765 -19.169 (0.001) -0.810 -21.741 (0.001) 
Locus of controlPrice fairness 0.035 2.46 (0.014) 0.029 2.46 (0.014) 
Judgment/intent orderPrice expectation -0.077 -4.769 (0.001) -0.072 -4.769 (0.001) 
Price fairness  Purchase intent 0.338 4.17 (0.001) 0.457 6.103 (0.001) 
Price magnitude  Purchase intent -0.213 -2.748 (0.006) -0.198 -2.917 (0.004) 
Price expectation  Purchase intent -0.033 -0.445 (0.657) -0.028 -0.433 (0.665) 
Focal price  Purchase intent -0.299 -4.822 (0.001) -0.247 -3.612 (0.001) 
   
 This structural model is also tested for group invariance. The measurement invariance 
and structural invariance tests show insignificant chi square difference between unconstrained 
and constrained model (the chi-square difference = 32.805 with 21 degrees of freedom, p=0.058, 
NFI difference=0.001and CFI difference=0.000), indicating that the conceptual model 
considered here (appendix Figure A.2.1) does not differ in model fit between groups (the groups 
being considered as less-than-expected and more-than-expected, with memory-and stimulus-
based contexts). 
 Table 2.9(b) provides the standardized path coefficients. The paths in the model for all 
groups were statistically significant with the following exceptions. First, the path between price 
expectation and purchase intent was not statistically significant in any group. Second, the path 
between price magnitude and purchase intent and between focal price and purchase intent were 
insignificant for groups 1 and 2 (less-than-expected groups). 
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 Across all groups, the effect of price fairness on purchase intent is significantly positive, 
and increases from memory- to stimulus-based context (groups 1, 3 to groups 2, 4). The effect of 
price magnitude on purchase intent is negative, but only significant for the more-than-expected 
groups (groups 3, 4). The effect of price expectation on purchase intent is not significant in any 
of the groups. Compared to the effects of price magnitude and price expectation, price fairness 
has a larger effect on purchase intent.  
 The effect of locus of control on price fairness is significantly positive, implying that a 
change from internal to external locus of control generates more price fairness. Compared to the 
more-than-expected groups (groups 3, 4), this impact is stronger in the less-than-expected groups 
(groups 1, 2). The effect of judgment/intent order on price expectation is significantly negative; 
compared to when purchase intent is measured prior to judgments, price expectation is lower 
when price judgments are measured first. The direct effect of focal prices on purchase intent is 
significant only for the more-than-expected groups (groups 3, 4).   
 Test of Hypothesis 3 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that (a) price fairness and (b) price magnitude mediate the effect 
of focal price on purchase intent; (c) price expectation does not mediate the effect of focal price 
on purchase intent. This hypothesis is tested using mediation analysis in SEM. Using Barron and 
Kenney (1986) method, complete mediation would be established if it could be shown that a 
significant direct path from focal price to purchase intent becomes insignificant after adding 
price judgments to the model, while paths from price judgments to purchase intent become 
significant. Partial mediation can also be confirmed when the paths from focal price to purchase 
intent remains significant with the introduction of significant mediators. 
Structural model results (Table 2.9b) show that a direct path from focal price to purchase 
intent is significant only for more-than-expected groups (for group 3 and 4, t= -4.822, and         
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t= -3.612, with p=0.001 for both groups), but not for less-than-expected groups (for groups 1 and 
2, t= -1.638, p=0.101 and t=0.131, p=0.896 respectively). These results indicate that the effect of 
focal price on purchase intent is fully mediated by price fairness and price magnitude for less-
than-expected groups (groups 1 and 2). These results support hypothesis 3(a) and 3(b).  
The path between price expectation and purchase intent was insignificant across all 
groups (t=-1.284, -0.767, -0.445, -0.433 for groups 1 through 4, with p=0.199, 0.443, 0.657, 
0.665, respectively). Thus price expectation does not mediate the effect of focal prices on 
purchase intent. These findings support hypothesis 3(c). 
Test of Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that price fairness has a stronger effect on purchase intent than 
does price magnitude.  
SEM results reported in Table 2.9 (b) show that of the three price judgments, price 
fairness has the largest positive effect on purchase intent across all groups. The path coefficients 
are significantly positive for price fairness (standardized path coefficients of price fairness on 
purchase intent for each of the groups are =0.370, 0.418, 0.338, and 0.457, respectively, with 
relevant t-values being=4.790, 5.384, 4.170, 6.103 and associated p<0.001 for each group). Price 
magnitude has significant negative effect on purchase intent only for the more than expected 
groups (groups 3 and 4) but has no significant effect on purchase intent for the less than expected 
groups (groups 1 and 2). The t-values and associated p-values for coefficients of price magnitude 
on purchase intent for groups 1 through 4 are: -0.086, -0.069, -0.213, and -0.198; p =0.378, 
0.571, 0.006, and 0.004, respectively. Price expectation does not have any significant effect on 
purchase intent across all the groups. These results demonstrate that of all the price judgments, 
price fairness has the largest impact on purchase intent which support hypothesis 4.  
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2.5.3 Repeated Measures ANOVA 
A multiple repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with three between-subject factors 
(each with two levels), focal price as the within-subject factor (three levels), and four dependant 
measures (price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, and purchase intent), which 
employed summated scales and were measured at each level of focal price. The results of this 
analysis are provided in Table A.2.6. 
 Test of Hypothesis 2 
This hypothesis predicted that (a) price fairness is a negatively sloped function of focal 
price; (b) price magnitude is a positively sloped function of focal price; and (c) price 
expectation displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with focal price.  
 For each price judgment, the mean and the standard deviation for the summated scale at 
each focal price is shown in Table 2.10. These descriptive results show that price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation reflect expected patterns. For example, with an increase in 
focal price, average price fairness declines and price magnitude increases. Price expectation at 
the mid focal price ($20.99) has the largest value compared to price expectations at the lowest 
($8.99) and the highest ($32.99) focal prices. This nonlinearity confirms the predicted pattern for 
price expectation. Table 2.10 and Figure 2.5 provide the mean price judgments for the three focal 
prices.  
 
Table 2.10 Mean values of price judgments 
  low ($8.99) mid ($20.99) high ($32.99) 
Price fairness  7.931  (0.057) 6.126  (0.084) 2.630 (0.071) 
Price magnitude  1.736 (0.050) 4.897 (0.061) 7.798 (0.064) 
Price expectation  2.268 (0.076) 6.589 (0.073) 3.132 (0.080) 
Note: numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors. 
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 The repeated measures ANOVA results (appendix Table A.2.6) indicate 
significant main effects of focal prices on each of the three price judgments (FPF (2,714) 
=1648.157; FPM (2,714) =3162.264; FPE (2,714) =979.242, with corresponding p<0.001for each 
judgment). Obtained t-values indicate significant mean differences between focal prices for each 
price judgment (tPF,low-mid, 364 = 18.400; tPF,low-high,364 = 57.860; tPF,mid-high, 364 =36.873; tPM,low-mid,364 = 
 -45.503; tPM,low-high,364 = -70.120;  tPM,mid-high ,364= -40.295;  tPE,low-mid, 364 = -38.173;  tPE,low-high,364  = 
 -5.021; tPE,mid-high,364 = 35.555  with corresponding p< 0.001 for each t-value provided).  
SEM results also show (see Table 2.9 b) that path coefficients between focal prices and 
price fairness are significantly negative (β=- 0.651, -0.562, -0.728, and -0.834, respectively, for 
each group, with p=0.001 for each of these values), while these coefficients are significantly 
positive for price magnitude (path from focal prices to price magnitude for each group is β = 
0.831, 0.867, 0.753, and 0.822, respectively, with p=0.001 for each of these values). 
SEM path coefficients between focal price and price expectation are positive in less-than-
expected groups (β=0.822 and 0.848, p<0.001), but negative in more-than-expected groups 
(β=−0.765 and -0.810, p<0.000),  suggesting a non linear relationship between focal price and 
price expectation.  The results from the SEM analysis and the repeated measures ANOVA 
provide support for hypotheses 2(a), (b), and (c). 
 
Figure 2.5 Relationships of price judgments to focal price 
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 Test of Hypothesis 5 
This hypothesis predicted that response times are faster for price fairness than for (a) 
price magnitude and (b) price expectation.  
Table 2.11 and Figure 2.6 provide the mean response times for the price judgments of the 
three focal prices. Average response times show that price fairness is the quickest of the three 
judgments. The average response time for price fairness is significantly lower than price 
magnitude (t364 = -4.129, t364 = -8.982, and t364 = -5.511,with p<0.001for low, mid, and high focal 
prices) and for price expectation (t364= -5.447, t364= -8.770, and t364= -6.675, with p<0.001at low, 
mid, and high focal prices). These results provide support for hypothesis 5(a). 
Differences in mean response time between price magnitude and price expectation are not 
significantly different at each focal price (t364=0.243, p = 0.808; t364= -0.714, p=0.476 and t364= -
0.109, p=0.913 at low, mid, and high focal prices).  These results provide support for hypothesis 
5 (b).  
 Table 2.11 Average response time of price judgments (in milliseconds) 
  low ($8.99) mid ($20.99) high ($32.99) 
Price fairness  3568.007 3586.456 3656.355 
Price magnitude  4276.440 4918.923 4660.607 
Price expectation  4233.107 5043.2712 4679.097 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Mean differences in response time of price judgments 
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 Test of Hypothesis 6 
  
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments only price expectation is 
affected by an interaction between focal price and judgment environment, and (b) price 
expectation is lower in a stimulus-based context than in a memory-based context at low and high 
focal prices, but does not differ across contexts at the mid focal price.   
Multivariate tests shows significant interaction of focal price and judgment environment 
(Wilks’ Lambda = 0.865, F(8,350) =6.827, p=0.000). The repeated measures ANOVA results 
(appendix Table A.2.6) indicate a significant interaction effect between focal price and judgment 
environment on price expectation (F(2,714) = 8.952, p=0.000), but also on price fairness (F(2,714) = 
15.188, p=0.000), and on price magnitude (F(2,714) = 6.891, p=0.100). Hypothesis 6(a) was not 
supported. 
As shown in Table 2.12 and Figure 2.7, mean expectation measures are significantly 
lower in the stimulus-based context than in the memory-based context at the low price level (t363 
=3.597, p=0.000), and at the high price level (t363 = 2.785, p=0.006). Price expectations do not 
differ at the mid focal price (t363 = -1.223, p=0.222). These results indicate that the focal prices 
are more expected in the memory-based than in the stimulus-based context at the low and high 
focal price levels.  These results support hypothesis 6(b). 
Table 2.12 Univariate contrasts – focal price and judgment environment on price 
expectation 
 
Judgment 
environment  
Price expectation Price fairness Price magnitude 
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Memory-based 
context 
2.932 6.501 3.349 7.962 5.879 2.881 1.865 4.983 7.665 
Stimulus-based 
context 
2.393 6.680 2.906 7.899 6.382 2.370 1.602 4.805 7.935 
t-value (p-value) 3.597 
(0.000) 
-1.223 
(0.222) 
2.785 
(0.006) 
0.552 
(0.581) 
-3.048 
(0.002) 
3.669 
(0.000) 
2.659 
(0.008) 
1.465 
(0.144) 
-2.122 
(0.034) 
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Figure 2.7 Mean differences in price expectation for judgment environment 
  
 Test of Hypothesis 7 
  
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is 
affected by locus of control, and (b) Price fairness is higher under external control than under 
internal control. 
Table 2.13 and Figure 2.8 provide the mean price judgments of the three focal prices for 
the external and internal locus of control conditions. Multivariate tests show a (marginally) 
significant main effect of locus of control (Wilks’ Lambda = 0.981, F(4,354) =1.728, p=0.143, one 
sided p=0.071). Results of the between-subjects effects (appendix Table A.2.6) suggest that locus 
of control has a significant main effect only on price fairness (FPF, (1,357)=4.454, p=0.036). Neither 
price magnitude nor price expectation are found to be influenced by locus of control 
(FPM,(1,357)=0.009, p=0.924; FPE,(1,357)=2.231, p=0.136), which supports hypothesis 7(a).   
The univariate t-test results indicate that price fairness is significantly higher under 
external control than under internal control (mean difference = 0.193, t363,PF, external-internal =2.123, 
p=0.034). This finding supports hypothesis 7(b). 
Table 2.13 Univariate contrasts – locus of control on price fairness 
 Locus of control Price 
fairness 
Price 
magnitude 
Price 
expectation 
Price expectation External  5.655 4.811 4.036 
 Internal  5.462 4.810 4.215 
 t-value (p-value) 2.123 
(0.034) 
0.017  
(0.987) 
1.730 
(0.085) 
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Figure 2.8 Effect of locus of control on price judgments 
 
 Test of Hypothesis 8 
  
 Hypothesis 8 predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is 
affected by judgment/intent order, and (b) price expectation is lower under judgment-first than 
under intent-first condition. Table 2.14 and Figure 2.9 provide the mean price judgments of the 
three focal prices when judgments are measure before purchase intent and when purchase intent 
is measure first. 
 Multivariate tests show a significant main effect of judgment/intent order (Wilks’  
Lambda = 0.958 F(4,354) =3.874, p=0.004). Results of the between subjects effects (Appendix 
A.2.6) suggest that judgment/intent order has a significant main effect only on price expectation 
(FPE, (1,357) =11.300, p=0.001). Neither price fairness nor price magnitude are influenced by 
judgment/intent order (FPF,(1,357)=0.188, p=0.665; FPM,(1,357)=0.060, p=0.807). These results 
support hypothesis 8(a).  
 The univariate t-test indicates price expectation to be significantly higher under intent 
first than under judgment first condition (mean difference = 0.348, t363 =3.397, p=0.001). These 
results support hypothesis 8 (b).  
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Table 2.14 Univariate contrasts – judgment/intent order on price expectation 
 Judgment/intent order Price 
fairness 
Price 
magnitude 
Price 
expectation 
Price expectation Intent first  5.545 4.824 4.314 
 Judgment first 5.578 4.797 3.965 
 t-value (p-value) -0.356 
(0.722) 
0.338 
(0.735) 
3.397 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Effect of judgment/intent order on price judgments 
 
2.6 DISCUSSION 
This section summarizes the results, briefly describes the implications of these findings, 
and discusses the limitations of this study with suggestions for possible future research.  
2.6.1 Findings 
 
This chapter developed and tested a conceptual model of price fairness, price magnitude, 
and price expectation. Hypotheses related to these price judgments were developed. Results were 
analyzed using data generated from an experiment. Structural equation modeling and repeated 
measures ANOVA were used to test the hypotheses. Table 2.15 summarizes the main findings.  
This study provided empirical evidence that the three price judgments are correlated, but 
distinct constructs, supporting the seminal hypothesis. In testing the conceptual model, price 
judgments were found to mediate the effect of price on purchase intent. More specifically, price 
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fairness mediated the effect in all conditions, price magnitude mediated the effect in half of the 
tested conditions, and price expectation did not mediate the effect in any condition. 
In addition, primacy, or the importance of price fairness over price magnitude and price 
expectation was supported. Finding support for the hypothesis that affective price judgments 
have stronger effects on purchase intent than cognitive price assessment not only validates affect 
primacy theories, but also helps to distinguish price judgments across the dimensions of affect 
and cognition. This research replicates and extends earlier findings that affect-driven judgments 
are processed faster than more cognitive judgments in the domain of price judgments. In 
particular, response times were significantly less for price fairness than for price magnitude or 
price expectation. 
Finally, the effects of judgment environment, locus of control, and judgment/intent order 
on price judgments were investigated. Judgment environment was found to affect price 
expectation (but also affected price fairness and price magnitude), with lower means for 
stimulus-based contexts than for memory-based contexts. This difference is found only at the 
low and high focal prices, but not at the mid focal price. Locus of control affected only price 
fairness, where these judgments were higher under external control and under internal control. 
Judgment/intent order affected only price expectation, where compared to the reverse order price 
expectation was lower when judgments were measured prior to purchase intent. Taken together, 
these unique antecedents provide addition nomological evidence that these three price judgments 
are distinct constructs. A summary of the hypothesis tests are provided in Table 2.15. 
Table 2.15 Empirical support to proposed hypotheses  
Hypotheses Hypotheses 
supported 
Hypotheses 
not supported 
H1: while correlated, price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation are different price judgments.   
H1   
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Table 2.15 Empirical support to proposed hypotheses (cond.) 
H2: (a) price fairness is a negatively sloped function of focal price; (b) 
price magnitude is a positively sloped function of focal price; and (c) 
price expectation displays an inverted U-shaped relationship with focal 
price. 
H2 (a), (b), 
(c)   
 
H3: (a) price fairness and (b) price magnitude mediate the effect of focal 
price on purchase intent;. (c) price expectation does not mediate the 
effect of focal price on purchase intent. 
H3 (a), (b), 
(c)  
 
H4: price fairness has a stronger effect on purchase intent than does price 
magnitude. 
H4   
H5: response times are faster for price fairness than for (a) price 
magnitude and (b) price expectation. 
H5(a), (b)   
H6: (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by 
an interaction between focal price and judgment environment;(b) price 
expectation is lower in a stimulus-based context than in a memory-based 
context at low and high focal prices, but does not differ across contexts 
at the mid focal price.   
H6 (b)  H6 (a)  
H7: (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by 
locus of control; (b) price fairness is higher under external control than 
under internal control. 
H7(a) and 
(b)   
 
H8: (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by 
judgment/intent order; (b) price expectation is lower under judgment first 
than under intent first condition. 
H8(a) and 
(b)   
 
 
This research extends price judgment and consumer decision making literature by finding 
evidence that a) price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations are different types of 
price judgments; b) price fairness and price magnitude mediate the effect of focal price with 
varying degrees of impact on purchase intent; c) memory-and stimulus-based contexts bear 
distinct implications only for price expectation, providing further justification for claiming that 
context plays varying roles of importance on three important price judgments; and d) price 
fairness and price magnitude are constructed automatically. 
2.6.2 Implications 
These findings add significant value to existing price judgment theories through the 
following iimplications. First, understanding that these three price judgments are distinct is an 
important contribution. Previous research isolated a single price judgment in an individual study. 
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Such an approach either fails to conceptualize the differences that exist between price judgments, 
or inherently implies that results applicable to one price judgment are probably true for other 
price judgments. With a notable exception from Xia and Monroe (2005), pricing studies 
generalize findings obtained from studying one specific price judgment as applicable to all other 
price judgments. For example, factors that influence price fairness would also be considered to 
affect price magnitude; price fairness could, in such a scenario, be considered an alternative 
interpretation of price magnitude. In measurement terms, price expectation or price fairness 
items would be incorporated into the same scale as price magnitude items. Finding that price 
fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations are distinct and developing scales to measure 
these price judgments provides important contributions to the price judgment literature.   
Findings from this chapter may also help consumers make better purchase decisions by 
making consumers more aware of the type of price judgments that influence their purchase 
decisions. Marketing managers may benefit from this research by better understanding the 
antecedents of these price judgments and which judgments affect consumer purchase decisions. 
2.6.3 Future Research and Limitations 
The research presented here is subjected to limitations that are inherent in projects of 
similar nature. An obvious issue is the sample, whose size and relevance needs to be tested in the 
real world, with different demographics. Supporting hypotheses with a small number of mostly 
homogenous participants is a potential shortcoming. Still, it was encouraging to find that the 
three main price judgments passed the discriminant validity and unidimensionality tests in 
separate studies using different samples. This may indicate that fundamental differences do exist 
between price judgments. It would be quite interesting, from the standpoint of external validity, 
to see how price judgments differ in the real world with several attenuating factors.  
75 
 
 This research paves the way for several future studies. First, price judgments not 
considered in this research could be included in the conceptual model developed here, which 
could significantly expand this research by finding different moderating or mediating 
relationships. Second, it would be worth finding different environmental variables and various 
contexts that could differentiate or add further explanations to price judgments. Third, exploring 
the breadth and depth involved in information processing stages associated with each type of 
price judgment could reveal more interesting questions about price judgments. Finally, growing 
awareness of consciousness and automaticity in judgment research can be applied in this 
research to see how price judgments differ across different levels of conscious thinking.  
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CHAPTER 3: FURTHER DISTINCTIONS AMONG PRICE FAIRNESS, PRICE 
MAGNITUDE, AND PRICE EXPECTATION: THE ROLES OF MOOD AND 
PROCESSING FLUENCY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 3 replicates and extends Chapter 2.  Replicating Chapter 2, this chapter pursues 
the primary objective of distinguishing between price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation. Extending Chapter 2, this chapter investigates two new antecedents, mood and 
processing fluency, and one additional dependent measure, consumer anger.  
Research on how mood and processing fluency influence price judgment is limited. 
Thomas and Morwitz’s (2009) findings, that computational ease positively affects price 
magnitude, is often cited as the only empirical research in this area. Many questions remain 
unanswered. Do mood and processing fluency have similar effects on price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation? Any evidence that processing fluency influences each price 
judgment differently would strengthen conceptual distinctions between the three price 
judgments.  
This chapter seeks to answer several research questions. How do mood and processing 
fluency differentiate price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation? Does mood affect 
price fairness, an affective judgment, differently from price magnitude or price expectation? Can 
processing fluency influence price magnitude? How does memory interact with processing 
fluency to affect price judgments? Does mood interact with processing fluency? To address these 
questions, this chapter develops several hypotheses and presents an empirical study designed to 
test them.  This chapter concludes with a discussion of findings, implications, future research, 
and limitations.  
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The next section provides brief definitions of price fairness, price magnitude, price 
expectation, and judgment environment, followed by definitions and conceptual descriptions of 
two new independent variables, mood and processing fluency. Next, definitions of the dependant 
variables used in this study, purchase intent and anger, are also provided.     
3.2 DEFINITIONS OF CONSTRUCTS 
3.2.1 Focal Price 
Focal price is a target price on which consumer judgments of price fairness, price 
magnitude, price expectation, purchase intent, and anger are based.   
3.2.2 Price Fairness 
Price fairness is a consumer judgment of how just, reasonable, acceptable, or satisfactory 
a focal price is (Xia and Monroe 2005).  
3.2.3 Price Magnitude 
Price magnitude is a consumer judgment of the numerical size of a focal price (Thomas 
and Morwitz 2007). Consumers judge how large, big, or huge a focal price is. 
3.2.4 Price Expectation 
Price expectation is a consumer judgment of how a focal price compares to an expected 
price.  
3.2.5 Judgment Environment 
The context in which consumers make judgments is known as judgment environment. In 
price judgment, any available price information provides a judgment environment that can be 
classified as a memory-based or stimulus-based context (Biswas and Blair 1991). In a memory-
based context, reference price information is retrieved from memory; in a stimulus-based 
context, reference prices are available externally (Biswas and Blair 1991; Grewal et al. 1998).  
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3.2.6 Mood 
Mood is a subjective, internal, and emotional state that is stable, not extreme, and weakly 
centered on any specific stimulus (Thayer 1989). Mood consists of two dimensions: valence, 
which can be positive or negative, and arousal, which can be low or high (Russell 1980). 
Thayer’s (1989) conceptualization of mood as a two dimensional construct consisting of energy 
(low or high) and tension (calm or tense) is consistent with the valence-arousal 
conceptualization. Mood belongs to the category of non cognitive factors (Schwarz 1997), which 
also includes emotions and attitudes, but mood lacks emotion’s specific referent and attitude’s 
evaluative valence to referent objects. Batson et al. (1992) describe mood as a structured set of 
beliefs, arising from expectations about future experiences, while emotion reflects instantaneous 
and complex reactions to specific events or outcomes. Mood is considered to be diffused and less 
informative, arising out of non-specific referent (Blechman 1990; Wegener et al. 1993).   
Mood provides contextual effects (Schwarz 1997). Its effects on memory, through mood 
congruency and mood dependency processes, are important determinants of how people attend, 
encode, and retrieve information (Bower 1981). In mood congruency, emotional content of 
material is matched with the emotional content in memory, which facilitates retrieval (Schwarz 
1997). Remembering negative aspects of an object when depressed is an example of mood 
congruency. Mood dependency explains how matching mood at retrieval with the mood at 
encoding facilitates memory (Lewis and Critchley 2003). Mood dependency involves a neutral 
object, but mood congruency implies that the information content of an object interacts with 
mood (Lewis and Critchley 2003). 
Mood, feelings, and emotions are important aspects of consumer behavior (Derbaix and 
Pham 1991; Havlena and Holbrook 1986). Recent developments in social psychology explain 
79 
 
how mood plays a central role in judgment and decision making (Pham 1998).  Existing research 
shows two distinct process-mechanisms, mood-congruent priming and mood misattribution, 
mediate the effects of mood on judgment (Ottati and Isbell 1996).  By priming mood-congruent 
concepts, mood assumes an indirect role that biases encoding (Bower1981), interpretation 
(Bower 1981), or retrieval of contextual information (Teasdale and Fogarty 1979). In mood-
misattribution, mood enters directly as an input in the judgment process. The direct role of mood 
has gained significant attention in psychology theories (Schwarz 1997). Mood as a source of 
information influences processing strategies and evaluative judgments where individuals in a 
happy mood employ heuristic processing, but individuals in a sad mood employ systematic 
processing (Clore et al. 1994; Schwarz and Clore 1996; Schwarz 1997).  Irrespective of its 
underlying mechanism, mood influences human judgments; positive moods elicit more positive 
or favorable judgments than do negative moods (Ottati and Isbell 1996; Schwarz 1997; 
Winkielman et al. 2003).  
Fishbein and Middlestadt (1995) distinguished non-cognitive factors from cognitive ones, 
and studied the effects of non-cognitive factors such as emotional reactions, affective responses, 
and conditioned reactions on human judgment. Extant research highlights evidence of how 
individuals’ affective states influence evaluations, such as satisfaction with purchases,  
impressions of people, and evaluations of past life events (Schwarz and Clore 1996). Empirical 
evidence also suggests that people respond to stimuli more favorably or positively when feeling a 
positive, rather than a negative, mood (Schwartz 1997).        
Mood effects on judgment are primarily explained by three theoretical perspectives 
(Schwarz 1997): a) cognitive accessibility theory suggests that mood enhances the cognitive 
accessibility of mood congruent information in memory. For example, an object’s positive 
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aspects are most likely to be accessible under positive mood; b) affect as  information, which 
suggest that people may use mood as input for judging a target object, rather than retrieving 
mood-consistent features of a target; and (c) theories explaining choice of processing strategies, 
which explain how processing strategies are chosen under a specific mood.  
3.2.7 Processing Fluency 
Processing fluency is a feeling of ease or difficulty a person experiences while making a 
decision or judgment (Novemsky et al. 2007). It is also defined as a meta cognitive 
understanding of ease or difficulty one experiences during processing of new information 
(Schwarz 2005). Fluency feelings arise from two important sources, the ease of creating and 
retrieving thoughts, and the ease with which external information is processed (Novemsky et al. 
2007). 
Stimulus processing is influenced by mental events that are uncorrelated to the 
information content of the stimulus (Winkielman et al. 2003). Extant research shows that 
identical information content may result in varying mental representations, primarily because the 
content may produce varying degrees of activation (Mandler 1980), speed (Jacoby 1983), effort 
(Schwarz 1998), and affective state (Reber et al. 1998), of which the speed and effort is 
considered as processing fluency (Schwarz 1998; Winkielman et al.2003).  
Processing fluency has two important dimensions: a) subjectivity-objectivity of fluency, 
which characterizes the degree of consciousness involved during stimulus processing 
(Winkielman et al. 2003);  b) perceptual-conceptual dimension of fluency, which describes the 
degree to which a stimulus is processed. In its perceptual form, processing fluency works only on 
the surface level of stimulus; in the conceptual phase, deeper-level fluency categorizes and 
processes a stimulus into semantic knowledge structures (Winkielman et al. 2003). Recent 
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studies on neuro-imaging also suggest that perceptual processing decreases neural responses, and 
conceptual processing activates brain areas responsible for creating or explaining meaning from 
the stimulus (Demb et al. 1995).      
Processing fluency affects evaluative judgments (Novemsky et al.2007). The greater the 
ease of processing a target, the more positive the evaluations are. Processing fluency affects 
probability judgments (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), assertiveness (Schwarz et al. 1991), risk 
perception (Raghubir and Menon 1998), product evaluations (Menon and Raghubir 2003), and 
preferences for brand logos (Janiszewski and Meyvis 2001). A high processing fluency, 
compared to a low processing fluency, generates more favorable judgments (Winkielman et al. 
2003).  
3.2.8 Purchase Intent: 
Purchase intent is defined as the degree to which a consumer is willing to buy a product 
(Dodds et al. 1991). It represents consumer intentions or beliefs rather than actual choice.  
3.2.9 Anger  
Anger can be defined as a negative affect expressing displeasure, irritation, wrath, ire, 
etc. Anger has been considered as a coping mechanism to deal with a present situation (Smith 
and Ellsworth 1985). Social constructivist theory of emotion (Averill 1982), which considers 
emotion as socially constructed, and classifies an emotion in terms of instigation, target, and aim, 
specifies that anger is instigated by violation of personal expectations, and is aimed at a person 
or an object (such as a price), with a desire to change the condition that created the instigation 
(Averill 1982). Using attribution theory, anger has been studied as an emotional outcome of 
consumers’ attributed reasons for a product failure (Richins 1983). Of the possible consumption-
related emotion, anger is considered as an important outcome of the consumption experience 
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(Richins 1997). Anger is also generated when consumers perceive any violation of existing 
equity norms (Xia et al. 2004). In this research, anger is the emotional response from judging a 
focal price.  
3.3 HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
Fundamentally distinct price judgments are expected to be affected differently by 
judgment environment (memory- or stimulus-based context). Price expectation, which involves 
predicting an expected price, would differ if the predicted value differs under memory- or 
stimulus-based context.  
Price expectation, as defined in this chapter, is determined by comparing a focal price to 
an expected price. Price expectation entails two judgment processes: prediction and comparison. 
In memory- and stimulus-based contexts, the comparison process implies that a focal price lower 
than the expected price would be judged as less than expected and a focal price greater than 
expected price would be judged as more than expected. However, the prediction process would 
differ in memory- and stimulus-based contexts primarily because a) the task for predicting a 
price is easier in a stimulus-based context (Helgeson and Beatty 1987); b) with an easier price 
prediction task, consumers show greater confidence and accuracy in a stimulus-based than in a 
memory-based context (Delvecchio et al. 2007); and c) in a memory-based context, with lower 
confidence in accuracy of the predicted price, consumers will place lower weights, and depend 
less, on contextually retrieved price (Delvecchio et al. 2007). Therefore, in a memory-based 
context, a systematic bias towards a focal price shifts the expected price (referred anchor) closer 
to the focal price, and thereby results in weaker contrasts (Delvecchio et al. 2007), than in a 
stimulus-based context, where all contextual prices are available, and consumers are able to 
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eliminate systematic biases. Hence, difference between a focal price and a predicted price will be 
larger in stimulus-based than in memory-based context.  
Other price judgments should be less vulnerable to systematic retrieval bias.  For 
example, price fairness is influenced by affect, and thus, the judgment environment should not 
influence price fairness.  Price magnitude is a comparative judgment, and does not involve a 
predictive process. Therefore, it should not be different across memory- and stimulus-based 
contexts. This leads to the following hypothesis, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1 (a). 
H1: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by an interaction 
between focal price and judgment environment;  (b) compared to the price expectations 
in the memory-based condition (which are assimilated), price expectations in the 
stimulus-based conditions (which are contrasted) are lower at low focal price, equivalent 
at mid focal price, and higher at high focal price.  
 
Figure 3.1 (a) Hypothesized effects of judgment environment on price expectation 
 
3.3.2 Hypothesis 2 
Positive mood leads to heuristic processing and negative mood creates systematic 
processing (Clore et al. 1994, Schwarz 1997, Schwarz and Clore 1996). Such processing 
strategies result from informative functions of affect, generating interactions between judgment 
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environment and mood (Schwarz 1990). Feeling good often “informs” a person that the 
environment is supportive or helpful; feeling bad suggests a problematic environment (Schwarz 
1997). A more challenging environment motivates systematic processing and greater attention to 
information; in contrast, a less challenging environment motivates heuristic processing and less 
attention to information (Schwarz 1997).  
As an affective judgment, price fairness is likely to be influenced by mood. From the 
affect as an information perspective, consumers generate affect-consistent judgments irrespective 
of the diagnosticity of a focal price (Pham 1998). Thus, consumers would generate more positive 
evaluations of a focal price in a positive mood than in a negative mood.  
Blaney (1986) shows that mood interacts with memory. He provides two explanations, 
mood dependency and mood congruency, to explain how mood-dependant memory facilitates 
contextual information processing. Using network activation theory, Bower (1981) suggests that 
mood activates specific memory nodes that are connected through a larger set of pointers to other 
areas in memory. Reflecting similar views, Tomkin (1980) states that affect, working as an 
amplifier, influences responses by affecting retrieval processes from other memory areas, or 
reinforce confidence in the information retrieved. Therefore, we expect to see an interaction 
between mood and judgment environment.    
Mood influences judgment by priming mood consistent thoughts that bias encoding, 
interpretation, or retrieval of judgment-relevant information (Bower et al. 1981; Bower 1981; 
Teasdale and Fogerty 1979). Mood produces an assimilation effect (Otatti and Isbell 1996), such 
that with positive mood, judgments become positive, or converge to larger positive values. This 
mood bias is assumed to be resource dependant. Mood misattribution is often corrected with 
greater availability of mental resources (Otatti and Isbell 1996), with availability of more 
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judgment-relevant information, and with prior knowledge or expertise (Srull 1983). Having 
sufficient cognitive resources, as in stimulus-based context, allows consumers to correct for 
mood biases (Petty and Wegener 1993; Srull 1983). Greater information availability (Otatti and 
Isbell 1996) allows accurate encoding and retrieval, eliminating mood’s affective impact on 
judgment. Mood consistent assimilation effect is eliminated when mood does not enter into 
judgmental computation (Otatti and Isbell 1996), particularly when judgment relevant 
information is abundantly available.  
Mood is expected to interact with judgment environment to influence price fairness. In 
the memory-based context, with fewer available resources, the mood misattribution effect will be 
stronger, with positive mood increasing price fairness and negative mood reducing it. With more 
available resources in a stimulus-based context, people will correct for mood biases in judgment, 
and the differences between mood conditions will be attenuated. Across all conditions, lower 
focal price is always perceived to be fairer than higher prices (Xia et al. 2004, Bolton et al. 
2003), eliminating the need for mood dependant interpretations at lower prices. Thus, the effect 
of mood will be stronger at higher focal price. This leads the following hypothesis also 
represented in Figure 3.2 (a) and (b).  
H2: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a three-way 
interaction between focal price, judgment environment, and mood; (b) in a memory-
based context, a positive mood generates higher price fairness than a negative mood, and 
this difference increases with focal price.  In a stimulus-based context, price fairness is 
not affected by mood.  
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Figure 3.2 (a) Hypothesized effects of memory-based context on price fairness 
 
 
Figure 3.2 (b) Hypothesized effects of stimulus-based context on price fairness 
 
3.3.3 Hypothesis 3 
Processing fluency, or ease of retrieval, affects human judgment and decisions (Tverksy 
and Kahneman 1973, Schwarz 1998). However, our understanding of this robust finding is 
somewhat limited in pricing research (Thomas and Menon 2007). Accessibility of information 
and processing difficulty influence numerical price judgments (Thomas and Mennon 2007, 
Thomas and Morwitz 2009). Price magnitude depends on mental computation of numerical 
distances between focal price and a reference price (Adaval and Monroe 2002). In encoding and 
retrieval of reference prices, processing fluency is expected to influence perceptual calculations 
of numerical distances between the focal price and the retrieved anchor (Thomas and Morwitz 
2009). Thomas and Menon (2007) find that low processing fluency produced by increased 
computational task difficulty affects price magnitude. Numerical differences are perceived to be 
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larger under low processing fluency (Thomas and Menon 2007). Therefore high processing 
fluency is expected to generate lower price magnitude when compared to low processing 
fluency. Figure 3.3(a) shows the predicted effect of this hypothesis proposed below.  
H3: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price magnitude is affected by processing 
fluency; (b) price magnitude is lower under high processing fluency than low processing 
fluency. 
 
Figure 3.3 (a) Hypothesized effects of processing fluency on price magnitude  
 
3.3.4 Hypothesis 4 
A principle that highlights the informative role of affect on processing fluency is the 
“aboutness principle” (Winkielman et al. 2003),  commonly known as the “How do I feel about 
it?” heuristic (Pham 1998). This principle states that feelings direct goals, attention, and 
information processing. But much of this effect takes place subconsciously, and is eliminated 
when brought to conscious thinking (Schwarz and Clore 1996; Winkielman et al. 2003). Using 
this heuristic, consumers generate judgments that are evaluatively consistent with their previous 
or pre-existing moods. Pham (1998) further finds that the efficacy of the “How do I feel about 
it?” heuristic is specifically relevant when consumer judgments are not stimulus driven. The 
“How do I feel about it?” heuristic generates more perceptually rich representations than 
attribute- or stimulus-based strategies can generate (Strack 1993).  
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Winkielman et al. (2003) find that underlying mechanism of fluency could be 
“hedonically marked,” which generates more positive evaluations under high fluency than under 
low fluency. In other words, more quickly processed stimulus can generate positive affect and 
produce a positive evaluation. Processing fluency creates “metacognitive feedback” of the 
processed information, through which a signal can become available to other processing 
modules, including an affect-based system, either directly (automatically) or indirectly (through 
conscious processing) (Winkielman et al. 2003). Conditions which facilitate processing fluency 
result in positive judgment (Schwarz 1998). Instead of relying on thorough stimulus-based 
processing, people often perform quicker evaluations based on how fluently they can create 
mental representations of the target and inspect their feelings about the representations (Pham 
1998).  
As argued, mood influences affective judgments, by introducing biases during encoding 
and retrieval (Bower 1981, Teasdale and Fogerty 1979). Existing literature suggests that mood 
affects processing style (Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Clore 1996). Using feelings-as-information 
explanations, Chartrand et al. (2006) argue that mood provides input for choice of processing 
strategy. With price fairness being the only affective judgment, one expects to find an interaction 
of processing fluency and mood on price fairness. In a low processing fluency, a positive mood 
relies on surface level information and generates higher price fairness, as opposed to negative 
mood which scans information thoroughly and generates low price fairness. A high processing 
fluency may generate an overall high positive mood and thereby reducing the need to consider 
information thoroughly. This leads to hypothesis 4 shown in Figure 3.4 (a) and (b). 
H4: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a three-way 
interaction between price, processing fluency, and mood;  (b) under low processing 
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fluency, a negative mood generates lower price fairness than a positive mood, and this 
difference increases with price;  (c) under high processing fluency, price fairness is not 
affected by mood. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 (a) Hypothesized effects of low processing fluency on price fairness 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 (b) Hypothesized effects of high processing fluency on price fairness 
 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGY  
This section describes the data collection methods for this research. A pretest is described 
and its results are discussed. A main study, based on pretest findings, is also delineated.  
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3.4.1 Pretest 
3.4.1.1 Purpose 
The pretests described in Chapter 2 resulted in a non-linear price expectation scale (i.e., 
price expectation was not a linear function of the focal price). As anticipated, the mid focal price 
was most expected, while price expectation fell as focal price became more extreme. Both price 
magnitude and price fairness were linear functions of price. Since a structural equation model 
requires linear variables, a linear price expectation scale would help to facilitate data analysis. 
Therefore, the objective of this pretest was to develop a linear price expectation scale.  
This pretest used eight items each for price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation. The scale levels (nine-point) and the semantic differential format of the scale were 
kept identical with those used in Chapter 2, except for the new price expectation items. Instead of 
words such as “very unexpected” to “very expected” or “very unanticipated” to “very 
anticipated,” as used in the previous study, the new items were modified to indicate a focal price 
as “much more than expected” and “much less than expected” or “much more than anticipated” 
and “much less than anticipated.” Scale anchors of price fairness and price magnitude were 
identical to those in Chapter 2. An example of a new price expectation item is provided in Table 
3.1. A list of items used for price fairness, price magnitude, purchase intent, and anger are 
provided in appendix (Table A.3.1).   
 
Table 3.1 An example of a price expectation scale item 
    Price Expectation -1 
How expected [thought-priming word] is the price of this card reader? 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 
 Much more than expected                                   Much less than expected 
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3.4.1.2 Sample  
Sixty –two undergraduate business students participated in the pretest in exchange for a 
chance to win a $20 gift card where the odds of winning were 1 in 20. The study was conducted 
online, using Qualtrics. The pretest was conducted over a one week period. After adjusting for 
respondents who used the scales incorrectly or provided incomplete answers, the final sample 
consisted of 52 respondents.     
3.4.1.3 Design and Procedure 
In the study, bipolar antonyms served as anchors on respective price judgment scales. As 
shown in Table A.3.1, price magnitude and price expectation scales were reverse-ordered, while 
the price fairness scale was positively directed, to yield scales that were consistent in direction 
That is, as price goes up, price magnitude goes up, price expectation is more than expected, and 
price fairness goes down. This directional consistency was considered necessary to reduce 
subjects’ interpretational difficulty. The pretest included eight items for the price expectation 
scale. Due to the change in meaning of the scale anchors, only two of the four price expectation 
items used in Chapter 2 were employed here. In addition, to replicate the tests of the 
psychometric properties of the price fairness and price magnitude scales, eight items were 
employed for each scale, which included the four items used in Chapter 2.  
A fictitious car polish was displayed on the initial screen to provide a realistic context. 
The product was chosen based on earlier pretest results where subjects had low product 
knowledge and low price confidence on car polish. The design was a 2 (judgment environment: 
stimulus-based context, memory-based context) by 2 (processing fluency: low, high) by 3 (focal 
price: low, medium, high) mixed design where focal price was the only within-subjects factor. 
Subjects were asked to judge the three focal prices given a set of contextual prices, which were 
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not judged. Processing fluency was manipulated by the number of prices in the price judgment 
context. In the low processing fluency condition, 17 prices were provided to subjects. In the high 
processing fluency condition, 9 prices were provided to subjects. Judgment environment was 
manipulated as described in Chapter 2. In the stimulus-based condition, all contextual prices 
were provided on the computer screen with the focal prices to be judged. In the memory-based 
condition, all contextual prices were provided on the computer screen one at a time; subjects 
were subsequently asked to judge the focal prices. Contextual prices ranged from $15.00 to 
$27.00, in increments of $1.50 for the high-processing fluency condition (nine reference prices), 
and $0.75 for the low processing fluency condition (17 reference prices). The uniform price 
distribution for both types of processing fluency had identical range and mean values. 
3.4.1.4 Results 
Identical procedures as in Chapter 2 were followed for scale refinement. Each scale was 
subjected to several iterations of reliability tests. In each stage, the least effective item from each 
scale was identified and eliminated from subsequent iterations. Various diagnostic criteria for 
testing scale reliability were considered. Items resulting in largest gain in alpha (if deleted) and 
other indicators, such as corrected item-total correlation (at least 0.7), squared multiple 
correlations (0.5 or more), and inter-item correlations (at least 0.5) were used as criteria to 
eliminate the weakest item from the scale (Hair et al. 1998).  Items dropped at each stage for 
price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectations and the scale reliability results for the 
final scale items retained, are provided in appendix Table A.3.3. 
When subjected to a factor analysis, the rotated component matrix and number of 
eigenvalues greater than 1 show three distinct orthogonal factors. Testing unidimensionality of 
each price judgment scale requires related items to have highest loadings on the underlying 
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common factor they represent, and low cross loadings on other factors (Hair et al. 1998). Results 
based on factor analysis (Table 3.2) suggest that final scale items satisfy the unidimensionality 
test. These price judgment items can be further used to represent price fairness, price magnitude, 
and price expectation as three unique underlying factors.   
Table 3.2 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix) 
Final scale items retained Low focal price Mid focal price High focal price 
Price fairness 1(fair) 0.280 0.876 0.245 0.899 0.109 0.160 0.376 0.190 0.787 
Price fairness 2 (reasonable) 0.321 0.851 0.228 0.882 0.104 0.390 0.222 -0.009 0.711 
Price fairness 3 (satisfactory) 0.212 0.877 0.333 0.862 0.056 0.359 0.628 0.234 0.638 
Price fairness 8 (acceptable) 0.224 0.872 0.340 0.898 0.034 0.322 0.497 0.233 0.754 
Price magnitude 1 (low) 0.444 0.198 0.753 0.516 0.305 0.600 0.766 -0.066 0.372 
Price magnitude 2 (small) 0.307 0.364 0.765 0.311 0.194 0.775 0.886 0.193 0.337 
Price magnitude 4 (little) 0.329 0.383 0.790 0.306 0.128 0.853 0.868 0.232 0.311 
Price magnitude 6 (tiny) 0.111 0.238 0.795 0.289 0.141 0.866 0.905 0.209 0.263 
Price expectation 1 (expected) 0.897 0.308 0.239 0.120 0.852 0.106 0.129 0.956 0.042 
Price expectation 2 (predicted) 0.839 0.296 0.381 0.118 0.915 0.154 0.000 0.938 0.254 
Price expectation 3 (typical) 0.912 0.235 0.208 -0.059 0.934 0.091 0.106 0.937 0.208 
Price expectation 6 (anticipated) 0.911 0.217 0.246 0.145 0.916 0.221 0.351 0.805 -0.081 
 
3.4.2 Main Study 
3.4.2.1 Purpose 
This study was intended to test the proposed hypotheses. The main objective of this study 
was to determine the effects of focal price and three proposed factors, judgment environment, 
mood, and processing fluency on the three price judgments, anger, and purchase intent. 
3.4.2.2 Sample  
Two hundred and forty three undergraduate business students participated in the 
experiment in exchange for extra credit. 
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3.4.2.3 Design and Procedure 
The experiment took approximately 60 minutes to complete and was conducted in groups 
of approximately 25 students in a computerized behavioral laboratory. Each study session was 
conducted at approximately the same time of the day, over two weeks. This experiment was run 
on Windows-based networked computers. E-prime 2.0 was used to develop, execute, and collect 
responses. Respondents were instructed to observe the experimental condition on a computer 
screen and respond to questions by using the attached keyboard. Response times for each 
question were recorded unobtrusively. To control for external distractions, noise, or other 
environmental interference, each respondent was provided with an individual cubicle in the lab.  
The experimental design consisted of three between-subjects factors and one within-
subjects factor. The between-subjects factors were mood (positive vs. negative), processing 
fluency (high vs. low), and judgment environment (memory- vs. stimulus-based context). The 
within-subjects factor was focal price ($8.99, $20.99, and $32.99, representing low, mid, and 
high focal prices). This created a 2x2x2x3 mixed design. 
  A five-minute movie clip was used to manipulate mood. To create a positive mood, a 
scene from the movie “Jungle Book,” depicting the song “Bare Necessities,” was played. For the 
negative mood condition, a scene from the movie “Sophie’s Choice,” depicting a concentration 
camp scenario, was chosen. The video was projected on a screen at the front of the experimental 
lab. A mood condition was randomly assigned to each session. 
To manipulate processing fluency, respondents were presented with either nine (high 
processing fluency) or 17 (low processing fluency) contextual prices. Other studies have also 
manipulated processing fluency by varying the number of provided reasons (Novemsky et al. 
2007) or number of digits (Thomas et al. 2007; Thomas and Morwitz 2009). 
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The contextual prices ranged between $15.00 and $27.00, in increments of either $1.50 
(high processing fluency) or $0.75 (low processing fluency). Contextual prices were distributed 
uniformly, with the range (between $15.00 and $27.00) and the mean ($21.00) kept constant for 
each subject.  
Judgment environment was manipulated as described in Chapter 2. Contextual prices, 
randomly chosen, were individually presented on the screen for nine (or seventeen) subsequent 
screens, in the memory-based context, or were simultaneously displayed on screen, in the 
stimulus-based context. In the memory-based context, subjects were instructed to remember the 
prices displayed, since contextual prices were not available during their judgment and choice 
tasks. In the stimulus-based context, subjects simultaneously viewed all contextual prices on 
each screen while evaluating each price judgment and anger questions. 
The three focal prices were chosen so that the low focal price was below the contextual 
range, the mid focal price was at the mean of the contextual range, and the high focal price was 
above the contextual range. To maintain a uniform price distribution, each of the three focal 
prices, $8.99, $20.99, and $32.99, representing low, mid, and high focal prices, consistently 
differed by $12.00. Also, the low and the high focal prices were equidistant from the minimum 
and the maximum of the contextual range by a difference of $6.00.  
One randomly chosen price from three focal prices was displayed at the center of the 
screen, highlighted boldly with black borders. Keeping the focal price fixed at the same location 
on the screen, price judgments, purchase intent, and anger questions were presented sequentially.  
Once a focal price was evaluated for price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, purchase 
intent, and anger, the same process was repeated for two other focal prices. The display order of 
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each focal price and the contextual prices were kept constant for individual subject, but 
randomized across subjects.   
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The main study was conducted to test hypotheses proposed in this chapter. First, scale 
reliability and validity assessments for three price judgments are evaluated. Second, results 
related to structural model are provided to explore the relationships between the price judgments, 
purchase intent, and anger. The proposed hypotheses are tested using repeated measures 
ANOVA.  
3.5.1 Scale Reliability and Validity Assessment  
According to measurement theory, drawing accurate, reliable, and valid conclusions 
based on perceptual data requires testing unidimensionality, reliability and validity for a 
summated scale (Cronbach 1951). Such testing ensures that the scale is accurate, and can be 
replicated in further studies. Reliability measures the degree to which a scale is consistent 
whenever used, while validity measures the degree to which interrelated items truly capture the 
underlying construct (Hair et al. 1998).  
 Cronbach alpha measures scale reliability based on the internal consistency of items (Hair 
et al. 1998). Alpha coefficients range from values 0 to 1 with higher scores signifying greater 
reliability. Nunnaly (1978) recommends 0.7 as a minimum acceptable value for alpha.  Anderson 
and Gerbing (1988) recommend a more stringent test using composite reliability (CR) and 
average variance extracted (AVE). CR measures the extent to which indicators capture a 
proportion of their unique variance of constructs and AVE measures the common variance 
shared by the indicators (Hair et al. 1998). AVE (Fornell and Larcker 1981) and Cronbach alpha 
are commonly reported measures of convergent validity (Hair et al. 1998). Dillon and Goldstein 
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(1984) and Bagozzi (1991) suggest that a coefficient alpha greater than 0.7 and an AVE greater 
than 0.5 provide adequate support for convergent validity.  In addition to establishing convergent 
validity, confirming discriminant validity of the latent constructs is also suggested (Hair et al. 
1998). Using confirmatory factor analysis the AVE method (Fornell and Larcker 1991) is used to 
test discriminant validity. In addition to reliability and validity, Anderson and Garbing (1988) 
have also suggested testing scale unidimensionality of the latent construct.  
 The data analysis begins by confirming the reliability and validity of the scales used in 
this study. The reliability analysis of price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation, 
provided in Table 3.3, conforms to all criteria discussed above. Each scale’s alpha value is more 
than the accepted minimum of 0.7, and item to total correlations and squared multiple 
correlations of each scale item are high. Composite scale reliabilities for each price judgment 
scale are more than 0.7, and AVEs for each are higher than 0.5. These results show that the 
multi-item scales used in this study to measure price fairness, price magnitude, and price 
expectation satisfy scale reliability tests.   
Table 3.3 Reliability of price judgment scales 
  Scale 
Alpha 
Composite 
reliability 
of scale 
AVE 
Price fairness  0.961 0.961 0.860 
Price magnitude  0.984 0.984 0.938 
Price expectation  0.957 0.957 0.846 
Purchase intent  0.980 0.980 0.943 
Anger  0.961 0.961 0.893 
 
 Each price judgment scale was tested for discriminant validity. Factor analysis results 
(Table A.3.3 in appendix) illustrate unidimensionality of each scale at each focal price. Relevant 
scale items reflecting price judgment, purchase intent, and anger have the largest factor loadings 
on respective factors only. None of the cross loadings are high (cross loadings values are not 
more than 0.230).  
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Table 3.4 Correlations between dependent variables 
Price judgment Price 
fairness     
Price 
magnitude 
Price 
expectation 
Purchase 
intent  
Anger 
Price fairness   -0.906 -0.873 0.877 -0.762 
Price magnitude   0.923 -0.855 0.834 
Price expectation     -0.829 0.796 
Purchase intent     0.762 
   
 Confirmatory factor analysis results (Table 3.5) show that standardized loadings for all 
items are high and significant. AVEs are all higher than 0.7.  The square roots of AVEs are 
greater than the correlations between the measures, which satisfies discriminant validity. Taken 
together, these results verify the reliability and validity of these scales.   
Table 3.5 Confirmatory factor analysis results  
Price judgment Squared standardized 
loadings of items 
AVE of 
summated 
scale 
Composite 
reliability 
Satisfies discriminant validity 
(AVE > squared correlation 
between  constructs 
Price fairness    1          2        3         4 
0.846  0.826  0.903  0.865 
0.860 0.961 YES 
Price magnitude  
 
   1         2        3         4 
0.947  0.951  0.937  0.916 
0.938 0.984 YES 
Price expectation  
 
   1         2        3         4 
0.810  0.841  0.893  0.880 
0.856 0.960 YES 
Purchase intent 1            2        3          
0.939  0.941  0.951   
0.943 0.980 YES 
Anger 1            2        3          
0.843  0.927  0.908   
0.893 0.961 YES 
   
  
 Descriptive statistics (Table 3.6) show price fairness decreases and price magnitude 
increases with an increase in focal price. The linear price expectation scale has larger mean 
values at the high focal price ($32.99) and gradually declines as focal price decreases. Recall that 
the scale anchors were “much more than expected” (9) and “much less than expected” (1) such 
that the mid-point of the scale (5) could be interpreted as the expected price. Purchase intent 
declines and anger (anger, frustration, and irritation) increases as focal price rises.   
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 Table 3.6 Mean values of price judgments, purchase intent, and anger 
  Low focal price 
($8.99) 
Mid focal price 
($20.99) 
High focal price 
($32.99) 
Price fairness  8.078 (1.072) 5.363 (1.569) 2.263 (1.123) 
Price magnitude  1.884 (1.130) 5.110 (1.020) 8.098 (1.061) 
Price expectation  1.986 (1.133) 4.902 (1.210) 7.575 (1.343) 
Purchase intent  7.805 (1.710) 4.912 (2.176) 1.796 (1.120) 
Anger  1.615 (1.048) 3.564 (1.790) 6.529 (1.860) 
Note: numbers in parenthesis denote standard deviations. 
3.5.2 Structural Model Assessment 
3.5.2.1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
 Confirmatory factor analysis was performed on the five-factor 18 item measurement 
model to confirm unidimensionality and discriminant validity of the scales (Netemeyer et al. 
2003). Model fit statistics from the analysis, summarized in Table 3.7, show adequate model fit. 
The overall minimum chi-square statistic (CMIN) is 343.390 with 125 degrees for freedom. The 
discrepancy function measuring the difference between the predicted model and actual 
covariance matrix (input matrix) is 2.747. The normed fit index (NFI), goodness of fit (GFI), and 
adjusted goodness of fit (AGFI) are 0.984, 0.949, and 0.930 respectively. The comparative fit 
index (CFI), robust to sampling characteristics, is 0.990, and the root-mean square error of 
approximation, supportive of a more complex model, is 0.049; other indices such as Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Brown-Cudeck criterion (BCC), which penalize greater model 
complexity or over-parameterization, are 435.390 and 437.898. Individually, each of these 
statistics satisfies accepted minimum criterion to confirm adequate overall model fit for the 
measurement model (Kline 2005; Netemeyer et al. 2003). In addition, all the scale reliability 
values (see Tables 3.3 and 3.5) are higher than the accepted minimum (0.7), and none of the 
AVEs is less than 0.50.  
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 The range of standardized factor loadings are between 0.909 and  0.950 for price fairness, 
0.957 and 0.975 for price magnitude, 0.896 and 0.936 for price expectation, 0.969 and 0.975 for 
purchase intent, and 0.918 and 0.963 for anger. Each of these loadings is significant. The 
smallest loading is 0.900. None of the modification indices are very large (the largest is 9.58). 
Taken together, these results provide support for the reliability and validity of these scales, which 
are used in subsequent analysis.  
Table 3.7 Confirmatory factor analysis results 
Model:  Chi-
square 
df CMIN
/df 
NFI CFI AGFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
5-factor model: 343.390 125 2.747 0.984 0.990   0.930 0.049 435.390 437.898 
 
3.5.2.2.Model Selection 
 An alternative model is accepted over another when incremental model fits, measured by 
incremental chi squares, change by 4 or more values for each degree change in freedom. Similar 
to the approach adopted in Chapter 2, the base model consisted of price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectations mediating the effect of focal prices on purchase intent. A new 
construct, anger is introduced to this model. Several alternative model specifications are tested to 
determine the best fitting model. 
 Based on theories of price judgment (Thaler 1985), price fairness, price magnitude, and 
price expectation are expected to be correlated. To account for the correlation among the three 
price judgments, their disturbance terms are correlated (Kline 1998).   
  In addition to the base model, all possible alternative specifications incorporating anger 
in the model are also tested. Depending on incremental fit indices (results shown in appendix 
Table A.3.5), the best model turns out to be the one that specifies paths from focal prices to 
purchase intent and anger as final dependant measures, mediated by three price judgments. In 
addition, anger was also found to mediate the paths between price judgments and purchase 
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intent. Fit indices of the initial model and final models are provided in Table 3.8. The final model 
is also depicted in appendix Figure A.3.1. 
Table 3.8 Fit statistics of the initial and final model 
 Chi-square df CMIN/df NFI CFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
Model1: Initial  
(without Anger in the model) 
269.423 95 2.836 0.987 0.991 0.051 383.423 386.195 
Model6: Final  
PL, Anger in the model and 
PFAnger, PMAnger, 
PEAnger and AngerPL path 
added 
391.811 139 2.819 0.983 0.989 0.050 531.811 535.834 
 
3.5.2.3 Structural Model Results 
 
 To account for the potential interactions between focal price, mood, processing fluency, 
and judgment environment, a multi-group SEM approach was employed. The three between-
subjects factors (processing fluency, judgment environment, and mood) created eight groups, 
which were separately fit to the final model shown in Figure A.3.1.Table 3.9 provides the 
standardized path coefficients along with their t-values and corresponding p-values for each 
group. 
 Before proceeding with the multi-group SEM analysis, configural model testing and 
group invariance testing is performed.  Those tests verify whether the same model holds across 
all groups (Byrne 2009). Configural model testing is done by analyzing model fits with no 
constraints imposed on the model coefficients. To test for model invariance, three different 
procedures, from least to most stringent, are followed: a) test the measurement model invariance 
by constraining factor loadings to be equal across groups;  b) test the structural model invariance 
by constraining factor variances and covariances to be equal  across groups;  c) constrain error 
variances to be equal  across groups (Byrne 2009).  Of these three approaches, only the first 
approach is tested here. Both the measurement model and the structural model considered here 
passed group invariance testing (appendix Tables A.3.9, A.3.10-a and b). 
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Table 3.9 Structural equation model results with standardized path coefficients 
 Low fluency x 
memory x positive 
t-values
(p-values)
Low fluency x 
memory x negative
t-values 
(p-values) 
Focal price Price fairness  -0.877 -16.056 (0.001) -0.921 -20.189 (0.001) 
Focal price Price magnitude 0.956 14.555 (0.001) 0.942 15.61 (0.001) 
Focal price Price expectation 0.853 29.065 (0.001) 0.865 26.06 (0.001) 
Price fairness  Anger -0.223 -1.852 (0.064) -0.474 -2.790 (0.005) 
Price magnitude  Anger 0.488 3.115 (0.002) 0.584 3.359 (0.001) 
Price expectation  Anger 0.210 1.708 (0.088) -0.208 -1.310 (0.190) 
Price fairness  Purchase intent 0.748 7.825 (0.001) 0.604 3.408 (0.001) 
Price magnitude  Purchase intent -0.257 -1.512 (0.131) -0.081 -0.409 (0.683) 
Price expectation  Purchase intent -0.013 -0.136 (0.892) -0.296 -2.09 (0.037) 
Focal price  Purchase intent 0.023 0.171 (0.864) 0.078 0.440 (0.660) 
Anger  Purchase intent 0.022 0.267 (0.789) -0.007 -0.060 (0.945) 
 Low fluency x 
stimulus x positive
t-values
(p-values)
Low fluency x 
stimulus x negative
t-values 
(p-values) 
Focal price Price fairness  -0.935 -17.449 (0.001) -0.910 -19.227 (0.001) 
Focal price Price magnitude 0.931 19.012 (0.001) 0.929 19.82 (0.001) 
Focal price Price expectation 0.916 17.325 (0.001) 0.908 22.796 (0.001) 
Price fairness  Anger 0.016 2.413 (0.016) -0.504 -3.422 (0.001) 
Price magnitude  Anger 0.457 1.819 (0.069) 0.199 1.127 (0.260) 
Price expectation  Anger 0.439 0.072 (0.943) 0.170 1.081 (0.279) 
Price fairness  Purchase intent 0.501 1.713 (0.087) 0.323 1.706 (0.088) 
Price magnitude  Purchase intent -0.437 -1.617 (0.106) -0.433 -2.093 (0.036) 
Price expectation  Purchase intent -0.469 -1.983 (0.047) 0.046 0.259 (0.795) 
Focal price  Purchase intent 0.375 1.38 (0.168) 0.094 0.418 (0.676) 
Anger  Purchase intent 0.190 1.376 (0.169) -0.230 -1.819 (0.069) 
 High fluency x 
memory x positive
t-values
(p-values)
High fluency x 
memory xnegative
t-values 
(p-values) 
Focal price Price fairness  -0.884 -14.633 (0.001) -0.953 -26.078 (0.001) 
Focal price Price magnitude 0.921 15.291 (0.001) 0.945 20.222 (0.001) 
Focal price Price expectation 0.893 18.672 (0.001) 0.921 26.509 (0.001) 
Price fairness  Anger 0.322 1.325 (0.185) -0.443 -2.162 (0.031) 
Price magnitude  Anger 1.276 2.719 (0.007) 0.165 0.728 (0.467) 
Price expectation  Anger -0.152 -0.491 (0.623) 0.309 1.580 (0.114) 
Price fairness  Purchase intent 0.695 4.469 (0.001) 0.661 3.53 (0.001) 
Price magnitude  Purchase intent 0.134 0.435 (0.664) 0.041 0.228 (0.820) 
Price expectation  Purchase intent 0.035 0.189 (0.850) -0.165 -1.072 (0.284) 
Focal price  Purchase intent -0.239 -2.102 (0.036) -0.002 -0.011 (0.991) 
Anger  Purchase intent -0.250 -3.08 (0.002) -0.178 -1.886 (0.059) 
 High fluency x 
stimulus x positive
t-values
(p-values)
High fluency x 
stimulus x negative
t-values 
(p-values) 
Focal price Price fairness  -0.953 -16.24 (0.001) -0.903 -15.873 (0.001) 
Focal price Price magnitude 0.945 24.292 (0.001) 0.881 16.189 (0.001) 
Focal price Price expectation 0.921 30.254 (0.001) 0.905 14.793 (0.001) 
Price fairness  Anger -0.443 -0.63 (0.529) -0.168 -0.673 (0.501) 
Price magnitude  Anger 0.165 2.354 (0.019) 0.340 1.279 (0.201) 
Price expectation  Anger 0.309 0.040 (0.968) 0.168 0.688 (0.491) 
Price fairness  Purchase intent 0.661 5.155 (0.001) 0.632 3.122 (0.002) 
Price magnitude  Purchase intent 0.041 0.368 (0.713) 0.058 0.296 (0.767) 
Price expectation  Purchase intent -0.165 -1.022 (0.307) -0.433 -2.165 (0.030) 
Focal price  Purchase intent -0.002 -0.362 (0.717) 0.143 0.681 (0.496) 
Anger  Purchase intent -0.178 -1.779 (0.075) 0.001 0.011 (0.991) 
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 Results provided in Table 3.9 show that the effect of focal price on price fairness is 
negative and significant across all groups. Effect of price fairness on purchase intent is positive 
and significant across all groups except in low fluency, stimulus-based, positive mood and low 
fluency, stimulus-based, negative mood groups, where the path coefficients are positive but 
marginally significant. Path coefficients of price fairness on anger is negative and significant 
across all groups except, positive and negative mood in high fluency-high processing stimulus 
group and positive mood, memory group in high fluency where the path coefficients are 
insignificant. The coefficients are positively significant in positive mood, low fluency stimulus 
based condition.  
  Effects of focal prices on price magnitude are positive and significant across all groups. 
Path coefficients of price magnitude on purchase intent is insignificant across all groups except 
low fluency, stimulus based positive and negative mood groups where they are negative and 
significant. Path coefficients of price magnitude on anger are positive across all groups but are 
significant for all positive mood groups in memory and stimulus based contexts under low and 
high frequency processing.  
 Effects of focal prices on price expectation are positive and significant across all groups. 
Path coefficients of price expectation on purchase intent is negative and significant only in low 
fluency memory based negative mood, low fluency stimulus based positive mood, and in  high 
fluency stimulus based negative mood. Path coefficients of price expectation on anger are 
insignificant across all groups. 
3.5.3 Repeated Measures ANOVA 
A multiple repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with three between-subject factors 
(each with two levels), focal price as the within-subject factor (three levels), and five dependent 
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measures (price fairness, price magnitude, price expectation, anger, and purchase intent), which 
employed summated scales and were measured at each level of the focal price. The results of the 
analysis are provided in Table A.3.6 and used to test the hypotheses. 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is 
affected by an interaction between focal price and judgment environment; (b) price expectation 
is lower in a stimulus-based context than in a memory-based context at low and high focal 
prices, but does not differ across contexts at the mid focal price.   
The multivariate test indicates a significant interaction between focal price and judgment 
environment (Wilks’ Lambda=0.814, F(10, 222)=5.077, p=0.000). The repeated measures ANOVA 
results (appendix Table A.3.4) indicate a significant interaction between focal price and 
judgment environment on price expectation (F(2, 462) = 6.887, p=0.002) and on price fairness 
(F(2,462) = 3.001, p=0.051), but not on price magnitude (F(2,462) = 1.827, p=0.165). Hence 
hypothesis 1(a) was not supported. 
Using planned contrasts, price expectations are compared between the memory- and 
stimulus-based contexts at each focal price level. As shown in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.1(b), 
mean expectation measures were marginally lower in the stimulus-based context than in the 
memory-based context at the low price level (t237=1.483, p=0.139, one-tailed p=0.07), and 
significantly higher in the stimulus-based context than in the memory-based context at the high 
price level (t237 =-3.329, p=0.001). Price expectations did not differ at the mid focal price        
(t237 =-0.683, p=0.495, one-tailed p = 0.247).These results indicate that the focal prices were 
more expected in the memory-based than in the stimulus-based context at the low and high focal 
price levels.  These results support hypothesis 1(b). 
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Table 3.10 Univariate contrasts – focal price and judgment environment on price expectation 
 
 
 
Judgment environment  
Focal prices 
Low Mid High 
Price expectation Memory-based context 2.093 4.851 7.302 
 Stimulus-based context 1.877 4.953 7.856 
 t-value (p-value) 1.483 
(0.139) 
- 0.683 
(0.495) 
-3.329 
(0.001) 
 
 
Figure 3.1 (b) Mean differences in price expectation for judgment environment 
Exploratory analysis reveals that although the interaction between focal price and 
judgment environment had no affect on price magnitude, the interaction did affect price fairness. 
More specifically, price fairness was higher in the stimulus-based context than in the memory-
based context at the mid focal price (PFmemory-mid price = 5.225 and  PFstimulus-mid price = 5.888, t237=-
1.879, p=0.050), but not at the low or high focal prices (t237, low price=0.815, p=0.416 and t237, high 
price= 0.084, p=0.933). These results further reinforce the idea that price fairness, price 
magnitude, and price expectation are affected differently by the interaction between focal price 
and judgment environment.  
Test of Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is 
affected by a three-way interaction between focal price, judgment environment, and mood; (b) in 
memory-based context, positive mood generates higher price fairness than a negative mood, and 
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this difference increases with focal price. In a stimulus-based context, price fairness is not 
affected by mood.  
Multivariate results show significant three way interactions between mood, judgment 
environment, and focal price (Wilks’ Lambda=0.914, F(10,222)=2.083, p=0.027). Repeated 
measures ANOVA results indicate significant three way interactions between focal price, mood, 
and judgment environment (F(2,462)=4.537, p=0.011). However, the three way interaction was 
also found to be significant on price magnitude (F(2,462)=5.978, p=0.003) and price expectation 
(F2df =3.525, p=0.035). Thus, hypothesis 2(a) was not supported. 
As shown in Table 3.11, Figure 3.2 (c), and Figure 3.2 (d), mean price fairness in 
memory-based context was significantly higher in positive mood than in negative mood at the 
mid (t237 =2.257, p=0.026) and high focal price (t237=4.147, p=0.000), but not at low focal price 
(t237 =-0.181, p=0.857). Mean difference in price fairness between positive and negative mood 
also increases with increase in focal price (mean differences at low, mid, and high focal prices 
are=-0.034, 0.690, 0.863, respectively). In stimulus-based context, price fairness did not differ 
between positive and negative mood at any focal price (tlow, 237=-0.462, p=0.645; t mid, 237=-1.323, 
p=0.188; thigh, 237 =-1.333, p=0.185). Results from Table 3.11 supports hypothesis 2(b). 
 
Table 3.11 Univariate contrasts –focal price, mood, and judgment environment on price fairness 
 
 
 
Judgment environment  
 
Mood  
Focal prices 
Low Mid High 
Price fairness Memory-based context positive 8.116 5.591 2.732 
  negative 8.150 4.903 1.869 
 t-value (p-value)  -0.181 
(0.857) 
2.257 
(0.026) 
4.147 
(0.000) 
 Stimulus-based context positive 8.078 5.362 2.137 
  negative 8.071 5.768 2.388 
 t-value (p-value)  -0.462 
(0.645) 
-1.323 
(0.188) 
-1.333 
(0.185) 
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Figure 3.2 (c) Mean differences in price fairness for memory-based context 
 
 
Figure 3.2 (d) Mean differences in price fairness for stimulus-based context 
 
Test of Hypothesis 3 
  This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price magnitude is 
affected by processing fluency; (b) price magnitude is lower under high processing fluency than 
low processing fluency.  
This hypothesis tests for significant main effect of processing fluency on price 
magnitude. Multivariate results show no significant main effect of processing fluency (Wilks’ 
Lambda=0.990, F(5,227) =0.475, p=0.795). Thus, hypothesis 3(a) was not supported.  
Although mean price magnitude is lower under high processing fluency than under low 
processing fluency at each price level (Table 3.12 and Figure 3.3), but the differences were not 
significant. Thus, hypothesis 3(b) was not supported. 
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Table 3.12 Univariate contrasts – focal price and processing fluency on price magnitude 
 Focal prices 
Low      Mid        High  
High processing fluency 1.817 5.084 8.085 
Low processing fluency 1.950 5.135 8.170 
t-value (p-value) -0.908 
(0.365) 
-0.389 
(0.698) 
-1.061 
(0.290) 
 
 
Figure 3.3 (b) Mean differences in price magnitude for processing fluency 
Exploratory analysis reveals a significant two-way interaction between focal price and 
processing fluency on anger (F(2,462) = 4.188, p=0.017) and a significant three-way interaction 
between focal price, mood, and processing fluency on price magnitude (F(2,462) = 3.135, 
p=0.048). Price magnitude did not differ between positive and negative mood under high 
processing fluency but differs significantly between positive and negative mood under low 
processing fluency at high and low focal prices (Table 3.13). For reasons previously noted, this 
finding indicates that at extreme prices, consumers’ affective reactions under low processing 
fluency influence price magnitude.   
Table 3.13 Univariate contrasts – mood and processing fluency on price magnitude 
 
 
 
Processing fluency  
 Focal prices 
Mood Low Mid High 
Price magnitude High processing fluency Positive 1.722 5.111 8.046 
  Negative 1.896 5.061 8.007 
 t-value (p-value)  -0.952 
(0.343) 
0.258 
(0.797) 
0.191 
(0.849) 
 Low processing fluency Positive 1.625 5.105 8.343 
  Negative 2.321 5.169 7.973 
 t-value (p-value)  -3.149 
(0.002) 
-0.348 
(0.729) 
1.992 
(0.049) 
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Test of Hypothesis 4 
This hypothesis predicted that (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is 
affected by a three-way interaction between price, mood, and processing fluency; (b) under low 
processing fluency, a negative mood generates lower price fairness than a positive mood, and 
this difference increases with price;  (c) under high processing fluency, price fairness is not 
affected by mood.  
Multivariate results indicate a significant three-way interaction between focal price, 
mood, and judgment environment (Wilks’ Lambda=0.915, F(10,222)=2.054, p=0.029). Repeated 
measures ANOVA results indicate a significant three-way interaction between focal price, mood, 
and processing fluency on price fairness (F(2,462)=2.390, p=0.093, one tailed p=0.046) and price 
magnitude (F(2,462) = 3.135, p=0.048), but not on price expectation (F2,462=0.125, p=0.866). Thus, 
hypothesis 4(a) was not supported. 
As shown in Table 3.14, Figure 3.4 (c), and Figure 3.4 (d), mean price fairness under low 
processing fluency was higher in a positive mood than in a negative mood. However, price 
fairness was significantly higher in positive mood than in negative mood at the high focal price 
(thigh,237=3.656, p<0.001), but not at mid (tmid,237=0.831, p=0.408) or low (tlow,237=-0.632, 
p=0.529) focal prices. The mean differences between positive and negative mood increases with 
increase in focal price. Thus hypothesis 4(b) was supported. 
Price fairness did not differ between positive and negative mood under high processing 
fluency at any focal price (tlow,237= 0.018, p=0.985; tmid,237=-0.045, p=0.964; thigh,237 =-0.308, 
p=0.759). Hypothesis 4(c) was supported.  
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Table 3.14 Univariate contrasts -mood, processing fluency, and focal price on price fairness 
 
 
 
Processing fluency  
 Focal prices 
Mood Low Mid High 
Price fairness High processing fluency Positive 8.181 5.374 2.282 
  Negative 8.128 5.339 2.280 
 t-value (p-value)  
 
0.018 
(0.985) 
-0.045 
(0.964) 
-0.308 
(0.759) 
 Low processing fluency Positive 8.045 5.587 2.749 
  Negative 8.033 5.326 1.934 
 t-value (p-value)  -0.632 
(0.529) 
0.831 
(0.408) 
3.656 
(0.000) 
 
 
Figure 3.4 (c) Mean differences in price fairness for high processing fluency 
 
 
Figure 3.4 (d) Mean differences in price fairness for low processing fluency 
 
3.6 DISCUSSION 
This section summarizes the results, briefly describes the implications of these findings, 
and discusses the limitations of this study with suggestions for possible future research. 
3.6.1 Findings  
The overarching proposition of this dissertation is that while correlated, the three price 
judgments are distinct constructs that behave differently within a nomological network. To test 
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this proposition and to advance our understanding of these price judgments, Chapter 3 developed 
and tested hypotheses concerning the antecedents (judgment environment, processing fluency, 
and mood) and consequences (purchase intent and anger) of price fairness, price magnitude, and 
price expectation. In order to conduct empirical tests, a four-item linear scale for price 
expectation was developed. A summary of the hypotheses tests are provided in Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15 Empirical support to proposed hypotheses  
Hypotheses Hypotheses 
supported 
Hypotheses 
not supported 
H1: (a) of the three price judgments, only price expectation is affected by 
an interaction between focal price and judgment environment;  (b) 
compared to the price expectations in the memory-based condition 
(which are assimilated), price expectations in the stimulus-based 
conditions (which are contrasted) are lower at low focal price, equivalent 
at mid focal price, and higher at high focal price.  
H1(b) H1 (a) 
H2: (a) of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a 
three-way interaction between focal price, judgment environment, and 
mood; (b) in a memory-based context, a positive mood generates higher 
price fairness than a negative mood, and this difference increases with 
focal price.  In a stimulus-based context, price fairness is not affected by 
mood.  
H2 (b) H2(a) 
H3: (a) of the three price judgments, only price magnitude is affected by 
processing fluency; (b) price magnitude is lower under high processing 
fluency than low processing fluency. 
 H3(a) , (b) 
H4: (a) Of the three price judgments, only price fairness is affected by a 
three-way interaction between price, processing fluency, and mood;  (b) 
under low processing fluency, a negative mood generates lower price 
fairness than a positive mood, and this difference increases with price;  
(c) under high processing fluency, price fairness is not affected by mood. 
H3 (b) , (c)  H4 (a) 
 
Even with a new, linear price expectation scale, hypothesis 1 validated findings of 
Chapter 2, i.e., judgment environment affects price expectation. The finding that judgment 
environment affects price expectation and price fairness but not price magnitude, indicates that 
price judgments are different under identical judgment environment. This result accentuates an 
overarching goal of this research, that price fairness, price magnitude, and price expectation are 
fundamentally distinct. The effects of judgment environment on price expectation being stronger 
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when judged prices belong to more extremes rather than mid level prices, exemplify an 
important characteristic that price expectation is sensitive towards extreme prices.  
Price fairness is influenced by mood and judgment environment interactions. Strong 
influence of mood across all price judgments provides evidence that affect plays an important 
role on price judgment (consistent with affect primacy results from Chapter 2).  
Although hypothesis 3 is not directly supported, but when mood is considered in addition 
to the processing fluency, it generates expected results, i.e. differences between positive and 
negative mood become prominent in low processing fluency than in high processing fluency. 
Hypothesis 4 shows that positive mood generates larger price fairness than negative mood, more 
so under low than under high processing fluency. Exploratory findings from this hypothesis 
show that, beside price fairness, mood and processing fluency interaction also influence price 
magnitude but not price expectation—a reinforcement of the fact that price judgments are 
different under the same antecedent.    
3.6.2 Implications 
With few exceptions (e.g., Xia and Monroe 2005), most research in the pricing literature 
investigates a single price judgment in isolation. This approach may overlook differences that 
exist between various price judgments or imply the effects hold for all price judgments. With a 
notable exception from Xia and Monroe (2005), price judgment research overlooked the 
subtleties of various price judgments. For example, factors that influence price fairness were also 
considered to be affecting price magnitude. Price fairness was considered to be an alternative 
interpretation of price magnitude. In measurement terms, items related to price expectations or 
price fairness were added to price magnitude items in the same scale. Finding price fairness, 
price magnitude, and price expectations to be different and finding items able to segregate price 
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judgments, provides significant theoretical contributions to existing pricing research by adding 
conceptual clarity to price judgments, and sets the stage to measure these judgments differently, 
as well.   
Findings from this chapter may benefit managers to understand how perceptual 
differences in price judgments affect purchase intent. Providing a shopping experience that 
influences consumers’ mood and processing fluency may generate different buying patterns. 
Understanding how differences in price judgments affect purchase decisions differently may 
influence different strategic and pricing decisions.  
3.6.3 Future Research and Limitations  
This research suffers from weaknesses inherent in projects of similar nature. Particularly, 
in this study, an obvious concern was the sample size. Having approximately 250 samples 
allocated to eight factorial combinations of experimental conditions satisfied basic requirement 
of sample adequacy for an experiment. However, having a larger sample, and thereby reducing 
sampling error, could either have added strength to the effects, or have found significance in a 
factor that otherwise may have remained undetected due to small sample size. Also, realism 
needs to be tested in the actual world with different demographics. The fact that proposed 
hypotheses are supported based on student perceptions could be a shortcoming. However, it is 
encouraging to find that the three main price judgments passed discriminant validity and 
unidimensionality tests, which confirms that fundamental differences do exist between price 
judgments. It would be quite interesting, from the standpoint of external validity and 
generalizability, to see how price judgments differ in real market place, with several attenuating 
factors. In addition, mood and processing fluency manipulations may be subjected to criticism 
about their effectiveness.  
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This research paves the way for several future prospects. First, finding alternative price 
judgments that could be included in the conceptual model developed in this chapter can 
significantly expand this research. Second, it would be worth finding different environmental 
variables, as well as various contexts, which could differentiate or add further explanations to 
price judgments. Third, exploring the breadth and depth involved in stages of information 
processing associated with each type of price judgment can further reveal interesting facts about 
price judgments. Fourth, it would be interesting to find if the order in which price judgments are 
made has any impact on subsequent judgments. Finally, varying levels of consciousness and 
automaticity involved in human judgments can as well be applied to the three price judgments 
referred to in this research, which could significantly expand the domain of judgment and 
decision making research.  
115 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Adaval, Rashmi and Kent B. Monroe (2002), "Automatic Construction and Use of Contextual 
Information for Product and Price Evaluation," Journal of Consumer Research, 28 (March), 
572–88. 
 
Alba, Joseph W. and J. W. Hutchinson (2000),"Knowledge Calibration: What Consumers Know 
and What They Think They Know," Journal of Consumer Research, 27 (2),123-156. 
 
Alba, Joseph W., Carl F. Mela, Terence A. Shimp, and Joel E. Urbany (1999), "The Effect of 
Discount Frequency and Depth on Consumer Price Judgments," Journal of Consumer Research, 
26 (2), 99-114. 
 
Alford, Bruce L. and Brian T. Engelland (2000), "Advertised Reference Price Effects on 
Consumer Price Estimates, Value Perception, and Search Intention," Journal of Business 
Research, 48, 93-100. 
 
Anderson, Eugene W. and Linda C. Salisbury (2003), "The Formation of Market‐Level 
Expectations and Its Covariates," Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (1), 115-124. 
 
Anderson, James C. and David W. Gerbing (1988), "Structural equation modeling in practice: A 
review and recommended two-step approach," Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 411-423. 
 
Anderson, James C. and David W. Gerbing (1988), "Structural equation modeling in practice: A 
review and recommended two-step approach," Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 411-423. 
 
Anderson, Norman (1971), "Integration Theory and Attitude Change,"  Psychological  Review,  
78 (May), 171-206. 
 
Anderson, Norman (1981), Foundation of information integration theory, New York: Academic 
Press. 
 
Arbatskaya, M., M. Hviid, and G. Shaffer (2004), "On the Incidence and Variety of Low‐Price 
Guarantees," The Journal of Law and Economics, 47 (1), 307-332. 
 
Arieh Y. and L. E. Marks (2002), "Context effects in visual length perception. Role of ocular, 
retinal, and spatial location," Perception and Psychophysics, 64 (3), 478-492. 
 
Arrow, K. (1973), "Information and Economic Behavior," Federation of Swedish Industries, 
Stockholm, Sweden.  
 
Averill, James R. (1983), "Studies on anger and aggression: Implications for theories of 
emotion," American Psychologist, 38(11), 1145-1160. 
 
Bagozzi, R. P. (1991), "Further thoughts on the validity of measures of elation, gladness, and 
joy," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 98–104. 
116 
 
 
Baron, R. M., and D. A. Kenny (1986),"The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations," Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173-1182. 
 
Bargh, J. A., J. Litt, F. Pratto, and L. A. Spielman (1989), On the preconscious evaluation of 
social stimuli. In: A. F. Bennett, K. M. McConkey (Eds), Cognition in individual and social 
contexts, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers. 
 
Batson, C.D., L. L. Shaw, and K. C. Oleson (1992), Differentiating Affect, Mood and Emotion: 
Toward Functionally-based Conceptual Distinctions. Emotion. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
 
Bechwati, Nada Nasr, Rajendra S. Sisodia, and Jagdish N. Sheth (2009), " Developing a model 
of antecedents to consumers' perceptions and evaluations of price unfairness, " Journal of 
Business Research, 62(8), 761-767. 
 
Bell, David E. (1982), "Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty," Operations Research, 
30, 961-81.  
 
Bentler, P. M. and C. P. Chou (1987), "Practical issues in structural modeling," Sociological 
Methods and Research, 16(1), 78-117.  
 
Biswas, A., C. Pullig, M. I. Yagci, and D. H. Dean (2002), "Consumer evaluation of low price 
guarantees: The moderating role of reference price and store image," Journal of Consumer 
Psychology, 12 (2), 107-118. 
 
Biswas, Abhijit and Edward A. Blair (1991), "Contextual Effects of Reference Prices in Retail 
Advertisements," The Journal of Marketing, 55(3), 1-12. 
 
Blair, E. and S. Burton (1987),"Cognitive processes used by survey respondents to answer 
behavioral frequency questions," Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (2), 280-288. 
 
Blais, Ann-Renée, Megan M. Thompson, and Joseph V. Baranski (2005),"Individual differences 
in decision processing and confidence judgments in comparative judgment tasks: The role of 
cognitive styles," Personality and Individual Differences, 38 (7), 1701-1713. 
 
Blaney, Paul H. (1986), "Affect and memory: A review," Psychological Bulletin, 99(2), 229-246. 
 
Blechman, E. A. (1990), Moods, Affect, and Emotions, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
 
Bollen, Kenneth A. (1989), Structural equations with latent variables. NY: John Wiley & Sons.  
 
Bolton, Lisa, Luk Warlop, and Joseph W. Alba (2003), “Consumer Perceptions of Price 
(Un)Fairness,” Journal of Consumer Research, 29 (March), 474-491. 
 
117 
 
Bornstein, Robert F., D'Agostino, and R. Paul (1992), "Stimulus recognition and the mere 
exposure effect," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 545-552. 
 
Bougie, R., R. Pieters, and M. Zeelenberg (2003), "Angry customers don't come back, they get 
back: The experience and behavioral implications of anger and dissatisfaction in services," 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Sciences, 31, 377–391. 
 
Bower, G. H. (1981), "Mood and memory," American Psychologist, 36, 129-148. 
 
Bower, G. H., S. G. Gilligan, and K. P. Monteiro (1981), "Selectivity of learning caused by 
affective states," Journal of Experimental Psychology, General, 7, 451-473. 
 
Briesch, Richard A., Lakshman Krishnamurthi, Tridib Mazumdar, and S. P. Raj (1997), "A 
Comparative Analysis of Reference Price Models," Journal of Consumer Research, 24 
(September), 202–214. 
 
Burton, Scott and Edward Blair (1991), "Task Conditions, Response Forumulation Processes, 
and Response Accuracy for Behavioral Frequency Questions in Surveys," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 55, 50-79. 
 
Byrne, B. M. (2009), Structural equation modeling with AMOS: Basic concepts, applications, 
and programming (2nd ed.), New York: Routledge / Taylor & Francis. 
 
Campbell, M.C. (1999),"Perceptions of price unfairness: antecedents and consequences," 
Journal of Marketing Research, 36 (May), 187-99. 
 
Chaiken, S., A. Liberman, and A. H. Eagly (1989), Heuristic and systematic information 
processing within and beyond the persuasion context, in Uleman, J. S. & Bargh, J. A.(Eds.), 
Unintended thought, New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Chebat, J. C., C. Zuccaro, and P. Filiatrault (1992), "Locus of control as a moderator variable for 
the attribution and learning processes of marketing managers," Journal of social psychology, 132 
(5), 597-608. 
 
Clore, G.L. (1992), Cognitive phenomenology: Feelings and the construction of judgment, in L. 
L. Martin and A.Tesser (Eds.), The construction of social judgments, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.   
 
Clore,G. L., N. Schwarz, and M. Conway (1994), Affective causes and consequences of social 
information processing, in Robert S. Wyer, Thomas K. Srull (ed.) Handbook of social cognition: 
Basic processes, vol.1, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, Inc. 
  
Cook, Thomas D., Donald T. Campbell, Laura Peracchio, and Marvin D. Dunnette, (1990), 
Quasi experimentation. Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology, 1 (2nd ed.), Palo 
Alto, CA, US: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
 
118 
 
Coulter, K. S. (2002),"The influence of print advertisement organization on odd-ending price 
image effects," Journal of Product and Brand Management featuring Pricing Strategy and 
Practice, 11(5), 319–334. 
 
Coulter, Keith S. and Robin A. Coulter (2005), "Size Does Matter: The Effects of Magnitude 
Representation Congruency on Price Perceptions and Purchase Likelihood," Journal of 
Consumer Psychology, 15 (1), 64-76.  
 
Cronbach, L. J. (1951), "Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests,"  Psychometrika, 
16, 297-334. 
  
Cronbach, L. J., and P. E. Meehl (1955), "Construct validity in psychological tests, psychological 
Bulletin, 52, 281-302. 
 
Danziger, Shai  and Ruthie Segev (2006), "The effects of informative and non-informative price 
patterns on consumer price judgments," Psychology and Marketing, 23 (6), 535-553. 
 
Dehaene, S. (1989), "The Psychophysics of Numerical Comparison: A Reexamination of 
Apparently Incompatible Data," Perception and Psychophysics, 45 (6), 557–66. 
 
Dehaene, S. (1992), "Varieties of Numerical Abilities," Cognition, 44 (1–2), 1–42. 
 
Dehane., S. and L. Cohen, (1995), "Towards an anatomical and functional model of number 
processing," Mathematical Cognition, 1, 83–120. 
 
DelVecchio, D., H. S. Krishnan, and D. C. Smith (2007), "Cents or percent? The effects of 
promotion framing on price expectations and choice," Journal of Marketing, 71, 3, 158-170. 
 
Demb, J. B., J. E. Desmond, A. D. Wagner, C. J. Vaidya, G. H. Glover, and  J. D. E. Gabrieli 
(1995), "Semantic encoding and retrieval in left inferior prefrontal cortex: A functional MRI 
study of task difficulty and process specificity," Journal of Neuroscience, 15, 5870-5878.  
 
Derbaix, Christian and Michel Tuan Pham (1991), "Affective Reactions to Consumption 
Situations: A Pilot Investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, 12 (2), 325-55. 
 
Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, Boston, MA: D. C. Heath & Co. 
 
Dhar, S. K., C. Gonzalez-Vallejo, and D. Soman (1999), "Modeling the effects of advertised 
price claims: tensile precise claims?" Marketing Science, 18 (2), 154–177. 
 
Dick, Alan, Dipankar Chakravarti, and Gabriel Biehal (1990), "Memory Based Inferences 
During Consumer Choice," Journal of Consumer Research, 17 (June), 82–93. 
 
Dickson, Peter R. and Rosemary Kalapurakal (1994),"The use and perceived fairness of price-
setting rules in the bulk electricity market," Journal of Economic Psychology, 15 (3), 427-448. 
 
119 
 
Dillon, W. and Goldstein, M. (1984), Multivariate analysis: Methods and applications, New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Dodds, William B., Kent B. Monroe, and Dhruv Grewal (1991), "The Effects of Price, Brand, 
and Store Information on Buyers' Product Evaluations," Journal of Marketing Research, 28 
(August), 307-319. 
 
Dunlosky J., and T. O. Nelson (1994),"Does the sensitivity of judgments of learning (JOLs) to 
the effects of various study activities depend on when the JOLs occur," Journal of Memory and 
Language, 33, 545-565. 
 
Eagly, A. and S. Chaiken (1993), The Psychology of Attitudes, Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
 
Ebert, Jane E., Daniel T. Gilbert, and Timothy D. Wilson (2009), "Forecasting and Backcasting: 
Predicting the Impact of Events on the Future," Journal of Consumer Research, 36 (October), 
353-366. 
 
Edwards, K. (1990), "The interplay of affect and cognition in attitude formation and change," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 202-216. 
 
Einhorn, H. J. and R. M. Hogarth (1981), "Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgement 
and Choice,"Annual Review of Psychology, 32, 53-88. 
 
Ekman, P. and H. Oster (1979), "Facial expressions of emotion," Annual Review of Psychology, 
20, 527-554.  
 
Emory, Fred (1970), Some Psychological Aspects of Price, in Pricing Strategy. Bernard Taylor 
and Gordon Wills, eds., Princeton, N.J.: Brandoni Systems, 98-111. 
 
Estelami, Hooman and Sarah Maxwell (2003), "Perspectives in Behavioral Pricing," Journal of 
Business Research, 56(2), 401-403. 
 
Fazio, R. H., J. Chen, E. C. McDonel, and S. J. Sherman (1982)," Attitude accessibility, attitude–
behaviour consistency and the strength of the object-evaluation association," Journal of  
Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 339–357. 
 
Feinberg, Fred M., Aradhna Krishna, and Z. John Zhang (2002), "Do We Care What Others Get? 
A Behaviorist Approach to Targeted Promotions, " Journal of Marketing Research, 39 (3), 277-
291. 
 
Ferguson, M. J. and J. A. Bargh (2007). Beyond the attitude object: How automatic attitudes 
spring from object-centered-contexts, invited chapter in B. Wittenbrink and N. Schwarz (Eds.), 
Implicit attitudes. NY: Guilford. 
 
120 
 
Fernandez-Duque, D., J. A. Baird, and M. I. Posner (2000), "Executive attention and 
metacognitive regulation," Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 288-307.  
 
Fishbein, M. and R. Hunter (1964), "Summation versus balance in attitude organization and 
change,"Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 69, 505-510. 
 
Fishbein, Martin and Susan Middlestadt (1995), "Noncognitive Effects on Attitude Formation 
and Change: Fact or Artifact?" Journal of Consumer Psychology, 4(2), 181-202. 
 
Folkes, V. S. (1984), "Consumer reactions to product failure: an attributional approach," Journal 
of Consumer Research, 10 (March), 398– 409. 
 
Fornell, Claes and David F. Larker (1981), "Evaluating Structural Equation Models with 
Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error," Journal of Marketing Research, 18, 39-50. 
 
Franciosi, Robert, Praveen Kuga, L Roland Michelitsch, Vemon Smith, and Gang Deng (1995), 
"Fairness: Effect on Temporary and Equilibrium Prces in Posted-Offer Markets," The Economic 
Journal, 105 (July), 938-50. 
 
Gielissen, R., C. E. Dutilh, and J. J. Graafland (2008), "Perceptions of price fairness: An 
empirical research, " Business & society: a journal of interdisciplinary exploration, 47(3), 370-
389. 
 
Gilbert, Daniel T., Elizabeth C. Pinel, Timothy D. Wilson, Stephen J. Blumberg, and Thalia P. 
Wheatley (1998), “Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75 (3), 617–38. 
 
Gilovich, T. and V. H. Medvec, (1995), "The experience of regret: What, when, and why. 
Psychological Review, "102, 379-395. 
 
Goldman, Abigail (1994), "Activists Visit Four Suspected Price Gougers," Los Angeles Times, 
(January 30), 6. 
 
Goldstone, R. (1995),"Effects of Categorization on Color Perception," Psychological Science, 6 
(5), 298-304. 
 
González-Vallejo, C. Claudia, Ido Erev, and Thomas S. Wallsten (1994), "Do Decision Quality 
and Preference Order Depend on Whether Probabilities Are Verbal or Numerical?" The 
American Journal of Psychology, 107(2),  157-172. 
 
Gourville, J. T. (1998), "Pennies‐a‐Day: The Effect of Temporal Reframing on Transaction 
Evaluation," Journal of Consumer Research, 24 (4), 395-403. 
 
Grace Kovenklioglu and Jeffrey H. Greenhaus (1978), "Causal Attributions, Expectations, and 
Task Performance," Journal of Applied Psychology, 63(6), 698-705. 
 
121 
 
Green, Thomas D., C. Roger Bailey, Otto Zinser, and Dale E. Williams, (1994), "Causal 
attribution and affective response as mediated by task performance and self-acceptance," 
Psychological Reports, 75(3), 1555-1562. 
 
Greenleaf, Eric A. (1995), "The  Impact of Reference Price Effects on the Profitability of Price 
Promotions," Marketing Science, 14 (Winter), 82-104. 
 
Grewal, Dhruv, Kent B. Monroe, and R. Krishnan (1998), "Effects of Price-Comparison 
Advertising on Buyers' Perceptions of Acquisition Value, Transaction Value, and Behavioral 
intentions," Journal of Marketing, 62 (Apri) l, 46-59. 
 
Grover, Ronald (1994), "$10 for Water! What's the Catch ?" Business Week (February), 7 (6). 
 
Hair, J. F. Jr., R. E. Anderson, R. L. Tatham, and W. C. Black (1998), Multivariate data analysis, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Hamilton, David L. and Leroy J. Huffman (1971), "Generality of impression-formation 
processes for evaluative and nonevaluative judgments," Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 20(2), 200-207. 
 
Hanna, Robert (2009), "Kant's Theory of Judgment," in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University 
 
Hardie, G. S., Eric J. Johnson, and Peter S. Fader (1993), "Modeling Loss Aversion and 
Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice," Marketing Science, 12 (4), 378-394. 
 
Hastie, R. (2001), "Problems for judgment and decision making," Annual Review of Psychology, 
52, 653-683.  
 
Havlena, William J. and Morris B. Holbrook (1986), "The Varieties of Consumption Experience: 
Comparing Two Typologies of Emotion in Consumer Behavior," Journal of Consumer 
Research, 13(3), 394-404. 
 
Haws, Kelly L. and William O. Bearden (2006)," Dynamic Pricing and Consumer Fairness 
Perceptions," Journal of Consumer Research, 33 (3), 304-311. 
 
Heath, C., R. P. Larrick, and G. Wu (1999), "Goals as Reference Points," Cognitive Psychology, 
38 (1), 79-109. 
 
Heider, F. and M. Simmel (1944), “An experimental study of apparent behavior,” American 
Journal of Psychology, 57, 243–259. 
 
Helgesson, James G. and Sharon E. Beatty (1985), "An Information Processing Perspective on 
the Internalization of Price Stimuli," Advances in Consumer Research, 12 (1), 91-96. 
 
122 
 
Helgesson, James G. and Sharon E. Beatty (1987), "Price Expectation and Price Recall Error: An 
Empirical Study," Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (December), 379-386. 
 
Helson,Harry (1947), "Adaptation-Level as Frame of Reference for Prediction of Psychophysical 
Data," American Journal of Psychology, 60 (January), 1–29. 
 
Herr, Paul M., Frank R. Kardes, and John Kim (1991), “Effects of Word-of-Mouth and Product-
Attribute Information on Persuasion: An Accessibility-Diagnosticity Perspective,” Journal of 
Consumer Research, 17 (March), 454-462. 
 
Heyman, James E. and Barabara A. Millers (2007), "Perceptions of Fair Pricing," in Curtis P. 
Haugtvedt , Paul M. Herr and Frank R. Kardes (ed.), The Handbook of Consumer Psychology, 
Mahwah, NY: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 
Hicks, J. R. (1939), Value and Capital. New York:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Hoch, Stephen J. (1985), "Counterfactual reasoning and accuracy in predicting personal events," 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 11(4), 719-731. 
 
Hogarth, R. M. (1987), Judgment and choice: The psychology of decision. 2nd Ed., New York: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Holbrook, Morris B, Robert F. Lusch, and Stephen L. Vargo (2006) (ed.) The Service-Dominant 
Logic of Marketing: Dialog, Debate, And Directions, M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Homans, G. C. (1961), Social Behavior: It's Elementary Forms, London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
 
Hristova, P., G. Petkov, and B. Kokinov (2005), Influence of Irrelevant Information on Price 
Judgment, Proceedings of the International Conference on Cognitive Economics, NBU Press, 
Sofia, 95-104.  
 
Huber, Joel and John McCann (1982),"The Impact of Inferential Beliefs on Product 
Evaluations," Journal of Marketing Research, 19 (August), 324-333. 
 
Huppertz, John W., Sidney J. Arenson, and Richard H. Evans (1978), “An Application of Equity 
Theory to Buyer–Seller. 
 
Isen, A. M. (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition. In R. S. Wyer, Jr., and 
T. K. Srull (Eds), Handbook of social cognition vol.3, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Jacobson,  Robert  and  Carl Obermiller (1990), "The  Formation  of  Expected  Future  Price:  A  
Reference  Price  for  Forward-Looking  Consumers,"  Journal of Consumer  Research, 16  
(March), 420- 432.  
 
123 
 
Jacoby, J. and J. C. Olson (1977), "Consumer response to price: an attitudinal information 
processing perspective", in Wing, Y, Greenberg, M.(eds), Moving Ahead in Attitude Research, 
American Marketing Association, Chicago, IL, 73-86. 
 
Jacoby, Jacob (1976), "Consumer and Industrial Psychology:Prospects for Theory Corroboration 
and Mutual Contribution," in  Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, ed. 
Marvin D. Dunnette, Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1031–1061. 
 
Jacoby, Jacob (2002), "Stimulus-Organism-Response Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Step in 
Modeling (Consumer) Behavior," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 12, 1, 51-57 
 
Jacoby, L.L. (1983), "Perceptual enhancement: Persistent effects of an experience," Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9, 21-38.  
 
Janiszewski, C. and D. R. Lichtenstein (1999), "A range theory account of price perception," 
Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 353–368.  
 
Janiszewski, Chris and Tom Meyvis (2001), "Effects of Brand Logo Complexity, Repetition, and 
Spacing on Processing Fluency and Judgment," Journal of Consumer Research, 28 (1), 18-32. 
 
Janiszewski, Chris, Donald R. Lichtenstein, and Julia Belyavsky (2008), "Judgments About 
Judgments: The Dissociation of Consideration Price and Transaction Commitment Judgments" 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 14, 2, 151–164. 
 
Johnson, E. J., G. Häubl, and A. Keinan (2007), "Aspects of endowment: A query theory of 
value construction," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
461 – 474. 
 
Johnson, M.D. and C. P. Puto (1987), "A Review of Consumer Judgement and Choice," in M.J. 
Houston. (ed.), Review of Marketing, Chicago: American Marketing Association, 236-292. 
 
Kachelmeier, Steven J., Stephen T. Limberg, and Michael S. Schadewald (1991), "A Laboratory 
Market Examination of the Consumer Price Response to information About Producers' Costs and 
Profits," The Accounting Review, 66 (October), 694-717. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1973), "On the Psychology of Prediction," Psychological 
Review, 80, 237-51.  
 
Kahneman, D. and Amos Tversky (1979),"Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk," 
Econometrica, 47, 313–327. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1982), "Variants of Uncertainty," Cognition, 11, 143-57.  
 
Kahman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986), "Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market," The American Economic Review, 76 (4), 728-41. 
 
124 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986), "Fairness and the Assumptions 
of Economics," Journal of Business, 59 (4), S285-S300.  
 
Kalapurakal, Rosemary , Peter R. Dickson, and Joel E. Urbany  (1991), "Perceived Price 
Fairness and Dual Entitlement", in Advances in Consumer Research , 18, eds. Rebecca H. 
Holman and Michael R. Solomon, Provo, UT : Association for Consumer Research, 788-793. 
 
Kalwani, M. U., Chi Kin Yim, Heikki J. Rinne, and Yoshi Sugita (1990), "A Price Expectations 
Model of Customer Brand Choice," Journal of Marketing Research, 27 (3), 251-262. 
 
Kalwani, Manohar U. and Chi Kin Yim (1992), "Consumer Price and Promotion Expectations: 
An Experimental Study," Journal of Marketing Research," 29 (February), 90–100. 
 
Kamins, M. A., V. S. Folkes,  and A. Fedorikhin (2009), "Promotional Bundles and Consumers' 
Price Judgments: When the Best Things in Life Are Not Free," Journal of Consumer Research, 
36, 4, 660-670. 
 
Kant, Immanuel (1781), “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, 
reprinted in “Critique of Pure Reason,” Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Kardes, Frank R. (1986), “Effects of Initial Product Judgments on Subsequent Memory-Based 
Judgments,” Journal of Consumer Research, 13, 1–11. 
 
Kardes, Frank R., Steven S. Posavac, and Maria L. Cronley (2004), "Consumer Inference: A 
Review of Processes, Bases, and Judgment Contexts," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14 (3), 
230-256. 
 
Katona, George (1960), The Powerful Consumer, New York:  McGraw-Hill.  
 
Katz, Victor J. (1998). History of Mathematics: An Introduction, Massachusetts: Addison-
Wesley. 
 
Kaufmann, Patrick, J. Gwen Onmeyer, and N. Craig Smith (1991), "Fairness in Consumer 
Pricing," Journal of Consumer Policy, 14, 117-40. 
 
Kenny, David A. (1979), Correlation and causality. New York: John Wiley.  
 
Kinzler, Katherine and Elizabeth Spelke (2007), "Core Systems in Human Cognition, in From 
Action to Cognition," Progress in Brain Research ,164, 257-264. 
 
Kline, Rex B. (1998), Principles and practice of structural equation modeling, NY: Guilford 
Press. 
 
Kokinov,  B., P. Hristova, and G. Petkov (2004), "Does  Irrelevant Information  Play a Role in 
Judgment?" in proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference  of the Cognitive Science  Society, 
Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ.  
125 
 
 
Kopalle, Praveen K. and Joan Lindsey-Mullikin (2003), "The impact of external reference price 
on consumer price expectations," Journal of Retailing, 79, 225-236 
 
Kopalle, Praveen K. and Donald R. Lehmann, (1995),"The effects of advertised and observed 
quality on expectations about new product quality," Journal of Marketing Research, 32, 280–
290. 
 
Koriat, A., H. Ma'ayan, and R. Nussinson (2006), "The intricate relationship between monitoring 
and control in metacognition: Lessons for the cause-and-effect relation between subjective 
experience and behavior," Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 36-69. 
 
Lefkoff-Hagius, Roxanne and Charlotte H. Mason (1993), "Characteristic, Beneficial, and Image 
Attributes in Consumer Judgments of Similarity and Preference," Journal of Consumer 
Research, 20(1), 100-110. 
 
Lewis P.A. and H. D. Critchley (2003), "Mood-dependent memory," Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7 (10), 431-433. 
 
Lichtenstein, Donald R., Peter H. Block, and William C. Black (1988), "Correlates of Price 
Acceptability," Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (September), 243-252. 
 
Lichtenstein, Donald R. and William O. Bearden (1989), "Contextual Influences on Perceptions 
of Merchant-Supplied Reference Prices," Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (June), 55-66. 
 
Lichtenstein, Donald R., Richard G. Netemeyer, and Scott Burton (1990), "Distinguishing 
Coupon Proneness from Value Consciousness: An Acquisition-Transaction Utility Theory 
Perspective," Journal of Marketing, 54 (July), 54-67. 
 
Lichtenstein, Donald R., Scot Burton, and Eric Karson (1991), "The Effect of Semantic Cues on 
Consumer Perceptions of Reference Price Advertisements," Journal of Consumer Research, 18 
(December), 380-391. 
 
Lichtenstein, Donald R., Nancy M. Ridgway, and Richard G. Netemeyer (1993), "Price 
Perceptions and Consumer Shopping Behavior: A Field Study," Journal of Marketing Research, 
30 (2), 234-245. 
 
Lichtenstein, Sarah and Paul Slovic (2006), The Construction of Preference, New York: NY, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lichtenstein, Sarah and Paul Slovic (1971), "Reversals of preference between bids and choices in 
gambling decisions," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89(1), 46-55. 
 
Loftus, E. F. and Lee Roy Beach (1982),"Human Inference and Judgment: Is the Glass Half 
Empty or Half Full?" (Reviewed: Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social 
Judgment by Richard Nisbett; Lee Ross), Stanford Law Review, 34 (4), 939-956. 
126 
 
 
Liu, Maggie Wenjing and Dilip Soman (2008), "Behavioral Pricing," in Curtis P. Haugtvedt , 
Paul M. Herr and Frank R. Kardes (ed.), The Handbook of Consumer Psychology, Mahwah, NY: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 659-681 
 
Luce, M. F., J. R. Bettman, and J. W. Payne. (1997), "Choice processing in emotionally difficult 
decisions," Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23(2), 384–
405. 
 
Lynch, J. G., and T. K. Srull (1982), "Memory and attentional factors in consumer choice: 
Concepts and research methods," Journal of Consumer Research, 9, 18-37. 
 
Lynch, J. G., Dipankar Chakravarti, Anusree Mitra (1991), "Contrast Effects in Consumer 
Judgments: Changes in Mental Representations or in the Anchoring of Rating Scales?" Journal 
of Consumer Research, 18, 284-297. 
 
Mandler, G. (1980), "Recognizing: The judgment of previous occurrence," Psychological 
Review, 87, 252-271.  
 
Marks, Joel (1982), "A Theory of Emotion," Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for 
Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 42 (2) 227-242.  
 
Marks, L. E. (1988), "Magnitude estimation and sensory matching," Perception and 
Psychophysics, 43, 511-525.  
 
Marks, L. E. and L. Armstrong (1996), Visual and haptic representations of space. In T.Inui and 
McClelland (Eds.),  Attention and Performance XVI: Information Integration in perception  and 
communication Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Marr, D (1982), Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and 
Processing of Visual Information, New York: Freeman.  
 
Maass, A, A. Colombo, S. J. Sherman, and A. Colombo (2001), "Inferring traits from behaviors 
versus behaviors from traits: The induction-deduction asymmetry, " Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 81, 391-404. 
 
Massaro, D. W., and D. Friedman (1990), "Models of integration given multiple sources of 
information," Psychological Review, 97(2), 225-252. 
 
Martins, Marielza (1995), "An Experimental Investigation of the Effects of Perceived Price 
Fairness on Perceptions of Sacrifice and Value," doctoral dissertation, Department of Business 
Administration, University of Illinois. 
 
Maxwell, Sarah (2002), "Rule based price fairness and its effect on willingness to purchase," 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 191-212 
 
127 
 
Mayhew, Glenn E. and Russell S. Winer (1992),"An Empirical Analysis of Internal and External 
Reference Prices Using Scanner Data," Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 62-70. 
 
Mazzoni, G., and T. O. Nelson (1998), Metacognition and Cognitive Neuropsychology: 
Monitoring and Control Processes, Mahwah, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum.  
 
McGuire, William J. (1997), "Creative Hypothesis Generating in Psychology," Annual Review of 
Psychology, 48 (February), 1-30. 
 
McCarty, J. A. and L. J. Shrum (2001), "The Influence of Individualism, Collectivism, and 
Locus of Control on Environmental Beliefs and Behavior," Journal of Public Policy & 
Marketing, 20 (1), 93-104. 
 
Mellers, B. A., A. Schwartz, and A. D. J. Cooke (1998), "Judgment and Decision Making," 
Annual Review of Psychology, 14, 332-348. 
 
Menon, G. (1993), "The effects of accessibility of information in memory on judgments of 
behavioral frequencies," Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 431-440. 
 
Menon, Geeta and Priya Raghubir (2003), "Ease of Retrieval as an Automatic Input Judgments: 
A Mere-Accessibility Framework?" Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (September), 230-243. 
 
Menon, Geeta, Priya  Raghubir, and Norbert Schwarz (1997), "How Much Will I Spend?  
Factors Affecting Consumers' Estimates of Future Expenses," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
6 (2), 141-164.    
 
Menon, Geeta, Priya Raghubir, and Norbert Schwarz (1995), "Behavioral Frequency Judgments: 
An Accessibility-Diagnosticity Framework," Journal of Consumer Research, 22 (September),  
212-228.  
 
Meyer, R. J. (1981)," A Model of Multiattribute Judgments under Attribute Uncertainty and 
Information," Psychological Review, 97, 225-252. 
 
Michael W., M. Roos, and Wolfgang J. Luhan (2008), "Are Expectations formed by the 
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic? An Experimental Investigation," Ruhr Economic Papers, 
54. 
 
Miller, D., M. F. R. K. De Vries, and J. M.Toulouse (1982),"Top Executive Locus of Control 
and Its Relationship to Strategy-Making, Structure, and Environment," The Academy of 
Management Journal, 25 (2), 237-253 
 
Mobley, Mary F., William O. Bearden, and Jesse E. Teel (1988), "An Investigation of Individual 
Responses to Tensile Price Claims," Journal of Consumer Research, 15 (September), 273–279. 
 
Monroe, Kent B. (1973), "Buyers’ Subjective Perceptions of Price," Journal of Marketing 
Research, 10 (February), 70-80. 
128 
 
 
Monroe,  Kent  B.,  and  Susan  M. Petroshius (1981), Buyers’  Perceptions  of  Price:  An  
Update  of  the  Evidence,  in  Perceptions  in  Consumer  Behavior, Harold  H.  Kassarjian  and  
Thomas S.  Robertson,  eds.,  Third  edition,  Glenview,  IL.: Scott,  Foresman  and  Company. 
 
Monroe,  Kent  B. (1984), Theoretical  and  Methodological  Developments  in  Pricing,  in  
Advances in  Consumer  Research, Tom  Kinnear (ed.), Association  for  Consumer  Research,  
Provo,  UT, 636-637.  
 
Monroe, Kent B. (1990), Pricing: making proﬁtable decisions, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
 
Monroe, Kent B., Larry Compeau, and Dhruv  Grewal (1991), "Reference Prices:  The Concept, 
its Historical Meanings, Theoretical Justifications and Current Research Issues," working paper, 
Department of Marketing, University of Illinois. 
 
Monroe, Kent B. and Angela Y. Lee (1999), "Remembering versus Knowing: Issues in Buyers’ 
Processing of Price Information," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 27 (2), 207–25. 
 
Moore, Don A. and Deborah A. Small (2007), "Error and bias in comparative judgment: On 
being both better and worse than we think we are," Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 92(6), 972-989. 
  
Murphy, Sheila T. and R. B. Zajonc (1993), "Affect, cognition, and awareness: Affective 
priming with optimal and suboptimal stimulus exposures," Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 64(5), 723-739. 
 
Neimeyer, Robert A., Greg J. Neimeyer, and A. W. Landfield (1983), "Conceptual 
differentiation, integration and empathic prediction," Journal of Personality, 51 (2), 185-191. 
 
Netemeyer, Richard G., William O. Bearden, and Subhash Sharma (2003), Scaling procedures: 
issues and applications, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
Neumann,  John Von and Oskar Morgenstern (1947), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
(2nd ed), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Niedrich, Ronald W., Subhash Sharma, and Douglas H. Wedell (2001), ''Reference Price and 
Price Perceptions: A Comparison of Alternative Models,'' Journal of Consumer Research, 28 
(December), 339-354. 
 
Novoseltsev, Alexey  and Luk Warlop (2002), "Toward Understanding of the Dual Entitlement 
Princimples in Consumer Fair Price Judgments", in Asia Pacific Advances in Consumer 
Research , 5, eds. Ramizwick and Tu Ping, Valdosta, GA : Association for Consumer Research, 
180-185.  
 
Novemsky, N. Ravi Dhar, Nobert Schwarz, and Itamar Simonson (2007), "Preference Fluency in 
Choice," Journal of Marketing Research, 44, 347-356. 
129 
 
 
Nowlis, Stephen M. and Itamar Simonson (1997), "Attribute-Task Compatibility as a 
Determinant of Consumer Preference Reversals," Journal of Marketing Research, 34 (May), 
205-218. 
 
Nunnaly, J. (1978), Psychometric Theory (2nd ed.), New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Ofir, Chezy, Priya Raghubir, Gili Brosh, Kent B. Monroe, and Amir Heiman (2008), "Memory 
based Store Price Judgments: The Role of Knowledge and Shopping Experience," Journal of 
Retailing, 84, 4(December), 414-423. 
 
Oh, H. and Miyoung Jeong (2004), "An extended process of value judgment," Hospitality 
Management, 23, 343-362. 
 
Okun, Arthur M. (1981), Prices and Quantities, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Oliver, R. L. (1980),"A cognitive model of the antecedents and consequences of consumer 
satisfaction decisions," Journal of Marketing Research, 460–469. 
 
Oliver, R. L. and R. S. Winer (1987),"A framework for the formation and structure of consumer 
expectations: review and propositions," Journal of Economic Psychology, 8 (4), 469-499. 
 
Oliver, R. L. (1977), "Effect of Expectation and Disconfirmation of Post exposure Product 
Evaluations: An Alternative Interpretation," Journal of Applied Psychology, 62, 4, 480-486. 
 
Olson, J. M., and M. P. Zanna (1993), "Attitudes and attitude change," Annual Review of 
Psychology, 44, 117-154.   
 
Ostrom, Thomas M. and Harry S. Upshaw (1968), Psychological Perspective and Attitude 
Change, in Psychological Foundations of Attitudes, ed. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., New York: 
Academic Press. 
 
Ottati, V. and L. Isbell (1996), "Effects of mood during exposure to target information on 
subsequently reported judgments: An on-line model of misattribution and correction," Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 39-53.  
 
Palmer, Frank R. (2001), Mood and Modality, (2nd ed.), Ch.2, 24-25, in Cambridge textbooks in 
Linguistics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Parducci, Allen (1965), "Category Judgment: A Range-Frequency model," Psychological 
Review, 72(6), 407-418.   
 
Parducci, Allen (1974), Contextual Effects: A Range-Frequency Analysis, Handbook of 
Perception, 2, NY: Academic Press.  
 
130 
 
Parducci, Allen and Peter Wedell (1986), "The category effect with rating scales: number of 
categories, number of stimuli, and method of presentation,"Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 12,  496-516. 
 
Paulus, Martin P. and Lawrence R. Frank, (2003), "Ventromedial prefrontal cortex activation is 
critical for preference judgments," Neuro Report, 14 (July 18), 10, 1311-1315. 
 
Pelham, Brett W., T. T. Sumarta, and L. Myaskovsky (1994), “The Easy Path from Many to 
Much: The Numerosity Heuristic,” Cognitive Psychology, 26 (April), 103–133. 
 
Petty, R. E. and J. T. Cacioppo (1986), Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral 
Routes to Attitude Change. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
 
Petty, R. E., and D. T. Wegener (1993), "Flexible correction processes in social judgment: 
Correcting for context-induced contrast," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 137-
165. 
 
Petty, R. E., J. R. Priester, and D. T. Wegener (1994), Cognitive processes in attitude change, in  
Petty, Richard E. and John T. Cacioppo (ed.), Attitudes and persuasion: classic and 
contemporary approaches, Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc. 
 
Pham, M. T. (1998), "Representativeness, relevance, and the use of feelings in decision making," 
Journal of Consumer Research, 25, 144. 
 
Pieters, R. G. M., E. Rosbergen, and M. Hartog, (1996). Visual attention to advertising, in K. P. 
Corfman, and J. G. Lynch (eds.), Advances in consumer research, Provo, UT: Association for 
Consumer Research, 23, 242–248. 
 
Potts, B. C. (1991), "The horizontal-vertical illusion: A confluence of configural, contextual, and 
framing  factors," Unpublished  doctoral dissertation, Yale University. 
 
Qian, J. and G. D. A. Brown (2005), "Similarity based sampling: Testing a model of price 
psychophysics," Proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 
1785-1790, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.  
 
Rachlin, H. (1989), Judgment, decision, and choice: A cognitive/behavioral synthesis, New 
York, W. J. Freeman and Company. 
 
Raghubir, Priya and Geeta Menon (1998), "AIDS and Me, Never the Twain Shall Meet: The 
Effects of Information Accessibility on Judgments of Risk and Advertising Effectiveness," 
Journal of Consumer Research, 25 (1), 52-63. 
 
Rajendran, N. K. and G. J. Tellis (1994),"Contextual and temporal components of reference 
price," Journal of Marketing, 58, 22–34. 
 
131 
 
Raman, Kalyan and  Frank M. Bass (1988),  "A  General Test of  Reference Price Theory in  the 
Presence  of  Threshold Effects," working paper, Department of  Marketing, University of  Texas 
at Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083. 
 
Rankin, K. M. and L. E. Marks (1991), "Differential context effects in taste perception," 
Chemical Senses, 16, 617-629.  
 
Rankin, K. M. and L. E. Marks (1992), "Effects of context on sweet and bitter tastes:  Unrelated 
to sensitivity  to PROP (6-n-propylthiouracil)," Perception and Psychophysics, 52, 479-486.  
 
Rankin, K. M. and L. E. Marks (2000), "Differential context effects in chemosensation: Role of 
perceptual similarity  and neural communality," Chemical Senses, 25, 747-759. 
 
Rao, Akshay R.  and Wanda A. Sieben (1992), "The Effect of Prior Knowledge on Price 
Acceptability and the Type of Information Examined," Journal of Consumer Research,19, 2, 
256-270. 
 
Rawls, John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Reber, R., P. Winkielman, and N. Schwarz (1998), "Effects of perceptual fluency on affective 
judgments," Psychological Science, 9, 45-48.  
 
Richins, Marsha L. (1997), "Measuring Emotions in the Consumption Experience," Journal of 
Consumer Research, 24 (2), 127-146. 
 
Rieh, Soo Young (2002), "Judgment of information quality and cognitive authority in the web," 
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 53(2), 145-161. 
 
Rotter, J. B. (1954), Social learning and clinical psychology. New York: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Russell J. A. (1980), "A circumplex model of affect," Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 39, 1161 - 1178. 
 
Saltzer, E. B. (1982), "The Weight Locus of Control (WLOC) Scale: A specific measure for 
obesity research," Journal of Personality Assessment, 46, 620-628. 
 
Santos, J. Reynaldo (1999), "Cronbach's Alpha: A Tool for Assessing the Reliability of Scales," 
Journal of Extensions, (April), 37 (2),  
 
Sawyer, John E. (1993), Judgments of Nonlinear contingencies and Applications of 
Contingencies to Organizational Behaviors, in N. John Castellan (ed.), Individual and Group 
Decision Making: Current Issues, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc. 
 
Schindler, R.M. and P. N. Kirby (1997), "Patterns of rightmost digits used in advertised prices: 
implications for 9-ending effects," Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 192-201. 
 
132 
 
Schmidt, Greg and Bernard Weiner (1988), "An Attribution-Affect-Action Theory of Behavior. 
Replications of Judgments of Help-Giving," University of California, Los Angeles Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 14 (3), 610-621. 
 
Schooler, J. and T. Engstler-Schooler (1990), "Verbal overshadowing of visual memories: Some 
things are better left unsaid," Cognitive Psychology, 22(1), 36-71. 
 
Schultz, D.P. and S. E. Schultz (2005), Theories of Personality (8th ed.). Wadsworth: Thomson. 
 
Schwarz, N., H. J. Hippler, B. Deutsch, and F. Strack, (1985), "Response scales: Effects of 
category range on reported behavior and subsequent judgments," Public Opinion Quarterly, 49, 
388 - 395.  
 
Schwarz, N. (1990), Feeling as information: Informational and motivational functions of 
affective states, in E. T. Higgins and R. M. Sorrentino (eds.), Handbook of motivation and 
cognition, New York:  Guilford Press. 
 
Schwarz, N., H. Bless, F. Strack, G. Klumpp, H. Rittenauer-Schatka, and A.Simons (1991), 
"Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic," Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 195-202.  
 
Schwarz, N. and H. Bless, (1992),"Constructing reality and its alternatives:Assimilation and 
contrast effects in social judgment, In L.L. Martin and A. Tesser (Eds.), The construction of 
social judgment, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 217-245. 
 
Schwarz, N. and Gerald L.Clore (1996), Feelings and phenomenal experiences, in Edward Tory 
HIggins and Kruglanski, Arie W. (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles, New 
York, NY, 433-465.  
 
Schwarz, N. (1997), "Moods and attitude judgments: A comment on Fishbein and Middlestadt," 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 6, 93-98.  
 
Schwarz, N. (1998), " Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The interplay of 
declarative and experiential information in judgment,” Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 2, 87-99.  
 
Schwarz, N. (1999), "Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers," American 
Psychologist, 54, 93-105.  
 
Schwarz, N. (2004), "Metacognitive Experiences in Consumer Judgment and Decision Making," 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14 (4), 332-348. 
 
Schwarz, N. (2005), "When thinking feels difficult," Medical Decision Making, 25, 105-112. 
 
Schwarz, N. (2007), "Attitude Construction: Evaluation In Context," Social Cognition, 25, 5, 
638-656. 
133 
 
 
Schwitzgebel, Eric (2006), "Belief", in Zalta, Edward, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Stanford, CA: The Metaphysics Research Lab, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/, retrieved 
2010-06-01 
 
Sherif, M. and C. I. Hovland (1961), "Social judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects in 
communication and attitude change,"New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Shiraev, E. and D. Levy (2004), Cross-cultural Psychology, Critical Thinking and Contemporary 
Applications. (2nd ed.) Boston: Pearson. 
 
Shirai, Miyuri and Robert Meyer (1997), "Learning and the Cognitive Algebra of Price 
Expectations," Journal of Consumer Psychology, 6(4), 365-388. 
 
Shugan, Steven M. (1980), “The Cost of Thinking,” Journal of Consumer Research, 7(2), 99-
111. 
 
Simonson, I. and A. Tversky (1992), "Choice in context: tradeoff contrast and extremeness 
aversion," Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 281-295. 
 
Siu, wanda (2007), "Media Message Judgment and Decision Making: Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS)," Journal of Media Psychology, 12 (1). 
 
Srull, T. K. (1983), "The role of prior knowledge in the acquisition, retention, and use of new 
information," Advances in Consumer Research, 10, 572-576. 
 
Strack, F., N. Schwarz, H. Bless, A. Kuebler, and M. Waenke (1993), "Awareness of the 
influence as a determinant of assimilation versus contrast," European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 23, 53-62.  
 
Sujan, Mita (1985), "Consumer Knowledge: Effects on Evaluation Strategies Mediating 
Consumer Judgments," Journal of Consumer Research, 12(June), 31-46.  
 
Suri, R., and Kent B. Monroe (2003), "The effects of time constraints on consumers' judgments 
of prices and products," Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (1), 420-432. 
 
Suri, Rajneesh, Chiranjeev S. Kohli, and Kent B. Monroe (2007), "The Effects of Perceived 
Scarcity on the Evaluation of Prices," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 35.1, 89-
100. 
 
Swan, John E. (1972), "Search Behavior Related to Expectations Concerning Brand 
Performance," Journal of Applied Psychology, 56(4), 332-335. 
 
Teas, Kenneth R. (1993), "Expectations, performance evaluation, and consumers’ perceptions of 
quality," Journal of Marketing, 57(October), 18–34. 
 
134 
 
Teasdale, J. D., and S. J. Fogarty (1979), "Differential effects of induced mood on retrieval of 
pleasant and unpleasant events from episodic memory," Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 
248-257. 
 
Thaler,  Richard  (1985), "Mental  Accounting  and  Consumer  Choice,"  Marketing  Science,  4 
(Summer), 199-214. 
 
Thayer, Robert E. (1989), The biopsychology of mood and arousal. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Thomas, Manoj and Geeta Menon (2007), "When Internal Reference Prices and Price 
Expectations Diverge: The Role of Confidence," Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (August), 
401-409. 
 
Thomas, Manoj and Vicki G. Morwitz (2009), "Heuristics in Numerical Cognition: Implications 
for Pricing," in Handbook of Research in Pricing, Vithala Rao, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 
132-149. 
 
Thomas, Manoj, Daniel H. Simon, and Vrinda Kadiyali (2007), "Do Consumers Perceive Precise 
Prices to be Lower than Round Prices? Evidence from Laboratory and Market Data," Johnson 
School Research paper series 09-07, September, 1-31. 
 
Thurstone, L. L. (1929), "Theory of attitude measurement," Psychological Review, 36,  222-241. 
 
Thurstone, L. L. (1994), "A law of comparative judgment," Psychological Review, 101(2), 266-
270; reprinted from Psychological Review, 1927, 34, 273–286 
 
Tomkins, S. S. (1980), Affect as amplification: Some modifications in theory, in R. Plutchik and 
H. Kellerman (Eds.), Emotion: Theory, research and experience. New York: Academic Press. 
 
Trochim, W. M. (2000), The research methods knowledge base, retrieved 2003-11-13, from 
http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/  
 
Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1970), "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price Expectations," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 65 (332), 1441-1454. 
 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1973), "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability," Cognitive Psychology, 5(September), 207–232. 
 
Tversky, Amos, Paul Slovic, and Daniel Kahneman (1990),"The Causes of Preference Reversal," 
80, 1 (March), 204-217. 
 
Urbany, J., T. J. Madden, and P. R. Dickson, (1989),"All’s not fair in pricing: an initial look at 
the dual entitlement principle," Marketing Letters, 1 (1), 17–25. 
 
135 
 
Urbany, Joel E., William E. Bearden, and Dan C. Weilbaker (1988), "The Effect of Plausible and 
Exaggerated Reference Prices on Consumer Perceptions and Price Search," Journal of Consumer 
Research, 15 (June), 95–110. 
 
Vaidyanathan, Rajiv and Praveen Aggarwal (2003), "Who is the fairest of them all? An 
attributional approach to price fairness perceptions," Journal of Business Research, 56, 453-463. 
 
Van de Kaa, E. J. (2004), "Prospect Theory and the Understanding of Travellers' Choice 
Behavior," Proceedings of the 8th International TRAIL Congress, Rotterdam.  
 
Verplanken, Bas, Godelieve Hofstee, and Heidi J. W. Janssen (1998),"Accessibility of Affective 
versus Cognitive Components of Attitudes," European Journal of Social Psychology, 28, 23-35. 
 
Volkmann, J. (1951), "Scales of judgment and their implications for social psychology, in J. H. 
Rohrer and M. Sherif (eds.), Social psychology at the cross roads, New York: Harper & Row. 
 
Wathieu, Luc and Marco Bertini (2007), "Price as a Stimulus to Think: The Case for Willful 
Overpricing," Marketing Science, 26 (January-February), 118-29. 
 
Wegener, Duane T, Richard E. Petty, and David J. Klein (1993), "Effects of mood on high 
elaboration attitude change: The mediating role of likelihood judgments, European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 24(1) , 25-43. 
 
Weiner, B. (1974), (Ed.). Achievement Motivation and Attribution Theory, New Jersey: General 
Learning Press, 3-48. 
 
Weiner, B. (1979), "A theory of motivation for some educational experiences," Journal of 
Educational Psychology, 71, 3-25.   
 
Winer, Russell S. (1985), "A Price Vector Model of Brand Choice for Consumer Durables:   
 Preliminary Developments," Marketing Science, 4, 74-90. 
 
Winer, Russell S. (1986), "A Reference Price Model of Brand Choice for Frequently Purchased 
Products," Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (September), 250-256.  
 
Winer, R. S. (1988),"Behavioral perspectives on pricing: Buyer’s subjective perceptions of price 
revisited, in T. Devinney (Eds.), Issues in pricing: Theory and research. Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books. 
 
Winkielman, Piotr, Norbert Schwarz, and Tedra A. Fazendeiro (1990), The Hedonic Marking of 
Processing Fluency: Implications for Evaluative Judgment, in J. Musch and K. C. Klauer (eds.), 
The Psychology of Evaluation: Affective Processes in Cognition and Emotion, Mahwah: NJ, 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 
Wirtz, J. and S. E. Kimes (2007), "The moderating role of familiarity in fairness perceptions of 
revenue management," Journal of Service Research, 9 (3), 229-240. 
136 
 
 
Wittenbrink, B. (2007), Measuring attitudes through priming, in B.Wittenbrink and N. Schwarz 
(Eds.), Implicit measures of attitudes: Progress and controversies, New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Wittenbrink, B, M. J. Charles, and B. Park (2001), "Evaluative versus Conceptual Judgments in 
Automatic Stereotyping and Prejudice," Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology, 37, 
244-252. 
 
Wood, William D. and Jody Konat Letak (1982), "A mental-health locus of control scale," 
Personality and Individual Differences, 3(1), 84-87. 
 
Wyer, R. S. and T. K. Srull (), Handbook of social cognition (2nd ed.), 2, Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 69-142. 
 
R. S. Wyer Jr., and D. E. Carlston (1979), Social Cognition, Inference, and Attribution, Sussex, 
UK: Psychology Press. 
 
Xia, Lan and Kent B. Monroe (2005), "The Many Routes to Price Unfairness Perception," 
Advances in Consumer Research, 32, 387-390. 
 
Xia, Lan, Kent B. Monroe, and Jennifer L. Cox (2004), "The Price is Unfair! A Conceptual 
Framwork of Price Fairness Perceptions," Journal of Marketing, 68 (4), 1-15. 
 
Zajonc, R. B. (1980), "Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences," American 
Psychologist, 35, 151–175. 
 
Zajonc, R. B, and H. Markus (1984), Affect and cognition: The hard interface in C. E. Izard, J. 
Kagan, and R. B. Zajonc (Eds.), Emotions, cognitions, and behavior, New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1988), "Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End 
Model and Synthesis of Evidence," Journal of Marketing, 52 (July), 2–22. 
 
Websites:  
http://www.daytondailynews.com/o/content/shared-
gen/blogs/dayton/taste/entries/2009/03/12/kettering_cafe_lets_you_set_yo.html  
http://zencaroline.blogspot.com/2007/06/composite-reliability.html  
 
Kenny (2009): http://davidakenny.net/cm/mgroups.htm  
 
http://www.brocku.ca/MeadProject/Thurstone/Thurstone_1927f.html  
 
http://www.technologyreview.com/communications/18894/page2/ 
 
Hanna, Robert (2009), “Kant's Theory of Judgment,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Metaphysics Research Lab, CSLI, Stanford University 
 URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/kant-judgment/  
137 
 
APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS 
 
Table A.2.1 Prestest-1 with initial scale items considered for each type of price judgment.  
                    1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   
Price fairness items:      Very   Very 
  PF1  How  fair is the price of this card reader?  Unfair  ---  fair 
  PF2  How  reasonable is the price of this card reader?  unreasonable ---  reasonable 
  PF3  How  satisfactory is the price of this card reader? unsatisfactory ---  satisfactory 
PF4 How  agreeable is the price of this card reader? disagreeable ---  agreeable 
PF5 How  appropriate is the price of this card reader? inappropriate ---  appropriate 
PF6 How  tolerable is the price of this card reader? intolerable ---  tolerable 
PF7 How  just is the price of this card reader?              unjust              ---  just 
PF8 How  legitimate is the price of this card reader? illegitimate ---  legitimate 
PF9 How  warranted is the price of this card reader? unwarranted ---  warranted 
  PF10How  acceptable is the price of this card reader?  unacceptable ---  acceptable 
Price magnitude items: 
 PJ1 How  attractive is the price of this card reader?   unattractive ---   attractive 
     PJ2 How  high is the price of this card reader?  high  ---   low 
 PJ3 How  desirable is the price of this card reader? undesirable ---   desirable 
 PJ4 How  appealing is the price of this card reader? unappealing ---   appealing 
     PJ5 How  expensive is the price of this card reader? expensive ---   inexpensive 
     PJ6 How  extreme is the price of this card reader? extreme      ---   unextreme 
 PJ7 How  good is the price of this card reader?  bad       ---   good 
     PJ8 How  significant is the price of this card reader? significant      ---   insignificant 
     PJ9 How  large is the price of this card reader?  large       ---   small 
Price expectation items: 
 PE1 How  expected is the price of this card reader? unexpected ---   expected 
 PE2 How  predictable is the price of this card reader? unpredictable ---   predictable
 PE3 How  probable is the price of this card reader? improbable ---   probable  
     PE4 How  likely is the price of this card reader?  unlikely ---   likely   
     PE5 How  surprising is the price of this card reader? surprising ---   unsurprising 
     PE6 How  typical is the price of this card reader?  atypical ---   typical   
 PE7 How  common is the price of this card reader? uncommon ---   common 
     PE8 How  anticipated is the price of this card reader? anticipated ---   anticipated 
 PE9 How  ordinary is the price of this card reader? extraordinary ---   ordinary   
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Table A.2.2 Prestest-2 with scale items considered for each type of price judgment.  
       1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9  
Price fairness items:                                                                        Very   Very 
  PF1 How  fair is the price of this card reader?  Unfair  ---  fair 
  PF2 How  reasonable is the price of this card reader?  unreasonable ---  reasonable 
  PF3 How  satisfactory is the price of this card reader? unsatisfactory ---  satisfactory 
  PF10How  acceptable is the price of this card reader?  unacceptable ---  acceptable 
 
Price magnitude judgment items: 
 PJ1 How  low is the price of this card reader?    high  ---   low  
  PJ2 How  small is the price of this card reader?  large  ---   small 
 PJ3 How  inexpensive is the price of this card reader? expensive ---   inexpensive 
 PJ4 How  little is the price of this card reader?  big  ---   little 
     PJ5 How  insignificant is the price of this card reader? significant ---   insignificant 
 PJ6 How  tiny is the price of this card reader?  huge      ---   tiny                  
 PJ7 How  inextreme is the price of this card reader? extreme      ---   inextreme 
     PJ8 How  low-level is the price of this card reader? steep      ---   low-level 
     PJ9 How  miniscule is the price of this card reader? enormous ---   minuscule 
     PJ9 How  insubstantial is the price of this card reader? substantial ---   insubstantial 
 
Price expectation items: 
 PE1 How  expected is the price of this card reader? unexpected ---   expected 
 PE2 How  predictable is the price of this card reader? unpredictable ---   predictable 
 PE7 How  common is the price of this card reader? uncommon ---   common 
 PE9 How  ordinary is the price of this card reader? extraordinary ---   ordinary   
Note: Items marked with an arrow were retained as the best items to represent the construct.  
 
Table A.2.3 Purchase intent scales used in pretest-1, 2 and the main study. 
Please circle the appropriate number that provides your best response to each of the following questions. 
 Very                  Neither low                         Very  
low                      nor high                              high 
The likelihood that I would purchase the car polish 
at the given price is 
 
 
1       2        3       4       5        6        7        8      9 
The probability that I would consider buying the 
car polish at the given price is 
 
 
1       2        3       4       5        6        7        8      9 
My willingness to buy the car polish at the given 
price is 
 
1       2        3       4       5        6        7        8      9 
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Table A. 2.4 Scale refinement through iterative reliability analysis (pretest 1) 
Iterations  Scale   Items 
dropped 
 Reasons/ Criteria for eliminating items Scale 
reliability 
after deletion 
Final 
items 
retained 
1 Price 
fairness  
6th  gain in alpha if item deleted 0.94 to 0.95  
2 Price 
fairness 
4th, 5th  Low squared multiple correlations, low inter-
item correlations 
0.95 to 0.94  
3 Price 
fairness 
8th, 9th  Lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations, inter-item 
correlations  
0.94 to 0.94  
4 Price 
fairness 
7th  Lowest squared multiple correlations and 
gain in alpha if item deleted 
0.94 to 0.95 1,2,3,10 
1 Price 
magnitude 
5th, 6th, 
8th  
gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared 
multiple correlations and lowest item-total 
correlations, low inter-item correlations,  
0.87 to 0.91  
2 Price 
magnitude 
2nd  gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared 
multiple correlations and lowest item-total 
correlations, low inter-item correlations,  
0.91 to 0.91  
3 Price 
magnitude 
9th  gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared 
multiple correlations and lowest item-total 
correlations, low inter-item correlations, 
0.91 to 0.92 1,3,4,7 
1 Price 
expectation 
3rd, 4th lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item 
correlations, 
0.89 to 0.89  
2 Price 
expectation 
5th lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item 
correlations, 
0.89 to 0.89  
3 Price 
expectation 
6th  lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item 
correlations, 
0.89 to 0.89  
4 Price 
expectation 
8th  lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item 
correlations, 
0.89 to 0.89 1,2,7,9 
 
Table A.2.5 Scale refinement for price magnitude (pretest 2) 
Iterations Scale   Items 
dropped 
 Criteria for eliminating items Scale 
reliability after 
deletion 
Final scale 
items 
retained 
1 Price magnitude  10th  gain in alpha if item deleted 0.9780.979  
2 Price magnitude  5th  gain in alpha if item deleted 0.9790.983  
3 Price magnitude  9th  Lowest squared multiple correlations and 
low inter-item correlations  
0.9830.981  
4 Price magnitude  7th  gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest 
squared multiple correlations and low 
inter-item correlation 
0.9810.986  
5 Price magnitude  8th  Conceptually unclear with the meaning of 
the item 
0.9860.984  
6 Price magnitude  3rd  Conceptually unclear with the meaning of 
the item 
0.9840.980 1,24,6 
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Table A.2.6 Results from repeated measures ANOVA 
Factors Measure df F p Effect size 
Main Effects      
Intercept Price fairness 1 14788.12 0.000 0.976 
Price magnitude 1 18050.83 0.000 0.978 
Price expectation 1 6620.73 0.000 0.949 
Purchase intent 1 8309.68 0.000 0.959 
Price Price fairness 2 1648.157 0.000 0.822 
 Price magnitude 2 3162.264 0.000 0.899 
 Price expectation 2 979.242 0.000 0.733 
 Purchase intent 2 882.571 0.000 0.712 
Judgment environment Price fairness 1 0.007 0.932 0.000 
Price magnitude 1 0.532 0.466 0.001 
Price expectation 1 6.956 0.009 0.019 
Purchase intent 1 1.130 0.288 0.003 
Locus of control Price fairness 1 4.454 0.036 0.012 
Price magnitude 1 0.009 0.924 0.000 
Price expectation 1 2.231 0.136 0.006 
Purchase intent 1 0.567 0.452 0.002 
Judgment/intent order Price fairness 1 0.188 0.665 0.001 
Price magnitude 1 0.060 0.807 0.000 
Price expectation 1 11.300 0.001 0.031 
Purchase intent 1 1.402 0.237 0.004 
Interaction Effects      
Judgment environment  
x Locus of control 
Price fairness 1 30.808 0.052 0.011 
Price magnitude 1 40.178 0.042 0.012 
Price expectation 1 30.131 0.078 0.009 
Purchase intent 1 0.482 0.488 0.001 
Judgment environment   
x Judgment/intent order 
Price fairness 1 0.106 0.744 0.000 
Price magnitude 1 0.215 0.643 0.001 
Price expectation 1 10.935 0.165 0.005 
Purchase intent 1 0.086 0.769 0.000 
Locus of control  
x Judgment/intent order 
Price fairness 1 0.340 0.560 0.001 
Price magnitude 1 20.128 0.145 0.006 
Price expectation 1 0.148 0.700 0.000 
Purchase intent 1 0.051 0.822 0.000 
Judgment environment   
x Locus of control  
x Judgment/intent order 
Price fairness 1 0.832 0.362 0.002 
Price magnitude 1 20.333 0.128 0.006 
Price expectation 1 0.006 0.940 0.000 
Purchase intent 1 10.080 0.299 0.003 
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Table A.2.6 Results from repeated measures ANOVA 
Price x 
 Judgment environment 
 
 
Price fairness 2 15.188 0.000 0.041 
Price magnitude 2 6.891 0.001 0.019 
Price expectation 2 8.952 0.000 0.024 
Purchase intent 2 9.483 0.000 0.026 
Price  x Locus of control 
 
Price fairness 2 0.085 0.918 0.000 
Price magnitude 2 0.967 0.381 0.003 
Price expectation 2 1.112 0.329 0.003 
Purchase intent 2 1.371 0.254 0.004 
Price 
x Judgment/intent order 
 
Price fairness 2 1.898 0.151 0.005 
Price magnitude 2 0.206 0.814 0.001 
Price expectation 2 1.741 0.176 0.005 
Purchase intent 2 1.170 0.311 0.003 
 Price 
x Locus of control  
x Judgment environment 
Price fairness 2 0.098 0.907 0.000 
Price magnitude 2 1.142 0.320 0.003 
Price expectation 2 1.543 0.214 0.004 
Purchase intent 2 2.635 0.072 0.007 
Price 
x judgment environment 
x Judgment/intent order 
Price fairness 2 0.864 0.422 0.002 
Price magnitude 2 0.692 0.501 0.002 
Price expectation 2 4.113 0.017 0.011 
Purchase intent 2 1.895 0.151 0.005 
Price 
x Locus of control  
x Judgment/intent order 
Price fairness 2 1.687 0.186 0.005 
Price magnitude 2 0.092 0.912 0.000 
Price expectation 2 1.437 0.238 0.004 
Purchase intent 2 1.063 0.346 0.003 
Price 
x Judgment environment 
x Judgment/intent order 
x Locus of control 
Price fairness 2 0.218 0.804 0.000 
Price magnitude 2 0.118 0.889 0.001 
Price expectation 2 0.027 0.973 0.000 
Purchase intent 2 0.451 0.637 0.001 
Error df. 357      
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Table A.2.7 Reliability of price judgment items and overall scales  
   Scale 
Alpha 
Gain in alpha 
if item is 
deleted 
Squared 
multiple 
correlation 
Item to total 
correlations 
Composite 
reliability 
of scale 
AVE 
Price fairness items 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 0.95 
0.94 
0.95 
0.95 
0.80 
0.82 
0.81 
0.81 
0.89 
0.91 
0.90 
0.90 
  
Price fairness scale  0.958    0.958 0.853 
Price magnitude items 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 0.97 
0.97 
0.97 
0.97 
0.91 
0.91 
0.91 
0.89 
0.95 
0.95 
0.95 
0.94 
  
Price magnitude scale  0.980    0.980 0.926 
Price expectation items 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 0.91 
0.92 
0.92 
0.92 
0.76 
0.72 
0.73 
0.72 
0.86 
0.84 
0.85 
0.84 
  
Price expectation scale  0.935    0.935 0.783 
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Table A.3.2 List of scale items used in this study 
 
 1                 2               3              4              5              6             7             8            9  
Very                                                                                                                    Very 
Price 
fairness  
unfair 
 unreasonable 
 unsatisfactory 
 disagreeable 
 inapproprite 
 intolerable 
 unjust 
unacceptable 
fair 
 reasonable 
 satisfactory 
 agreeable 
 approprite 
 tolerable 
 just 
acceptable 
Price 
magnitude 
high 
large 
expensive 
big 
significant 
huge 
extreme 
steep 
low 
small 
inexpensive 
little 
insignificant 
tiny 
inextreme 
low-level 
Price 
expectation 
Much more than 
 
expected 
predicted 
typical 
common 
normal 
anticipated 
ordinary 
standard 
Much less than  
 
expected 
predicted 
typical 
common 
normal 
anticipated 
ordinary 
standard 
Purchase 
intent 
 
 
The likelihood that I would purchase the 
car polish at the given price is 
 
The probability that I would consider 
buying the car polish at the given price is 
 
My willingness to buy the digital card 
reader at the given price is 
 
Very               Neither low               very  
low                     nor high                 high 
1       2      3      4      5      6    7     8     9 
 
Anger Ziggy Electronics is now offering the 
digital card reader at a price of  
[focal price] 
The price offered by Ziggy electronics 
makes me feel  
 
The price offered by Ziggy electronics 
makes me feel  
 
The price offered by Ziggy electronics 
makes me feel  
 
 
1       2      3      4      5      6    7     8     9 
very                                            not at all 
frustrated                                  frustrated 
 
very                                            not at all 
angry                                              angry 
 
very                                            not at all 
irritated                                       irritated 
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Table A.3.3 Scale refinement through iterative reliability analysis  
Iterations  Scale   Items 
dropped 
 Reasons/ Criteria for eliminating items Scale 
reliability 
after deletion 
Final scale 
items 
retained 
1 Price 
fairness  
5th  Gain in alpha, lowest squared multiple 
correlations, lowest item-total correlations, 
lowest inter-item correlations 
0.9880.989  
2 Price 
fairness 
4th, 7th  Lowest squared multiple correlations, lowest 
item-total correlations, lowest inter-item 
correlations 
0.9890.989  
3 Price 
fairness 
6th  Low squared multiple correlations, lowest 
item-total correlations 
0.9890.987 1,2,3,8 
1 Price 
magnitude 
5th  gain in alpha if item deleted, low squared 
multiple correlations, lowest item-total 
correlations, low inter-item correlations,  
0.984 0.988  
2 Price 
magnitude 
7th  gain in alpha if item deleted, lowest squared 
multiple correlations, lowest item-total 
correlations, lowest inter-item correlations,  
0.9880.989  
3 Price 
magnitude 
8th , 3rd    lowest squared multiple correlations, lowest 
item-total correlations, low inter-item 
correlations, 
0.9890.988 1,2,4,6 
1 Price 
expectation 
7th, 8th Improves scale alpha if items deleted,  lowest 
squared multiple correlations and lowest item-
total correlations, lowest inter-item 
correlations, 
0.9800.990  
2 Price 
expectation 
4th lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations,  
0.9890.989  
3 Price 
expectation 
5th  lowest squared multiple correlations and 
lowest item-total correlations, low inter-item 
correlations, 
0.9890.989 1,2,3,6 
 
Table A.3.4 Rotated factor loadings (component matrix) 
Low focal price 
($8.99) 
scale 
items 
Factors 
     1              2           3         4            5  
(at low focal price) 
Price fairness 1 0.089 0.053 0.158 0.077 0.697 
 2 0.055 0.152 0.177 0.200 0.634 
 3 0.204 0.286 0.057 0.124 0.740 
 4 0.171 0.077 0.088 0.075 0.733 
Price magnitude 1 0.698 0.083 0.290 0.280 0.249 
 2 0.796 0.178 0.256 0.192 0.116 
 3 0.840 0.182 0.267 0.149 0.079 
 4 0.892 0.137 0.167 0.088 0.092 
Price expectation 1 0.234 0.015 0.771 0.028 0.218 
 2 0.227 0.180 0.757 0.133 0.210 
 3 0.217 0.144 0.755 0.244 0.160 
 4 0.187 0.185 0.653 0.184 0.008 
Purchase intent 1 0.171 0.878 0.155 0.130 0.202 
 2 0.176 0.900 0.122 0.111 0.151 
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Table A.3.4 Rotated factor loadings (contd.) 
 3 0.132 0.899 0.175 0.100 0.169 
Anger 1 0.131 0.121 0.162 0.767 0.179 
 2 0.176 0.099 0.161 0.863 0.162 
 3 0.199 0.101 0.148 0.850 0.102 
Mid focal price 
($21.99) 
scale 
items 
     1              2            3           4            5  
(at mid focal price) 
Price fairness 1 0.062 0.790 0.109 0.145 0.103 
 2 0.038 0.841 0.103 0.044 0.194 
 3 0.087 0.750 0.321 0.170 -0.053 
 4 0.210 0.792 0.246 0.083 -0.072 
Price magnitude 1 0.807 0.143 0.141 0.188 0.120 
 2 0.826 0.031 0.156 0.203 0.146 
 3 0.825 0.115 0.100 0.014 0.157 
 4 0.822 0.087 0.120 0.274 0.086 
Price expectation 1 0.161 0.215 0.074 -0.039 0.786 
 2 0.159 0.126 0.066 0.141 0.817 
 3 0.153 0.002 -0.030 0.077 0.794 
 4 -0.011 -0.170 0.229 0.229 0.600 
Purchase intent 1 0.135 0.269 0.897 0.071 0.076 
 2 0.147 0.231 0.883 0.153 0.153 
 3 0.234 0.224 0.886 0.124 0.078 
Anger 1 0.197 0.166 0.033 0.847 0.152 
 2 0.220 0.166 0.153 0.880 0.075 
 3 0.189 0.083 0.150 0.893 0.135 
High focal price 
($32.99) 
scale 
items 
       1              2             3           4            5  
(at high focal price) 
Price fairness 1 0.210 0.796 0.104 0.114 0.194 
 2 0.199 0.829 0.057 0.064 0.111 
 3 0.236 0.796 0.038 0.082 0.222 
 4 0.151 0.706 0.263 0.018 0.295 
Price magnitude 1 0.759 0.240 0.215 0.204 0.170 
 2 0.859 0.208 0.203 0.205 0.122 
 3 0.774 0.253 0.124 0.186 0.106 
 4 0.746 0.175 0.242 0.104 0.179 
Price expectation 1 0.253 0.078 0.814 0.124 0.089 
 2 0.170 0.065 0.752 0.081 0.120 
 3 0.060 0.146 0.755 0.058 0.021 
 4 0.184 0.070 0.825 0.144 0.165 
Purchase intent 1 0.203 0.285 0.127 0.064 0.815 
 2 0.154 0.204 0.176 0.185 0.868 
 3 0.132 0.243 0.086 0.140 0.875 
Anger 1 0.168 0.074 0.110 0.848 0.151 
 2 0.176 0.047 0.149 0.894 0.144 
 3 0.191 0.112 0.110 0.885 0.052 
 
146 
 
Table: A.3.5 Fit statistics of models in the iterated stages 
 Chi-
square 
df CMIN
/df 
NFI CFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
Model1: Initial  
(without Anger in the model) 
269.423 95 2.836 0.987 0.991 0.051 383.423 386.195 
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger 
path added 
494.841 142 3.485 0.979 0.985 0.059 628.841 632.691 
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger,  
AngerPL  path added 
492.758 141 3.495 0.979 0.985 0.059 628.758 632.666 
PL, Anger in the model and PMAnger
path added 
412.338 142 2.904 0.982 0.988 0.052 546.338 550.189 
PL, Anger in the model and 
PMAnger,  AngerPL  path added 
406.838 141 2.885 0.983 0.989 0.051 542.838 546.746 
PL, Anger in the model and PEAnger 
path added 
485.766 142 3.421 0.979 0.985 0.058 619.766 623.616 
PL, Anger in the model and PEAnger, 
AngerPL  path added 
480.604 141 3.409 0.979 0.985 0.058 616.604 620.512 
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger, 
PMAnger, PEAnger path added 
388.284 140 2.773 0.983 0.989 0.050 526.284 530.250 
PL, Anger in the model and PFAnger, 
PMAnger, PEAnger and 
AngerPL path added 
384.063 139 2.763 0.984 0.989 0.050 524.063 528.086 
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Table A.3.6 Repeated measures ANOVA results for between and within subject effects 
Source Measure df F p Effect Size 
Between subject effect:      
Intercept PF (1,231) 10207.967 0.000 0.978 
 PM (1,231) 11346.918 0.000 0.980 
 PE (1,231) 8330.320 0.000 0.973 
 PL (1,231) 3695.483 0.000 0.941 
 Anger (1,231) 2643.498 0.000 0.966 
processing fluency PF (1,231) 0.067 0.796 0.000 
 PM (1,231) 0.940 0.333 0.004 
 PE (1,231) 0.078 0.781 0.000 
 PL (1,231) 0.392 0.532 0.002 
 Anger (1,231) 0.192 0.661 0.001 
judgment environment PF (1,231) 0.279 0.598 0.001 
 PM (1,231) 0.001 0.969 0.000 
 PE (1,231) 1.787 0.183 0.008 
 PL (1,231) 1.694 0.194 0.007 
 Anger (1,231) 6.278 0.013 0.026 
mood PF (1,231) 3.138 0.078 0.013 
 PM (1,231) 1.362 0.244 0.006 
 PE (1,231) 0.611 0.435 0.003 
 PL (1,231) 0.099 0.753 0.000 
 Anger (1,231) 0.307 0.580 0.001 
processing fluency * judgment environment PF (1,231) 16.078 0.000 0.065 
 PM (1,231) 2.329 0.128 0.010 
 PE (1,231) 0.032 0.859 0.000 
 PL (1,231) 5.872 0.016 0.025 
 Anger (1,231) 4.499 0.035 0.019 
processing fluency * mood PF (1,231) 2.917 0.089 0.012 
 PM (1,231) 0.434 0.510 0.002 
 PE (1,231) 0.193 0.661 0.001 
 PL (1,231) 1.049 0.307 0.005 
 Anger (1,231) 1.763 0.186 0.008 
judgment environment * mood PF (1,231) 10.917 0.001 0.045 
 PM (1,231) 1.443 0.231 0.006 
 PE (1,231) 0.778 0.379 0.003 
 PL (1,231) 5.571 0.019 0.024 
 Anger (1,231) 0.354 0.552 0.002 
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Table A.3.6 Repeated measures ANOVA results for between and within subject effects 
(contd.) 
processing fluency * judgment environment * 
mood 
PF (1,231) 2.461 0.118 0.011 
 PM (1,231) 3.414 0.066 0.015 
 PE (1,231) 0.676 0.412 0.003 
 PL (1,231) 0.211 0.646 0.001 
 Anger (1,231) 2.257 0.134 0.010 
Within subject effect      
price PF (2,462) 1424.817 0.000 0.860 
PM (2,462) 2432.326 0.000 0.913 
PE (2,462) 1521.271 0.000 0.868 
PL (2,462) 984.638 0.000 0.810 
ang (2,462) 802.689 0.000 0.777 
price * processing fluency PF (2,462) 0.639 0.528 0.003 
PM (2,462) 0.456 0.620 0.002 
PE (2,462) 0.275 0.741 0.001 
PL (2,462) 0.196 0.822 0.001 
ang (2,462) 4.188 0.017 0.018 
price * judgment environment PF (2,462) 3.001 0.051 0.013 
 PM (2,462) 1.827 0.165 0.008 
PE (2,462) 6.887 0.002 0.029 
PL (2,462) 5.071 0.007 0.021 
ang (2,462) 5.722 0.004 0.024 
price * mood PF (2,462) 1.275 0.281 0.005 
PM (2,462) 6.088 0.003 0.026 
PE (2,462) 1.975 0.144 0.008 
PL (2,462) 3.507 0.031 0.015 
ang (2,462) 8.721 0.000 0.036 
price * processing fluency* judgment 
environment 
PF (2,462) 0.673 0.510 0.003 
PM (2,462) 1.372 0.254 0.006 
PE (2,462) 0.403 0.651 0.002 
PL (2,462) 2.546 0.079 0.011 
ang (2,462) 0.143 0.861 0.001 
price * processing fluency * mood PF (2,462) 2.390 0.093 0.010 
PM (2,462) 3.135 0.048 0.013 
PE (2,462) 0.125 0.866 0.001 
PL (2,462) 1.652 0.193 0.007 
ang (2,462) 1.599 0.204 0.007 
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Table A.3.6 Repeated measures ANOVA results for between and within subject effects 
(contd.) 
price * judgment environment *  mood PF (2,462) 4.537 0.011 0.019 
PM (2,462) 5.978 0.003 0.025 
PE (2,462) 3.525 0.034 0.015 
PL (2,462) 4.575 0.011 0.019 
anger (2,462) 2.835 0.061 0.012 
price * processing fluency * judgment 
environment * mood 
PF (2,462) 0.725 0.485 0.003 
PM (2,462) 4.348 0.016 0.018 
PE (2,462) 1.540 0.217 0.007 
PL (2,462) 1.278 0.280 0.006 
anger (2,462) 2.452 0.089 0.011 
 
Table A.3.7 (a) Univariate contrasts –focal price, mood, judgment environment on price magnitude 
 
 
 
Judgment environment  
 
Mood  
Focal prices 
Low Mid High 
Price magnitude Memory-based context positive 8.317 4.942 1.986 
  negative 8.045 4.850 1.742 
 t-value (p-value)  1.685 
(0.095) 
0.454 
(0.650) 
1.285 
(0.201) 
 Stimulus-based context positive 8.342 4.847 1.617 
  negative 7.750 4.933 2.317 
 t-value (p-value)  2.482 
(0.015) 
-0.510 
(0.611) 
-3.644 
(0.000) 
Table A.3.7 (b) Univariate contrasts –focal price, mood, judgment environment on price expectation 
 
 
 
Judgment environment  
 
Mood  
Focal prices 
Low Mid High 
Price expectation Memory-based context positive 7.901 5.098 2.758 
  negative 7.911 5.192 2.646 
 t-value (p-value)  -0.050 
(0.960) 
-0.396 
(0.693) 
0.447 
(0.656) 
 Stimulus-based context positive 8.238 5.022 1.824 
  negative 8.017 5.089 2.504 
 t-value (p-value)  0.932 
(0.353) 
-0.441 
(0.660) 
-3.152 
(0.002) 
 
Table A.3.8 Univariate contrasts – processing fluency on price magnitude 
 
 
 
Processing fluency  
Focal prices 
Low Mid High 
Price magnitude High processing fluency 1.817 5.084 8.025 
 Low processing fluency 1.950 5.135 8.171 
 t-value (p-value) -0.908
(0.365)
-0.389
 (0.698)
-1.061 
(0.290) 
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Table: A.3.9 Fit statistics of SEM models- invariance testing 
 Chi-square df CMIN
/df 
NFI CFI RMSEA AIC BCC 
Model: unconstrained 2280.371 1112 2.051 0.915 0.954 0.038 3400.371 3751.48 
Model: measurement invariance-all 
factor loading constrained 
2389.325 1203 1.986 0.910 0.953 0.037 3327.325 3621.38 
Model: structural invariance- factor 
covariance constrained 
2429.353 1224 1.985 0.909 0.952 0.037 3325.353 3606.24 
 
Table: A. 3.10 (a)  Group invariance testing results (compared to unconstrained model) 
 Model DF CMIN P NFI CFI 
Factor loadings constrained- 
Measurement invariance 
91 108.954 0.097 0.004 0.001 
Factor covariance constrained- 
Structural invariance 
7 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Measurement and structural invariance  98 108.954 0.211 0.004 0.001 
  
Table: A.3.10 (b)  Model fits of constrained and unconstrained model 
Model CMIN DF P 
CMIN/ 
DF 
NFI CFI 
Unconstrained 2280.371 1112 0.000 2.051 0.915 0.954 
Factor loadings constrained- 
Measurement invariance 
2389.325 1203 0.000 1.986 0.910 0.953 
Factor covariance constrained- 
Structural invariance 
2280.371 1119 0.000 2.038 
0.915 0.954 
Measurement and structural invariance  2389.325 1210 0.000 1.975 0.910 0.953 
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Appendix Figures 
Figure A.2.1 Path model of price judgment 
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Figure A.3.1 Path model of Consumers' price evaluation 
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